El contrato bancario como contrato de adhesión

k7

Figure 5« Diamondiferous deposits in central Kono: Sierra Leone Geological Survey

who may enter the area. S.L.S.T. paid a surface rent to the main mining chiefdoms in Kono, but this amounted only to a few hundred pounds a year. During this same period the company did not bother to give money or materials for development in Kono* The Government also ignored the area, allowing it to stagnate in isolation. As a result the Company lost the goodwill and support of the Kono people* This attitude proved crucial once illicit diamond mining began*

Production of diamonds by S.L.S.T. was 7^9 carats in 1932, reached I,

0

6

87

500,000

(Parsons 196*0. Before 1930 S.L.S.T. did not publish production values or profits. In 19**5 the world*s largest alluvial diamond, weighing 770 carats, was found near Tumbodu in Kono. News of such wealth spread despite the Company*s secrecy and the isolated remoteness of Kono.

Increasingly after 19**5» control of the diamond deposits be­ came intertwined with the movement for political control and in­ dependence. S.L.S.T. has also been associated with the colonial regime, such that the ensuing diamond rush became a political struggle between the African masses and a colonial company despite the underlying anarchy and straightforward profit motive of the African diamond diggers.

The Occurrence of Illicit Diamond Mining

As S.L.S.T. had a mining lease that covered the whole country an individual who mined diamonds on his own initiative was doing so illegally. The only way for such an illicit miner to dispose

of his finds was to sell them to a trader who was willing to smuggle the diamonds out of the country. Generally traders were in a good position to indulge in illicit diamond buying (I.D.B.) because they had some capital and often moved about to the larger towns, knowing trade routes and markets. A market for illicitly mined diamonds was found in Monrovia. Other routes out of the country were undoubtedly used in the earlier instances of illicit diamond mining (I.D.M.) but the Monrovian market dominated by the early 1930*s.

During the 1930*s S.L.S.T. rewarded any local person in*.Kono with a few shillings for bringing to the company or the District Office any diamonds that were discovered accidentally. Most people at that time had no idea of the value of the diamonds, including S.L.S.T. workers, but the offer of a reward, however small, encouraged some people to go searching for diamonds (In­ terviews in Jaiama Nimikoro 1975/6). The writer, Graham Greene, mentioned smuggling of diamonds into Guinea during the Second World War in his novel *The Heart of the Matter*.

The Reverend Paul Dunbar, a Kono teacher, went into the Evangelical United Brethren (E.U.B.) Church, was ordained as a pastor in the early 19*f0*s and was sent to run the mission in the village of Koidu in Gbense Chiefdom. Dunbar was related to the Paramount Chief of Gbense Chiefdom, Kaimachende, whose chiefdom town, Yaradu, was situated several miles to the north. Koidu was on the only motor road which led up to the District Office at

Sefadu, a couple of miles to the north. South of the diamondiferous Woyie stream, in Tankoro chiefdom S.L.S.T. had built its Sembehun

50.

camp to house a large workforce of diamond miners and a gravel washing plant had been built beside the stream. On the ridge directly above the washing plant was the E.U.B. dispensary, while half a mile to the west, by the road, was the E.U.B. church and school. A Lebanese trader, Koussa, had come to the village in 1956, building his house and shop close to the site of the E.U.B. mission. As modern developments and cash were clearly coming into this village P.O. Kaimachende built a house for himself on the ridge above the Voyie stream, between the church and the dispen­ sary. Pastor Dunbar arranged evening classes for S.L.S.T. workers and labourers, teaching them literacy at the mission. He also encouraged them to bring diamonds to him, which he sold to Koussa. This was discovered by the S.L.S.T. Diamond Protection Force

(D.P.F.) but when they attempted to expel Dunbar from Kono, Kai­ machende intervened and the struggle became political.

Both Kaimachende and Dunbar were involved in the Paramount Chiefs* Conference which took place in Koidu village in 19^3, and which later developed into the District Council and led to the Protectorate Assembly and Legislative Council. Dunbar was nomin­ ated by the Chiefs, mainly with the backing of Kaimachende, and represented Kono as a member of the Legislative Council, where he was able to attack the mining company’s policy and the terms of its lease and royalties (Dunbar 1976).

Thus the early occurrences of illicit diamond mining around Koidu, which had the richest deposits and is the source area of

the kimberlite, involved Kono who were opposed to S.L.S.T.’s con­ trol and who were to become influential politicians, as well as the earliest Lebanese trader, and S.L.S.T. workers who were willing to ’steal* diamonds as they mined them.

51.

The company ceased to have absolute control over the lease and between 1952 and 195^ a gradual increase took place in illi­ cit diamond mining, followed by the frenetic diamond rush of 195^ to 1956. There were a number of factors that led to the diamond rush. The general lack of goodwill among the Kono people towards S.L.S.T., has already been mentioned. Along with S.L.S.T. the government was also keen to suppress illicit mining, but with the rising feeling of anti-colonialism and the drive towards indepen­ dence, respect for the government was considerably lessened. For the Kono politicians of the time it was easy to point to the lack of development and the lack of government involvement in Kono, while at the same time S.L.S.T. had taken millions of pounds worth of diamonds from the land. Since the beginning of the diamond rush up to the present time, the illicit miners have be­ lieved and claimed that they as Africans are rightly taking what is theirs. The Kono have believed this most strongly, but most non-Kono • have claimed the same right in justification of their actions. This attitude among illicit diamond miners has persis­ ted eveft since control of S.L.S.T. was taken by the Sierra Leone government in 1970*

Rumours of the wealth of the diamond fields spread rapidly, as the Sierra Leone diamonds comprise a very high proportion of gemstones. Some of the diamonds found in Kono were exceptionally large and many people became literally rich overnight. Mining the diamonds was very easy, as the diamondiferous gravel only lay ten to twenty five feet below the surface and could be dug out, sorted and washed using only a bucket, spade and sieve (often made of mosquito netting, or an aluminium water bowl with nail holes knocked through the bottom).

Another important factor in the diamond rush was the return of the ex-servicemen after the Second World War. About 20,000 men had been recruited or conscripted. They returned, having been exposed to a more western lifestyle, a money economy and

to the discipline and organisation of the army. The ex-service- men became urbanised and were easily attracted to the cash earn­ ings of the diamond fields. The diamond fields also offered a break from the traditional way of life, not only for the ex- servicemen, but for other dissatisfied young men (Mills 1975)

(Joseph 1972).

Other Africans, and especially the Lebanese, had had some experience in gold mining, where they had learned alluvial mining methods in competition with European companies and had been mod­ erately successful. The Lebanese had gained a lot of confidence from the experience, and were willing to invest their capital in illicit diamond buying, in sponsoring illicit mining operations and in smuggling (Van der Laan 1975)*

Agricultural production had been high during the 19^0*s when the country managed to feed itself, but the war had disrupted in­ ternational trade, cutting off exports of cash crops, such as oil palm kernels, cocoa and coffee (Shanu-Wilson 1966). Mining pro­ vided an alternative means of earning cash. Then in the early 1950*s the lack of opportunities in farming were compounded by poor harvests (Minikin 1971)*

Before 1952 there was no police or army presence in Kono, and there were few roads for the police to operate from when they were based at Motema from 1952 onwards. Kono was still remote from the centre of government, and its borders, both internal and'inter*

53

national, could not adequately be patrolled. At the same time there had also been a decline in the authority of the chiefs, so that they were virtually powerless to control the vast influx of strangers, both into Kono and into the other diamond areas of the south.

The factors which first led to the diamond rush, continued to be important for the following twenty five years. Migration to the diamond fields continues to take place, but whereas at first the area could only offer legendary riches, it now offers an urban lifestyle with facilities and services not offered in most other areas of Sierra Leone.

Methods of Diamond Mining

The extraction of gravel and of diamonds by S.L.S.T. and 2

later N.D.M.C. is regulated by the yearly quota which specifies the volume of carats to be produced. The amount of gravel that has to be extracted to achieve the production quota is determined by the thickness of the overburden (soil and gravel that lie

above this diamondiferous deposits), and the richness of the gravel, while distance from the washing plant influences the amount of gravel that can be processed.

The diamondiferous gravel is processed in two stages; firstly in the washing plant which sorts and concentrates the gravel

2. In 1970 the Sierra Leone government negotiated with the Sierra