The elements of Aristotelian virtue theory discussed above are especially germane to the project of promoting ethics within the American military. For instance, a surprising number of soldiers, as well as civilians, view morality as unquestionably subordinate to military
expediency. Establishing the relevance of virtue to well-being provides an end of ethical behavior in which soldiers are personally invested. However, whether the concept of well- being encourages ethical conduct depends on the way in which soldiers conceptualize well- being. If well-being is to serve as an end for virtue, then it cannot be narrowly interpreted as a matter of shallow self-interest, measured only in superficial, material terms. What has been emphasized throughout this discussion is that the moral virtues are those excellences of behavior that we exhibit in living our life well, which, in turn, is predicated on how we treat others. For instance, there is a strong correlation between well-being and the existence of close relationships with family and friends. Behaving in ways that result in the loss of these vital personal
relationships has a measurable, deleterious effect on our well-being.146
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Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.3 1156b07-08. 146
The association between virtue and well-being extends beyond the maintenance of personal relationships and encompasses a soldier’s behavior on the battlefield. As demonstrated in Chapter One, the killing of an enemy combatant, even when done in accordance with the rules of engagement, resonates within a soldier’s psyche for the rest of his life, often affecting his
emotional equilibrium to the detriment of his happiness, as well as that of his family, friends and colleagues.147 Establishing a correlation between the practice of the moral virtues and human well-being provides a motivation for ethical behavior that is difficult to discount. If virtue is seen to contribute to our well-being and if our well-being is understood to encompass the well- being of others, then it would seem that we have made some progress towards basing moral action on something about which a rational human is likely to care deeply.148
A concrete example may help illustrate this point. During the Vietnam War, hundreds of American airman were shot down and captured in the course of conducting missions over North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese viewed the American prisoners as a valuable propaganda resource, especially if the prisoners could be persuaded to make formal statements condemning American involvement in Vietnam. To this end, the prisoners were subjected to extraordinarily severe torture designed to coerce them into signing statements declaring themselves to be war criminals and condemning the American war effort. The torture was effective in the sense that virtually all the American prisoners signed some form of propaganda statement, merely as a result of the intense physical pain to which they were subjected. However, the North
Vietnamese were ultimately frustrated in the realization of their larger goal, that of permanently
147 Edward Tick, War and the Soul (Theosophical Publishing: Wheaton, Il, 2005), 20.
148
At this point, one could always ask, “Why should I care about my own well-being?” There is no response to a query such as this, other than to assert that anyone who could seriously pose such a question is not thinking
rationally, or as Aristotle asserts, has not been brought up in the right way and, therefore, lacks the necessary appreciation for the importance of virtue.
subverting the will of the POWs and obtaining their wholesale, voluntary cooperation with the North Vietnamese propaganda campaign.
The fortitude the American prisoners displayed in the face of torture was grounded in a conception of well-being that transcended relief from physical pain, lack of food or release from solitary confinement; the alleviation of these hardships was not to be bought at the expense of betraying their most deeply held beliefs and values. Their conception of well-being was expansive enough to include the well-being of their fellow prisoners, as well as an appreciation of the fact that collaboration with the enemy would reflect poorly on themselves and their country. Without a conception of well-being that transcended personal self-interest it would have been very easy for the prisoners to despair and cooperate with their captors. As it was, most American POWs acquitted themselves honorably.149
The focus on maintaining high standards of moral behavior, even in the most extreme situations, should not imply that an instance in which a person fails to behave ethically irredeemably compromises her moral character. The fact that the American POWs were all coerced into signing condemnatory statements does not indicate a lack of commitment to virtue. Virtue theory acknowledges that life often presents us with circumstances so challenging that few individuals possess the strength of character to overcome them, at least through their own resources. Practical wisdom requires insight into one’s character flaws and an understanding of how various circumstances exploit these weaknesses. A virtuous person uses this knowledge to avoid situations in which the temptation to act unethically is too great or, if the situation cannot
149
James Stockdale, Courage Under Fire: Testing Epictetus’s Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior (Stanford University: Hoover Essays No. 6, 1993). The account of how American POWs resisted efforts to
propagandize them makes for interesting reading. In particular, Vice Admiral James Stockdale provides a detailed account of how the POWs formed a covert network and communicated regularly in order to lift each other’s spirits and provide support and guidance without which resistance to the North Vietnamese interrogation would not have been possible.
be avoided, she draws on the resources of friends and associates for support. In fact, the
POWs’ success in resisting North Vietnamese attempts to subvert them was partly attributable to the establishment of a communications network by which orders were disseminated and moral support and advice was provided. Without this communal support, maintaining their moral standards would have been much more difficult.
Given the example of the American POWs, a theory for promoting moral excellence should be sensitive to the realities soldiers face in combat, taking into account how situational factors influence moral behavior. Aristotelian virtue theory offers such a realistic account, one in which a moral agent cannot unreflectively conform to inflexible moral principles but must employ practical reason in order to ascertain how changes in circumstances affect the numerous ethically ambiguous situations that confront him.
The wars the United States has fought over the last several decades have increasingly been counterinsurgencies. Counterinsurgency operations are particularly challenging from an ethical perspective, requiring soldiers to interact closely with indigenous populations, a situation that demands an extraordinary degree of practical judgment and self-control. A soldier must not only have the courage and aggressiveness for combat operations but also cultivate the empathy and compassion necessary to treat noncombatants and enemy prisoners humanely. Often, the whole range of moral virtues are called into service within the span of a few minutes; a soldier who shoots and wounds an insurgent may be called upon to render first aid and evacuate him for medical treatment, despite the fact that the insurgent was trying to kill him a few minutes earlier. This is the standard of ethical behavior we ultimately hope to promote in American soldiers and which makes the understanding of the moral virtues and the possession of moral character so vital.
Unfortunately, there is widespread confusion within the armed forces regarding the nature of the moral virtues, particularly which character traits truly deserve to be classified as moral
virtues and which are better described as ‘military advantageous.” The latter are traits that are essential to effective military service and receive an enormous amount of emphasis, but do not warrant consideration as virtues as they are too easily subverted to serve unethical ends. The following chapter will explore three of these traits in more detail, as well as consider how their ethical practice can be shaped and guided by the application of the elements of virtue theory that have been the focus of this chapter.