When discussing this section, it is important to note that several prominent members of the royal family possess influential positions in the different state institutions. Alongside the members of the royal family, the Wahhabi establishment have enjoyed a close link to the state and the royal family due to the political structure of Saudi Arabia.
The foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, Saʿud al-Faisal is one of the longest-serving foreign ministers in the world as he became the head of the Ministry in 1975. Saʿud al-Faisal was, however, replaced by Adel al-Jubeir on April 29, 2015. Christopher Hill (2003: 62) states, “Foreign ministers are vulnerable for removal in the early phases of their tenure, […], but the longer they survive the more vital their experience and contacts become.” The kingdom consolidated its important international position after the oil embargo towards Western interests in 1973, implying that Saʿud al-Faisal had been the head of the Ministry throughout the whole period. The Saudi Foreign Minister has experienced the dynamics of the region,
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and international affairs for the last forty years, thus providing him a significant position in Saudi foreign politics and relations with other states.
King Abdullah created the National Security Council (SNC) as an organisational mechanism in 2005 to handle security related issues. The NSC was, however, dissolved on January 29, 2015, when King Salman ascended the throne. Instead, Salman implemented a similar mechanism - Council for Political and Security Affairs. The NSC importance as a decision- making organisation is, therefore, only relevant for the thesis defined period of 2011-2014. Sager Abdulaziz (2005, November 11) in Arab News states, “Although the executive leadership makes the final decisions that determine state policy, this only takes place following consultation with appropriate institutions. By providing options and solutions to the executive leadership in order to enable them to adopt the best option, these institutions participate in the decision-making process. In this respect, the work of the National Security Council secretariat is considered vital.” Abdulrhman A. Hussein (2012: 51) argues the council was created in response to major geopolitical developments, while Sager Abdulaziz (2005) suggests that the creation took place in the wake of domestic developments as well.
The council had responsibility for the creation of Saudi Arabia’s national security, intelligence, and foreign policy strategies. In addition, the council had the power to declare war and investigate the country’s security agencies. However, the council’s power was, however, limited by the King, as Article 62 of the Basic Law states, “If an imminent danger is threatening the safety of the Kingdom, the integrity of its territories or the security and interests of its people, or is impeding the functions of official organizations, the King may take urgent measures to deal with such a danger. When he considers that these measures should continue, necessary arrangements shall be made in accordance with the Law,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia The Shura Council. Laws and Regulations > The Basic Law Of Government > Chapter 6 (1992, March 1). Stratfor Global Intelligence (2005) states, “Saudi Arabia has created an enhanced National Security Council that will enjoy wide- ranging powers related to domestic and foreign policy.” Furthermore, Stratfor Global Intelligence (2005) observes that what makes NSC interesting is the council’s composition. In 2005, the NSC consisted of King Abdullah as Chairman, Crown Prince Sultan as deputy chairman, and the former Saudi Ambassador to the United State Prince Bandar bin Sultan as the secretary-general of NSC. In addition, other members of the council included Saudi National Guard Deputy Commander Badr bin Abdel Aziz, Interior Minister Nayef, Foreign
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Affairs Minister Saʿud al-Faisal and the Chief of the General Intelligence Department Nawaf bin Abdel-Aziz.
The composition of the NSC in September 2014 included King Abdullah as Chairman, Crown Prince Salman as Deputy Chairman of the Council, Saʿud bin Faisal, Bandar bin Sultan, who served as the Secretary General, Khalid bin Sultan, who serves as the General Intelligence President, Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah, who serves as the National Guard Minister, and Mohammed bin Nayef, who served as the Minister of Interior. Given the prominent royal family members included, the NSC is considered to have been an important stakeholder in the decision-making process of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. This assumption is also supported by Stratfor Global Intelligence (2005) who noted that the council consist of figures in the top layer of the royal family, which, in return, suggests the royal family as being in charge of the major foreign policy decisions.
Anthony H. Cordesman (1997: 21) states that, “The monarchy remains the key source of power in the Saudi Arabian government.” Moreover, Cordesman (1997) suggests that there is a lack of a formal constitution and that elections and political parties are, however, prohibited in the Kingdom. The Saudi Basic Law of Government was established in 1992, but, as Cordesman asserts, that the King’s power is, however, limited by the need for support by the religious leaders. The support from the religious establishment may be explained by the strong Islamic narratives that took place when Saudi Arabia was founded, in addition to the mutually dependent political alliance between the Wahhabi establishment and the King that still exists. In order to ensure the governance as an absolute monarchy, the Saudi religious establishment has issued a fatwā, prohibiting political parties. The fatwā states, “It is not permissible for Muslims to divide into separate religious groups and parties, with members cursing and fighting each other. Allah not only forbids such factionalism, but censures those who introduce or follow them and threatens them with grievous punishment. Both Allah and His Messenger (peace be upon him) renounced this practice,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Portal of the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta`(n.d).
The role of the Wahhabi establishment in the decision-making process is, however, debated. Gregory F. Gause III (2002: 205) suggests that there exists an ongoing discourse among observers of Saudi foreign policy in relation to the role of the religious establishment in the decision-making process. He argues that some observers suggest that the religious
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establishment has considerable power to claim veto in cases, while others perceive its power is greatly attenuated from previous times. Gause himself believes that the religious establishment has restricted power in foreign policy decision-making. The religious establishment has often been used as a tool for the royal family, whereby senior clerics usually issue fatwās following the King’s political stance. There are several examples where the royal family uses the religious establishment and prominent clerics to validate and approve decisions on both domestic and foreign policy, as the case studies will show. A prime historical example of how the royal family has used the religious establishment for political validation, is as Gregory F. Gause III (2002: 205) observes, when King Fahd ordered the Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz to justify the request for US troops to assist the kingdom in 1991, and of the hostilities against Iraq the same year.
In contrast, Mai Yamani (2008: 146) states that, “Meanwhile, the Wahhabi clerics are continually indulged as the kingdom’s de facto rulers.” Mai Yamani (2008: 146) further says, “The Wahhabi establishment controls not just the juridical system, but also the Council of Senior Ulama; the General Committee for Issuing Fatwas, Da’wa, and Irshad; the Ministry of Islamic Affairs; the Supreme Headquarters for the Council for International Supervision of Mosques; and the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prohibition of Vice.” Several of these agencies have an international orientation and provides the religious establishment an important function, as the Saudi legitimate much of its foreign policy through Islamic terms. Moreover, the Wahhabi establishment controls all religious education, the Ministry of Hajj, and endorses great influence in the Ministry of Finance through the control of Zakat. In addition, Article 8 in the Basic Law states, “Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, shura (consultation) and equality according to Islamic Sharia,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia The Shura Council. Laws and Regulations > The Basic Law Of Government > Chapter 2 (1992, March 1). Article 8 in the Basic Law of Gowenment suggests that the religious establishment enjoys considerable power at the domestic level, but I will argue that the Wahhabi clerics also have a direct impact on the external sphere as well. The case of the foreign troops stationed in the kingdom during the second Gulf War suggests that the royal family needs to gain political validation.
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