301. Discuss the Right of Suffrage, and its substantive and procedural requirements.
Held: In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the democratic institutions our people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage x x x is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
“SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE.”
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration.
Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the “Voter‟s Registration Act of 1996.”
(Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, 355 SCRA 318, Mar. 26, 2001, En Banc [Buena])
302. Discuss the reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy. May the conduct of exit polls transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot to justify its prohibition?
Held: The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified.
Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters‟
verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people. (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
133486, Jan. 28, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban])
303. Discuss the meaning and purpose of residency requirement in Election Law.
Held: 1. The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement were explained recently in our decision in Aquino v. Comelec (248 SCRA 400, 420-421 [1995]), as follows:
X x x [T]he place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego v. Vera is “to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community” from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.
(Marcita Mamba Perez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, Oct. 28, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza]) 2. The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers‟ qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for.
Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has registered as voter in the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed “a stranger or newcomer” when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be liberally construed to give effect to the popular mandate. (Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban])
3. Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a “stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community.” Such provision is aimed at excluding outsiders “from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.” Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is “best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.” (Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban]) 304. Does the fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district proof that he is not domiciled in another district?
Held: The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), this Court held that the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence. (Marcita Mamba Perez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, Oct. 28, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza])
305. Discuss the nature of Voter‟s Registration.
Held: Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, x x x registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter‟s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. (Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, 355 SCRA 318, Mar. 26, 2001, En Banc [Buena])
306. What is the Lone Candidate Law? What are its salient provisions?
Answer: The Lone Candidate Law is Republic Act No. 8295, enacted on June 6, 1997. Section 2 thereof provides that “Upon the expiration of the deadline for the filing of the certificate of candidacy in a
special election called to fill a vacancy in an elective position other than for President and Vice-President, when there is only one (1) qualified candidate for such position, the lone candidate shall be proclaimed elected to the position by proper proclaiming body of the Commission on Elections without holding the special election upon certification by the Commission on Elections that he is the only candidate for the office and is thereby deemed elected.”
Section 3 thereof provides that “the lone candidate so proclaimed shall assume office not earlier than the scheduled election day, in the absence of any lawful ground to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy in order to prevent such proclamation, as provided for under Sections 69 and 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 also known as the Omnibus Election Code.”
307. Who are disqualified to run in a special election under the Lone Candidate Law?
Answer: Section 4 of the Lone Candidate Law provides that “In addition to the disqualifications mentioned in Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, whenever the evidence of guilt is strong, the following persons are disqualified to run in a special election called to fill the vacancy in an elective office, to wit:
a) Any elective official who has resigned from his office by accepting an appointive office or for whatever reason which he previously occupied but has caused to become vacant due to his resignation;
and
b) Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens, harasses, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or persons aspiring to become a candidate or that of the immediate member of his family, his honor or property that is meant to eliminate all other potential candidate.”
308. What is the purpose of the law in requiring the filing of certificate of candidacy and in fixing the time limit therefor?
Held: The evident purpose of the law in requiring the filing of certificate of candidacy and in fixing the time limit therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the candidates among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. (Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999)
309. May a disqualified candidate and whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course and/or canceled by the Comelec be validly substituted?
Held: Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. (Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, en Banc [Melo])
310. Should the votes cast for the substituted candidate be considered votes for the substitute candidate?
Answer: Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act, provides in Section 12 thereof: “In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided, however, That if the substitute candidate is of the same family name, this provision shall not apply.”
311. What is the effect of the filing of certificate of candidacy by elective officials?
Answer: COMELEC Resolution No. 3636, promulgated March 1, 2001, implementing the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) provides in Section 26 thereof: “any elective official, whether national or local, who has filed a certificate of candidacy for the same or any other office shall not be considered resigned from his office.”
Note that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 which modified said Section 67, were expressly repealed and rendered ineffective, respectively, by Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of The Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006).
312. What kind of “material misrepresentation” is contemplated by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code as a ground for disqualification of a candidate? Does it include the use of surname?
Held: Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the (Omnibus Election) Code refers to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave – to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantial political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.
[A]side from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a
“deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one‟s qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one‟s identity, is not within the scope of the provision. (Victorino Salcedo II v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 135886, Aug. 16, 1999, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])
313. Who has authority to declare failure of elections and the calling of special election? What are the three instances where a failure of election may be declared?
Held: The COMELEC‟s authority to declare failure of elections is provided in our election laws. Section 4 of RA 7166 provides that the Comelec sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special election as provided in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. X x x
There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely, (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. In these instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. This is obvious in the first two scenarios, where the election was not held and where the election was suspended. As to the third scenario, where the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to the consequence of failure to elect, it must x x x, be interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner. (Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 701, July 31, 2000, En Banc [Quisumbing])
314. What are the two conditions that must concur before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a afailure of election?
Held: Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election two conditions must concur, namely: (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election. Note that the cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
Thus, in Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC (336 SCRA 701, July 31, 2000, En Banc [Quisumbing]), the SC held:
“We have painstakingly examined the petition filed by petitioner Banaga before the Comelec. But we found that petitioner did not allege at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Neither did he aver that although there was voting, nobody was elected. On the contrary, he conceded that an election took place for the office of vice-mayor of Paranaque City, and that private respondent was, in fact, proclaimed elected to that post. While petitioner contends that the election was tainted with widespread anomalies, it must be noted that to warrant a declaration of failure of election the commission of fraud must be such that it prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation and transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. These essential facts ought to have been alleged clearly by the petitioner below, but he did not.”
315. Cite instances when Comelec may or may not validly declare failure of elections.
Held: In Mitmug v. COMELEC (230 SCRA 54 [1994]), petitioner instituted with the COMELEC an action to declare failure of election in forty-nine precincts where less than a quarter of the electorate were able to cast their votes. He also lodged an election protest with the Regional Trial Court disputing the result of the election in all precincts in his municipality. The Comelec denied motu proprio and without due notice and hearing the petition to declare failure of election despite petitioner‟s argument that he has meritorious grounds in support thereto, that is, massive disenfranchisement of voters due to terrorism.
Held: In Mitmug v. COMELEC (230 SCRA 54 [1994]), petitioner instituted with the COMELEC an action to declare failure of election in forty-nine precincts where less than a quarter of the electorate were able to cast their votes. He also lodged an election protest with the Regional Trial Court disputing the result of the election in all precincts in his municipality. The Comelec denied motu proprio and without due notice and hearing the petition to declare failure of election despite petitioner‟s argument that he has meritorious grounds in support thereto, that is, massive disenfranchisement of voters due to terrorism.