Examining the types of aid a nation provides may divulge the political interest of the donor state. Foreign aid consists of humanitarian, subsistence, military, and prestige aid, along with bribery and aid for economic development. According to Morgenthau, humanitarian aid is the only type of aid that is nonpolitical.62 Subsistence aid provides an
artificial foundation for “nonviable regimes” to prevail despite the existence of a “political alternative.”63 Historically, this type of aid goes to these regimes because the
donor has an economic or military interest in the region.64 Military aid has typically
served to increase a nation’s power through alliances. In the Twentieth Century, this type of aid has included prestige aid, where a nation’s stature is elevated based on its receipt of state of the art equipment. Additionally, military aid may act as a bribe to nations by leveraging physical security for specific political action (or inaction).65
Morgenthau defines bribery as the exchange of money and services for political service. Leaders may disguise this concept with the moniker of “foreign aid for economic development” which requires the façade of an economic development
61 Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004), 179.
62 Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” 301. 63 Ibid., 302.
64 Vandana Shiva, “Geopolitics of Food: America’s Use of Food as a Weapon,” Economic and
Political Weekly Vol. 23, No. 18 (Apr 30, 1988), 881.
“machinery” that creates inefficiencies when compared to a traditional bribe.66 The
duplicitous nature of this type of foreign aid is likely to leave both sides disappointed due to the lack of clear expectations.67 Another characteristic associated with foreign aid for
economic development is the stipulation that the majority of the funds are spent in the donor’s economy.68 While aid may overtly make recipients dependent on the patron,
sociologists describe another, less obvious, outcome of these programs.
1. Social Hierarchies
Tomohisa Hattori, an assistant professor of political science at Lehman College, construes foreign aid as means to dominate others by creating palatable social hierarchies.69 As a result, the gift of aid creates a dominant giver and a grateful
recipient.70 Hattori cites sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in pointing out that there are “only
two ways of getting and keeping a lasting hold over someone: gifts or debt.”71
According to the giver-receiver hierarchy, the interest of the giver should prevail since the receiver must show gratitude. Hattori claims that this system of relations embodies the Kantian view of international relations since it creates an option to avoid “the more standard recourse to violence or coercive means.”72 In simple terms, Hattori’s
characterization describes a neo-colonial structure where imperial powers influence colonies through gifts instead of occupation. This is hardly a peaceful arrangement based on the third world’s historical fight against imperialism and the failure to address the fact that inequality may lead to conflict.
66 Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” 302. 67 Morgenthau, 303.
68 80 percent of aid to Egypt is spent on U.S. goods and services. Sullivan, “The Failure of Foreign Aid: An Examination of Causes and a Call for Reform,” 411.
69 Hattori, “Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid,” 639. 70 Ibid., 640.
71 Ibid. 72 Ibid., 649.
2. Inequality and Instability
Literature on the relationship between inequality and conflict is mainly limited to the scope of intrastate violence. According to Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, “Income inequality increases socio-political instability.”73 Edward Muller and Mitchell
Seligson support this interpretation of inequality’s role in conflict and expand on it to show that semi-repressive regimes increase the potential for violence.74 Frances
Stewart’s concept of horizontal inequalities, or inequalities between groups versus economic classes, provides a concept that can be applied to the international realm.75
According to her research, “The significance of any measure of inequality from a conflict-creation perspective is increased if it occurs systematically over a number of dimensions and grows over time.”76 Therefore, counter to Hattori’s claim that social
hierarchies create platitudes when states give aid the perpetuation of such relationships, in lieu of creating more equal relationships, may provide the foundation for conflict.
Although the rationality of states may prevent the manifestation of such violence, sub-state groups could be galvanized in response to the interstate relationship. Christopher Cramer concludes that, although “a relatively peaceable durable inequality” may exist, “sharp changes in the nature of the relationship between groups; external interventions; ideological shifts whereby injustices that were previously accepted come to be regarded as grounds for conflict, violent or nonviolent; and new possibilities of equality” may provide the impulse towards struggle.77
73 Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4486, October 1993,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4486 (accessed Oct 8, 2011), 18.
74 Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Inequality and Insurgency,” The American Political
Science Review Vol. 81, No. 2 (Jun 1987), 437, 445.
75 Stewart gives examples of groups as the executive, military, and law enforcement. In the international arena groups would represent nations. According to Stewart, horizontal inequality is a far greater harbinger of conflict than vertical inequality (usually represented by the GINI coefficient). Frances Stewart, “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities,” Oxford Development Studies Vol. 28, No. 3 (200), 256. Further analysis is required to support the concept that horizontal inequalities between nations results in conflict although anecdotal historical evidence supports the claim.
76 Stewart, 256.
77 Christopher Cramer, “Does Inequality Cause Conflict?” Journal of International Devleopment Vol. 15 (2003), 409.
3. U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt
In light of these revelations, Hattori’s argument that gifts “naturalize” relations is misleading for two reasons: first, it assumes that recipient states are content with their dependencies on aid; second, it does not account for conditions demanded by the donor.78
Egypt has acted counter to Hattori’s theory despite being the second largest recipient of U.S. aid. The United States and Egypt signed the “Glide Path Agreement” in the late 1990s that resulted in a 69 percent decrease in economic support funds to Egypt.79
According to the Congressional Research Service, Egypt desires to “graduate from U.S. bilateral economic assistance” in part due to its “reluctance to accept conditions for U.S. aid” which indicates that aid has failed to naturalize the relationship.80 Hattori’s model
failed in this case because U.S. economic aid to Egypt included conditions and, therefore, was not a gift; instead, it was a bribe according to Morgenthau’s definition. Furthermore, the presence of conditions begets the observation that U.S. aid to Egypt is undertaken with the U.S. national interest in mind. Research must determine whether the entirety of U.S. aid to Egypt focused on the nation’s transition to a democracy that respects human rights or other motivations.