El éxtasis deportivo

In the UK, the proliferation of terms associated with crisis is a challenge. New policy initiatives generate new terms that may survive or be superseded, often complicated by regional and local adoption and uneven promulgation.

II. CRISIS: CONCEPTS, TYPOLOGIES, SYNONYMS, and POLICIES

30 Incidents are initially dealt with at the lowest level by the appropriate organisation but when this proves insufficient a Major Incident is declared, defined as “an event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency” (JESIP 2016:8). A multi-agency strategic ‘GOLD’ group is convened for major events, often with political links.

The legislation (Civil Contingencies Act 2004) refers only to an emergency however the accompanying non-statutory guidance is more creative. In their guidance, the Cabinet Office (2005/2010) considered local emergencies as synonymous with major incidents but then described levels of severe emergency that would require activation of the government crisis management facility COBR, so named because it evolved from the very modest Cabinet Office Briefing Room A. Severe emergencies may be significant, serious, or catastrophic, the latter necessitating the Prime Minister’s personal attention.

A new term disruptive challenge (Cabinet Office 2010) was extended to disruptive incident by the London Resilience Partnership (2012) to describe such events as power outages and industrial action. The London Strategic Emergency Plan uses the above terms but defines a catastrophic incident as where “the Designated Minister is of the opinion that it [the incident] will require a specific or exceptional response” (London Resilience 2010). The reconstituted London Resilience Partnership, represents a wide range of power, transport, water and other utilities and it is the managers and technical experts of these second-tier non-emergency services that may have an increasingly important part to play in future contingencies.

In contrast to the above the current UK doctrine is quite clear about the two phases of an emergency that is crisis management and consequence management, defining crisis management as “the phase of the response that attempts to prevent or avert an imminent emergency” and listing examples such as hostage negotiation, evacuation, and informing the public. It is noted that the duration of the crisis management phase can vary from a few hours or a few days in the case of an accident of explosion, or a few weeks or even months following an outbreak of a human or animal disease, until the situation is brought under control (Cabinet Office 2010 para 1.5). The consequence management phase covers the restoration of services and infrastructure, and dealing with hazardous waste (ibid). The issue of lack of clarity is important because the events in question are life threatening, even involving mass casualties, as well as threatening the long-term stability of government and the economy.

II. CRISIS: CONCEPTS, TYPOLOGIES, SYNONYMS, and POLICIES

31 3.5. Emergencies and emergency powers

The UK provides a useful example in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 of the difference between emergency, and other synonyms, and crisis. An emergency is defined but no powers to manage an emergency are given, only to plan. Part II of the Act is quite different and deals with emergency powers, powers that are of “awesome scope”

according to Walker and Broderick (2006: 153). These powers which are time limited would be invoked ideally by an Order in Council or, to avoid serious delay, by a senior Minister. Whilst subject to subsequent parliamentary scrutiny the scope of the potential regulations is wide and can be further extended by resort to the Royal Prerogative (Maer & Gay 2009; UK Ministry of Justice 2009; Blick 2014). Walker &

Broderick (2006) conclude that the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 is “the most powerful and extensive peacetime legislation ever enacted ... Indeed, it contains within it the tools for dismantling civil society” (p188).

There is a potential paradox between the concerns of Gross and Ni Aolain (2006) who warn “if a time of crisis permits stepping outside the legal system, no limits – and certainly no legal limits – can be set on how far such deviations would go and how wide in scope they would be” (p147) and the suggestion by Borodzicz (2004; 2008) that successful crisis leadership is almost synonymous with rule breaking.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1950) acknowledges the need to accommodate States in times of crisis by the derogation in Article 15. An emergency justifying derogation had to be “a situation of exceptional and imminent danger or crisis affecting the general public, as distinct from particular groups [e.g. political party, corporation] and constituting a threat to the organised life of the community …”. In other words, this is a curb on the authorities who might for instance declare a state of emergency because of legitimate protests or trade union gatherings (Gross & Ni Aolain 2006:249).

This brings us to Article 2 - Right to Life, that asserts “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court …” (ECHR 1950:2.2). It is a positive obligation (Akandji-Kombe 2006) but with exceptions that might be applicable in a crisis, especially if emergency powers are used, such as self-defence, riot, and insurrection (ECHR 1950: 2.2).

II. CRISIS: CONCEPTS, TYPOLOGIES, SYNONYMS, and POLICIES

32 Human rights were the driving force behind the establishment of a worldwide early warning system (UN Secretary-General 2005) consistent with the national and international duties to inform the public of risks e.g. Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Seveso Directive (EC 1982; 2012), Aarhus Convention (UN 1998), and REACH (ECHA 2010).