There are several variables that contributed to Taiwan’s rural development. As already mentioned, Taiwan inherited from the Japanese colonial period an extensive network of farmers’ organizations, advanced agricultural technologies, and an industrial infrastructure that was based primarily on agro-processing and dispersed throughout the countryside. Taiwan’s decentralized pattern of industrialization provided critical off-farm sources of income and mitigated the negative effects of Taiwan’s developmental squeeze. Taiwan also benefited from U.S. aid. In particular, the JCRR oversaw land reform and the reorganization of farmers’ associations, and it
85 For more information on the Korean case, see You 1986: 53; Burmeister 1988: 66; Chung 2009: 41-43; Brandt & Lee 1981: 68-69; Ban et al. 1980: 276.
encouraged Taiwan’s government to pass legislation that ensured the farmers’ associations would be controlled by farmers instead of non-farm interests. In addition, the KMT’s
development strategy in Taiwan was very different than its strategy in Mainland China. In order to secure food and foreign exchange, as well as political control of the countryside, the regime placed heavy emphasis on rural development. It quickly carried out land reform and granted Taiwan’s farmers limited autonomy over rural affairs through the farmers’ associations.
As for KMT rural policy outcomes, land reform reduced rural inequality but otherwise had a limited effect on Taiwan’s rural development. While most gains in rural incomes must be attributed to rural industrialization instead of farming,86 Taiwan’s farmers’ associations were critical to gains in agricultural production during the period of accelerated growth (about 5.6% a year in the 1950s-1960s) and agricultural adjustment (about 3.2% a year in the 1970s).87
Modernization campaigns also played a role in Taiwan’s rural development, contributing to major improvements in the village environment in the 1970s.
This section first focuses on the reasons Taiwan’s farmers’ associations were such effective institutions. It then examines the reasons that the KMT reversed its urban-biased policies and pursued an agricultural adjustment program in the 1970s. Finally, it compares the Taiwanese case with the Chinese and Korean cases to better understand the underlying reasons for Taiwan’s successful record of rural development.
86 Stavis 1974: 18; Gallin & Gallin 1982: 215; Ho 1979b: 648-649; Ranis 1995: 522-523. 87 Yager 1988: 2-3, 51-52, 61-62. In contrast, Korea’s agricultural sector grew only 3.6% a year in the 1950s and 2.7% a year in the 1960s and 1970s; see Ban et al. 1980: 291. China’s
agricultural sector grew about 3.6% a year in the early 1950s (followed by negative growth during the Great Leap Forward) and 2.4% a year in the 1960s and 1970s; see Bramall 2004: 114, 121. Bramall’s estimates for Taiwan and Korea are slightly different. According to his data, Taiwan’s agricultural output grew 5.2% per year in 1960-1970 and 2.3% per year in 1970-1980. Korea’s agricultural output grew 4.5% per year in 1960-1970 and 2.7% per year in 1970-1980; see Bramall 2004: 134.
Structure and Internal Governance of the Farmers’ Associations
Taiwan’s farmers’ associations were parastatal organizations that shared a corporatist relationship with the state. One reason for their effectiveness is that they were closely linked to higher levels of government that controlled developmental resources.88 Like the ROC
administration, Taiwanese farmers’ associations have a tiered structure, reaching from the central state down to the village. At each level, the associations worked closely with the government to implement agricultural policy (see Figure 3.6). Higher-level FAs, along with several government agencies, carefully monitored the work of lower-level FAs. Township FA programs and budgets had to be approved at the county and provincial levels, and the provincial FA had the power to dissolve any poorly performing FAs. Writing in the 1960s, Bernard Gallin found that most farmers actually welcomed this supervision from the higher levels because it assured them that FA programs would be properly administered.89
88 Uphoff & Esman 1974. 89 Gallin 1966: 70.
3.6: The Farmers’ Association System in Taiwan Village Government Township Government County Government Provincial Government PDAF, PFB**
Small Agricultural Units 4889 Township FAs 340 County/City FAs 21 Provincial FA 1 Central Government
Ministry of Interior Rural ReconstructionJoint Commission (JCRR)*
Supervision ––––– Assistance ---
*Replaced by the Council for Agricultural Planning and Development in 1979. **Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Provincial Food Bureau.
Source: Number of FAs based on 1971 estimates; see Guo 1984: 167.
In addition to being closely linked to the government, the FAs were effective because of their rules for internal governance. The FAs employ a system of indirect representation. At the village level, farmers elect SAU leaders and township FA representatives. At the township level, the assembly of member representatives elects county FA representatives, as well as two groups of township FA leaders—the board of directors and the board of supervisors. The board of directors sets policy for the FA, and the board of supervisors regularly audits FA activities. The board of directors is in charge of appointing a general manager to oversee the daily operations of FA service departments (see Figure 3.7). Based on the principle of “separating authority and ability,” the board of directors (i.e. those with authority) can select non-farmers (i.e. those with
ability) as general managers.90 The general manager is usually someone with close ties to the KMT and experience working in both the government and the FA system.91 Non-farmers are also allowed to hold one-third of elected positions on the board of supervisors, but these bodies normally have only 3 people in total.
3.7: Internal Structure of a Township Farmers’ Association in Taiwan
Board of Directors Board of Supervisors
Agricultural Extension Department
Credit
Department DepartmentInsurance Supply andMarketing Department General Manager
Assembly of Member Representatives
Supervision –––––
Secondary line of supervision ---
County and provincial FAs, besides not having credit departments, are structured and governed in the same way as the township FAs. At the national level, the provincial FA elects representatives to the Legislative Yuan. In the 1950s-1970s, these representatives were instrumental in raising national awareness about rural sector problems, but they were never politically powerful and played only a consultative role in policymaking.92 The provincial level
90 KMT 1954: 36-38; KMT 1955b: 10; De Lasson 1976: 150-157.
91 Huang 1981: 291, 415-417. For KMT-recommended selection standards, see KMT 1954: 56- 57.
was the only branch where mainlanders had a significant presence, but they were still a minority, comprising about 40% of FA staff.93 In fact, the FAs were the only (quasi-) public institution in postwar Taiwan that was controlled by Taiwanese, not mainlanders.
These organizational features facilitated the monitoring of local policy implementation by higher-level governments and higher-level FAs. They also allowed lower-level FAs to provide feedback on agricultural policy. Compared to the Korean case, where there was strong
bureaucratic separation between the different levels of the NACF, Taiwan’s system of indirect representation was more effective at transmitting policy feedback upwards. Since the FAs were controlled by farmer members, it also allowed for greater representation of their preferences.94 Although the FAs were perhaps less “representative” at the higher-levels, they were still controlled by Taiwanese with some kind of agricultural background, who along with the JCRR were able to alert the KMT to problems in the rural sector.95 As described below, however, the FAs’ success cannot be traced to factors normally associated with open, pluralist politics, such as autonomy from the state or democratic decision-making. Elections were an imperfect mechanism for selecting FA leaders, and the FAs operated with only limited autonomy from the state.
Farmers’ Association Politics: Relations with Local Factions, the Kuomintang, and the State
On the surface, FA elections appear to be a narrowly circumscribed form of political participation, but especially at the township level, elections were highly politicized and contested. Joseph Bosco and other scholars have underscored the importance of local factions (difang paixi
) in Taiwanese politics. While questions about the origins and influence of particular
93 De Lasson 1976: 245; Burmeister et al. 2002: 136. 94 Burmeister et al. 2002: 136.
95 For example, Wu Wangji was a FA Legislative Yuan member who was outspoken about growing rural unrest as the relative position of agriculture declined; see KMT 1972: 17.
factions are beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that local factions were also important in FA politics. Bosco writes, “The Farmers’ Association is a semi-governmental organization that controls much patronage, so its political offices are sharply contested by local factions.”96 Indeed, the FAs controlled key developmental resources, which could be distributed to farmers as a form a patronage. For example, the general manager of the FA had the power to select staff and to distribute such items as cash crop licenses, construction contracts, loans, and community development funds.97 The FA general manager was, in many ways, as powerful as the township government executive.
As the board of supervisors was a relatively weak body, local factions mostly competed to get elected to the assembly of member representatives and the board of directors. The board of directors would elect a chairman (lishizhang ) who was in charge of selecting the general manager. The chairman’s selection for general manager had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the other directors, but was normally someone loyal to the chairman. The general manager was, in Anderson’s words, the “chairman’s man.”98
To prevent local factions from gaining too much power, the KMT frequently intervened in FA elections and recruited FA leaders to join the party. During the reorganization of the FAs in the early 1950s, the KMT established temporary party organizations within each FA to
96 Bosco 1992: 158. With the exception of places where one faction clearly dominated, FA elections were contested throughout the postwar period. Although this study does not extend beyond the 1970s, it appears that FA elections became even more contested over time, as
agricultural adjustment policies increased the number of resources that could be distributed along factional lines as patronage; see Burmeister et al. 2002: 143; Bain 1993.
97 Stavis 1974: 55-61, 95-98. 98 Anderson 1950: 10.
oversee elections and recommend candidates for the position of general manager.99 In 1954 the KMT successfully captured the majority of FA leadership positions (see Table 3.8), setting a pattern that continues through the present day.
3.8: Extent of KMT Representation in FAs (1954 FA Election Results) (a) Total Elected (b) KMT Candidates (c) KMT Recruits % KMT (b + c)/ a Village SAUs SAU Head 4875 1939 1642 73% SAU Vice-head 4875 1456 1603 63% Township FA Representatives 16916 6421 4141 62% Township FAs FA Directors 3805 2193 862 80% FA Supervisors 1086 617 22 59% County FA Representatives 1349 782 351 84% County FAs FA Directors 386 287 62 90% FA Supervisors 124 82 27 88% Provincial FA Representatives 89 69 0 78% Provincial FA FA Directors 33 33 0 100% FA Supervisors 10 10 0 100% TOTAL 33548 13889 8710 67%
Notes: “KMT candidates” refers to party members who won the election. “KMT recruits”
refers to those candidates who joined the party after winning the election. FA rules allow for the election of 4 representatives to the Legislative Yuan. Based on the data presented here, it is reasonable to assume that 100% of these representatives were KMT.
Source: KMT 1954: 59-60.
The state exerted its control over the FAs in several ways. In addition to backing its own candidates and recruiting newly elected leaders, the KMT set strict election rules that prohibited extensive campaigning. Concerned that FA elections might provide the basis for an independent political movement, the KMT only allowed candidates to campaign for 10 days leading up to the election. Candidates were allowed to criticize incumbents for their implementation of national
policies, but could be arrested if they opposed national policies.100 The state also exerted its control over the FAs by setting strict training and education requirements for general
managers.101 Finally, the state placed secret security agents in every township FA to monitor its activities. Normally employed by the Provincial Food Bureau (PFB), this agent was responsible for guarding the FA granary and checking for any signs of political or social unrest. In most cases, this agent was the only mainlander working in the township FA.102
The FA system was simultaneously a highly centralized, state-controlled institution and a faction-ridden, patronage institution. The JCRR encouraged the government to grant the FAs some degree of autonomy because of its commitment to American democratic ideals, but this is not the main reason that the ROC government allowed the FAs to hold elections. The
government needed the Taiwanese to run these institutions partly because fluency in local
dialects was critical for agricultural extension work.103 The more important reason, however, was that the KMT, as part of its anti-communist strategy, was determined to establish a firm base of support in the countryside and viewed elections as a way of giving legitimacy to FA activities. Moreover, the KMT’s successful co-optation of FA leaders ensured that they would not function as a rival political party or interest group. In fact, the FAs functioned as a kind of voter
mobilization machine for the KMT during local elections.104
100 Stavis 1974: 58-59.
101 KMT 1954: 56-57.
102 Gallin 1966: 70-71; Stavis 1974: 118; De Lasson 1976: 172; Moore 1988: 131-137; Wade 2004: 242.
103 De Lasson 1988: 24.
Although factional politics meant that elections were often dominated by concerns other than the candidates’ professional qualifications, they nonetheless gave farmers a vested interest in election outcomes and served to raise awareness about the state’s rural development
policies.105 And while some resources were selectively distributed along factional lines as a form of patronage, the centralized supervision of FA resources helped to mitigate the potential
negative effects of factional politics. It seems that even in places where one or a few factions dominated, the elections contributed to a general sense of farmer member ownership over the FAs. According to JCRR survey data, the percentage of farmers who stated that “the farmers own the FAs” increased from 1.7% in 1952, to 56.1% in 1955, to 79.5% in 1959.106 The
percentage of farmers who stated that “the chairman of the FA board of directors is determined by election” also increased from 20.7% in 1952, to 66.5% in 1955, to 80.2% in 1959. Farmers gave similar responses when asked about FA representatives. In addition to farmers’ perceptions of ownership and control over the FAs, the survey data suggests that farmers were at least
minimally engaged in FA activities: In 1959 about 82% of farmers said they had attended a SAU meeting in the last year.107 Like its counterparts in Korea and Japan, the FAs were encompassing organizations that provided basic services to all of Taiwan’s farmers. Indirectly, they also played a role in the government’s decision to reverse urban bias and adopt protective policies for
agriculture.
Agricultural Adjustment in Taiwan
105 Burmeister et al. 2002: 134-5. 106 Guo 1984: 146.
The government adopted the Accelerated Rural Development Program for both economic and political reasons. By the late 1960s, the relative decline of agriculture had become apparent in terms of the rural-urban income gap,108 declining agricultural output,109 and rural labor shortages caused by increased levels of rural-to-urban migration.110 In addition to the government’s concern over these problems, the cost of pursuing agricultural adjustment had declined. Taiwan’s rapid industrialization and the shrinking of the agricultural sector meant that the government was in a better position to subsidize farmers. In fact, even before the ARDP was adopted, the government started to experiment with more favorable terms of trade for agriculture, lowering the prices of fertilizers, pesticides and farm machinery in the late 1960s.111 Moreover, the fertilizer-rice barter system was increasingly unnecessary as a source of cheap grains or government revenue. Mick Moore observes that urban consumer income levels and diet
108 After 1964 the growth rate of agricultural income started to decline, and industrial wages ranged from 50-100% higher than agricultural wages; see Wade 2004: 76-77; Stavis 1974: 22. Owing to this wage differential and the small size of Taiwan’s farms, increasing numbers of farmers sought off-farm employment. Using PDAF and JCCR data, Dennis Chinn writes: “Between 1955 and 1965 the percentage of all farm households earning more than half of their total income from off-farm sources increased from 28 to 42, while the contribution of off-farm sources to total income for all farm households rose from 29% to 52%;” see Chinn 1979: 299- 300.
109 Total output slowed from 5.2% growth annually between 1960 and 1970 to 2.3% growth annually between 1970 and 1980; see Bramall 2004: 134. Yager estimates that it slowed from 5.7% in 1952-1967 to 3.2% in the 1970s; see Yager 1988: 2-3.
110 Compared to Korea, where about half of the rural population migrated to urban areas in the 1970s and 1980s, the rate of out-migration in Taiwan was not as extreme. Still, Taiwan’s dispersed rural industries were insufficient to prevent long-distance labor migration as the agricultural sector declined. Between 1950 and 1965, about 15% of the rural population (1 million out of 5.7 million) migrated from rural to urban areas; see Stavis 1974: 21. Due to rural labor shortages, labor costs increased from 1,992 yuan in 1960-1962 to 4,631 yuan in 1970-1972, contributing to an 8% rise in the total cost of agricultural production; see Chinn 1979: 289. For more on rural labor shortages, see Ho 1978: 159; Gold 1986: 106; Wu & Jiao 1978: 33. 111 Li 1988: 296.
diversification greatly reduced political pressure to provide cheap rice to the urban sector. Moore writes: “The retail price of rice was almost doubled in 1974 without overt protest.”112
Besides the government’s economic calculations, rural policy change may also be traced to a process of political liberalization that was initiated in the late 1960s. For the first time since the ROC government arrived in Taiwan, elections were held in 1969 for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. Intended to fill vacancies created by an aging political elite, the elections brought more Taiwanese into the government. Although mainlanders still exercised majority control over these bodies, the elections signaled a much deeper reconfiguration of power taking place, as aggressive party recruitment efforts had changed the basic composition of the KMT. It is estimated that by the early 1970s about 80% of the KMT’s 1.25 million members were Taiwanese.113 Thomas Gold refers to 1969 as the beginning of “Taiwanization” in the political sphere. In 1972, Shieh Tung-min became the first Taiwanese to assume the post of provincial governor. Following the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, Chiang Ching-kuo appointed a number of Taiwanese to top party and state posts and even selected Taiwanese politicians as vice-presidents in 1978 and 1984 (Shieh Tung-min and Lee Teng-hui).114 Gold attributes these changes to the government’s growing realization that it would not be returning to the mainland, especially after China’s 1964 atomic bomb test.115
Although few national politicians came from a farming background, the advent of elections enfranchised Taiwan’s rural population, which was already highly organized and
112 Moore 1988: 139-141. 113 Gold 1986: 92.
114 Gold 1986: 114. 115 Gold 1986: 92.
educated in electoral politics because of the farmers’ associations. Moreover, the FAs were an important entry point to local government for Taiwanese farmers. Huang Dazhou’s oral history research on the farmers’ associations reveals that most FA leaders moved between the FAs and the government during the course of their careers. The following example comes from one of Huang’s informants, Mr. Jiang, and represents the typical career trajectory of an FA leader: Born in 1926, Jiang entered school at age 10, which he attended for 5 years before joining the military. Jiang returned to his village after the war in 1949 and became a small agricultural unit leader in the early 1950s. Jiang then became a township FA representative and a member of the board of directors in 1955. He was elected to the county government assembly in 1957, shortly after which he worked for the county party organization. Moving every few years between the county government and the township FA, Jiang eventually became a township FA general manger in 1970.116 According to KMT reports, few county assemblymen had a farming background (about 27% in 1957), but those who did normally had experience working in the FAs.117 Since FA