One of the things that makes the concept of UN intelligence an interesting object to explore is the restrictions imposed on it, primarily by the oxymoron of transparency and confidentiality. The multinational nature of the organization limits how the organization can gather, analyze and disseminate information within a mission. Furthermore, the UN Charter, particularly Article 2(7) on domestic jurisdiction, and the principles of state sovereignty, forbid the UN from collecting and analyzing information on member states and violation of their
sovereignty. There is, however, an exception to this rule; chapter VII of the Charter, allowing multinational intervention. Broadly interpreted, this includes collection and analysis of relevant information with respect to threats to peace and security (Ekpe, 2007, p. 3).
Despite the obstacles deriving from the charter, the development of JOC and JMAC concepts were driven from the challenges experienced in the field. Military personnel realized
that military intelligence capabilities could not fulfil the entire information requirements of senior mission leaders. Major General Dallaire, the UN Force Commander in Rwanda during the civil war, pointed out that “it is this type of intelligence [operational] which is absolutely essential to the force commander in order to enable him to fulfil his mandate”. General Dallaire furthermore argued that “the UN's primary [intelligence] requirement is for operation[al] intelligence” (Johnston, 1997, p. 8).
As Military Advisor to the Secretary General, Maj Gen Cammaert pushed the idea of a JMAC “as a central location for information to be received, analyzed, evaluated, and appropriately disseminated” (Maceda, 2007, p. 52). In late 2003, the UN’s Handbook on Multidimensional
Peacekeeping Operations briefly described the JMAC’s purpose: “The JMAC is responsible
for the management (collection, coordination, analysis and distribution of information and reports) of the mission’s civil and military information in order to support the SRSG’s and force commander’s decision-making process” (United Nations, 2003, p. 69). The latter element is important for analyzing the performance and role of the JMAC. The UN started to form JMACs by 2005 with trial versions in ONUB (Burundi) and MONUC (Congo) (Maceda, 2007, p. 53). Because JMACs report to civilian SRSGs, civilian analysts lead the JMACs, although they may have a substantial military component. In 2006, a policy directing all missions to establish a JOC and JMAC was issued.
The JMAC concept has its origins in a military model of integration developed by NATO for the purposes of coordinating joint operations. It was developed in a policy process initially led by the military division of DPKO, with support from UNDSS and from advocates in the military and security departments. Early organization chart drafts for the JMAC envisioned a substantial and robust JMAC staffing with representatives from all relevant information and intelligence entities included in the mission (Maceda, 2007, p. 79). However, the DPKO policy directive covering JMAC depicts an integrated peacekeeping mission with liaison to the other parts of the UN, contrary to a model integrating the mission and UN funds, programs and agencies – which is the definition of ‘integrated’ in the Secretary-General’s note of guidance of 2006 (Shetler-Jones, 2008, p. 7).
Recognizing the nature of modern UN peace operations all UN missions shall have a capacity to undertake multi-source integrated analysis and predictive assessments. Multi-dimensional peace operations shall establish a JMAC to meet these analysis requirements. In other mission
46
settings, the Head of Mission (HoM), in consultation with UNHQ, will determine whether the establishment of a JMAC is necessary in relation to the mission’s mandate, capacities and operational environment (United Nations, 2015, p. 2).
According to the 2014 UN Force Headquarters Handbook, the JMAC generates medium to long-term integrated analytical products, providing the Head-of-Mission and Mission Leadership Team (MLT) with an in-depth “understanding of issues and trends, their implications and potential developments, as well as assessments of crosscutting issues and threats that may affect the mission’s mandate implementation”. Enhanced situational awareness and understanding supports the ability of senior mission leadership to identify, prevent, mitigate and respond to threats and opportunities to mandate implementation. The JMAC is not a decision-making body and does not replace existing management, command or decision-making structures at any level in the mission (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 15).
JMACs are entities established at Mission Headquarters level and are part of the Office of the HoM. Chief of Staff (CoS) and the Chief JMAC supports HoM in developing mission-wide instructions, setting out the mandate of the JMAC and its relationship to other mission components (United Nations, 2015, p. 3). JMACs must be able to “effectively incorporate political, civil affairs, protection, military, security, rule of law, DDR, electoral, gender, humanitarian, development, human rights, natural resources and any other mandate related perspectives in mission-wide information collection and analysis” (United Nations, 2015, p. 5).
The JMAC is normally co-located with the JOC. Whereas JOCs focus on day-to-day
situational awareness, the JMAC generates integrated analysis and predictive assessments. Following the JMAC Policy from 2015, the work of JMACs should focus on “strategic, operational and contingency planning and it contributes to overall crisis management through the provision of integrated threat assessments and other analytical products and services” (United Nations, 2015, p. 3). However, experiences from Haiti shows that a JMAC can be successfully utilized at the tactical level to solve operational problems.
For effective mandate implementation, it is important that, from the outset, clear coordination and information exchange protocols are established within the mission, between the JMAC
and other mission components, as well as other stakeholders. The creation of an “information community” as a functional network linking the JMAC and different mission assets that contribute to providing understanding is a good practice for ensuring the efficient and effective use of resources (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2015, p. 6).
The JMAC should, according to UN policy, receive information from all components. For many reasons this has proven difficult in reality. Ramjouè presented the challenge of information flow in his 2011 article (figure 7). The JMAC has many potential source from whom they can received information, but only one body receives their reports – the Head of Mission normally the SRSG.
Figure 8: JMAC sources of information and output recipients (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 6).
The release authority of the JMAC products rests with the SRSG – a civilian with limited intelligence background that might hamper information sharing. Whereas JMAC products are usually only shared with a small number of clients, “procedures need to be put in place so that
48
other mission components can also benefit from the JMAC’s work, and create the conditions for two way information sharing” (Theunens, 2017, p. 7).
The JMAC staffing is a mixture of military, police and civilians. A minimum number of civilian JMAC staff members in large missions provides continuity to the JMAC contrary to
military and police colleagues, who are subject to 6 or 12-monthly staff rotations (Ramjoué,
2011, p. 5). A fully implemented JMAC in a UN multi-dimensional peace operation would ideally consist of individuals representing all components as well as some representatives from the UNCT. However, in reality JMAC in UN missions tend to vary in both staffing and
organization35. Not all missions have fully implemented a JMAC, and UN missions with a
sensitive political situation, like UNTSO in the Middle East, have no JMAC. Still, some commonalties in the staffing are included in a generic major configured JMAC as depicted in figure 9 below.
Figure 9: Generic JMAC Structure, source UN DPKO (2010), annexes to JMAC Guidelines
35The JMAC staffing has varied from 30 in MINUSTA (Haiti), 17 in UNAMID (South Sudan), 8 in UNIFIL