El espacio urbano de Caibarién: características generales

In this section I discuss another set of cases, which apparently cause trouble for counterfactual theories of causation. These are cases of non- paradigmatic causation and causation by omissions. As I will demonstrate, these cases are thought to be problematic for counterfactual theories, since they appear to show that it is possible to have counterfactual dependence without causation. In other words, they appear to illustrate that counterfactual dependence is not

sufficient for causation. Moreover, it looks as though production based concepts of causation, such as the SP concept, are simply able to avoid this problem.

In this section I argue that by appealing to the interventionist concept of

insensitivity34, not only can interventionism overcome the problems associated

with these cases35_{, but it is actually able to deal with these problems in a more}

satisfying way than the SP concept. This supports the conclusion that interventionism does, after all, provide a coherent and viable alternative theory of

causation, which does undermine the assumption of SP and hence does demonstrate that the non-reductive   physicalist   need   not   accept   Kim’s   a   priori  

exclusion problem. (I begin by outlining and examining the interventionist notion of insensitivity and will then demonstrate how this feature can be used to avoid the problems associated with these cases.)

What exactly is insensitivity? In order to explain this concept, it is useful to compare it to the central interventionist notion of invariance. As the discussion above should have made clear, we can think of invariance as a necessary feature that a generalization or relationship must possess if it is to qualify as genuinely causal. I suggest that we can then think of insensitivity as a further condition, which considers whether that relationship (that is at least minimally invariant and hence causal) would continue to hold (or alternatively, whether the counterfactuals associated with that claim would continue to hold) over a range of changes and varying background conditions. If that relationship does continue to hold under these changes, then we may regard that causal relationship as insensitive. If it does not, then that causal relationship will be considered as sensitive. Woodward defines the notion of insensitivity as follows:

34 _{Woodward (2006) discusses the notion of insensitivity in detail.}

35_{This  feature  also  allows  interventionism  to  avoid  the  problem  of  ‘double-prevention’,  noted  by}   Hall (2004), which cannot be discussed here. See Hall (2004) for further details.

“Broadly   speaking,   a   causal   claim   is   sensitive   if   it   holds   in   the   actual  

circumstances but would not continue to hold in circumstances that depart in various ways from the actual circumstances. A causal claim is insensitive to the extent to which it would continue to hold under various sorts of changes in the actual circumstances. The sensitivity of

counterfactuals  is  understood  similarly.”  (Woodward,  2006:  2)  

The idea of insensitivity can be elucidated further with the following

example  of  Woodward’s:  

“Suzy   stands   in   front   of   a   fragile   glass   bottle   with   a   large   rock   in   her   hand.  No  other  possible  causes  of  the  bottle’s  breaking  — no backup or preemptive throwers, no earthquakes and so on — are waiting in the wings. Suzy throws; the rock strikes the bottle squarely, and it shatters.

The  impact  of  the  rock  caused  the  bottle  to  shatter.”  (Ibid:  1)

Now, according  to  most  theories  of  causation,  it  was  Suzy’s  throwing of the rock that caused the bottle to shatter. Interventionism supports this

conclusion,  since  there  is  an  intervention  on  Suzy’s  throw  that  changes  whether  

the bottle shatters (i.e. the relationship between the throwing of the rock and the bottle shattering is minimally invariant). This conclusion is supported by the truth of the following two counterfactuals:

(1.1) If Suzy throws the rock, the bottle will shatter.

Now, as Woodward explains, in order to assess the insensitivity of the causal claim relating Suzy’s   throwing   of   the   rock   to   the   bottle   shattering   we  

should consider the insensitivity of the associated counterfactuals (1.1) and (1.2). As Woodward goes on to explain, in order to do this, we should consider whether, for example, counterfactual (1.1) “would   continue   to   hold   under  

changes that do not depart too much from the actual state of affairs or that do not seem too far-fetched or that are not judged to be unimportant or irrelevant for subject-matter-specific  reasons”  (Ibid:  11)  (I  explore  these  ideas  in  detail  below).  

This idea can be expressed in the form of the following counterfactual:

(1.1.2) “If   the   rock   thrown   by   Suzy   were   to   strike   the   bottle   in  

circumstances Bi different from the actual circumstances, the bottle would  (still)  shatter.”  (Ibid:  5)  

Since it appears that (1.1.2) is true, (for example, if Suzy were to throw the rock at a slightly later time, or with a slightly different degree of force, the bottle would still shatter), we should consider counterfactual (1.1) to be fairly insensitive and consequently also consider the   causal   claim   relating   Suzy’s  

throwing of the rock to the bottle shattering as insensitive. If, on the other hand (1.1.2) turned out false (if, for example, this relationship failed to hold across a range of such changes), we should instead consider counterfactual (1.1) and the causal claim to be fairly sensitive.

I noted above that a counterfactual, or causal claim will be judged to be insensitive if it holds over a range of changes to background conditions that do

not depart much from actuality or that seem important or relevant. Can we be more precise about the kinds of changes that are relevant for assessing insensitivity?

As Woodward notes, certain changes will seem irrelevant for assessing the insensitivity of a counterfactual or causal claim. These include, for example,

changes   to   the   colour   of   Suzy’s   blouse, or the sneezing of a man in Chicago. (One explanation of why these kinds of changes are not considered as relevant is that they fail to change the relevant features of the counterfactual, for example, the throwing of the rock and the smashing of the bottle.36) In other kinds of cases, (to be discussed below), certain changes will seem irrelevant because of the particular context of the counterfactual or causal claim.

Within those changes that we do judge to be relevant for assessing insensitivity, according to Woodward, we can be more precise about the specific nature of the changes by appealing to a similarity metric, along the lines of David

Lewis’   notion   of   the   closeness   of   possible   worlds.   Essentially,   the   possible  

worlds account would consider, as relevant for assessing the insensitivity of some counterfactual or causal claim, changes which are as close to actuality as possible. For example, when considering whether counterfactual (1.1.2) is true, it states that we should consider situations which do not depart much from the actual situation, such as a situation in which Suzy throws the rock at a slightly later time or with a different degree of force, rather than, for example, considering a situation in which Suzy throws the rock, which happens to be fitted with a navigation device which ensures that the rock reaches its target.

Now, one important aspect of insensitivity that will be especially relevant to the discussion below is that insensitivity provides an explanation of our causal

judgements and in particular, can explain how certain claims can qualify as causal according to the interventionist criteria for causation, while nonetheless striking us as non-causal. For example, take the case of Suzy: according to Woodward, it is the truth of counterfactuals (1.1) and (1.2), as well as the

insensitivity of these counterfactuals that   informs   our   judgement   that   Suzy’s  

throw is causally relevant to the bottle shattering. By way of contrast, consider

Woodward’s  variant of the Suzy case, which is extremely sensitive to slight changes to the actual situation: Suzy scratches her nose and the bottle shatters. As Woodward explains, although there may be counterfactual situations in which

it   is   true   that   the   shattering   is   caused   by   the   scratching   of   Suzy’s nose, if for example, Billy had promised to shatter the bottle if Suzy scratches her nose, the

reason  why  we  would  not  ordinarily  judge  that  Suzy’s  action  is  the  cause  of  the  

shattering is that it is extremely sensitive to slight changes to the actual circumstances. For example, Billy may renege on his promise or fail to be present. For Woodward, it is the relative sensitivity of the second claim that

informs   our   judgement   that   although   Suzy’s   action   may   technically   cause   the  

shattering of the bottle (since there is some intervention on whether Suzy scratches her nose that changes whether the bottle shatters), that causal claim nonetheless strikes us as un-paradigmatically causal, since it is extremely sensitive to small changes to background conditions.

Why does insensitivity affect our causal judgements in this way? Note that just as with the notion of invariance, by being stable or invariant over a wide range of changes (in this case, it is specifically stability under changes to

background conditions and circumstances, rather than just stability under interventions to the variables under consideration), causal claims and explanations that are insensitive will be able to answer a wider range of w- questions, since they tell us what would happen to the effect under these wide

range of changes. Moreover, those causal claims and explanations will be more potentially useful for the purposes of control and manipulation, since those relationships will continue to hold and hence continue to provide a means of control over these wide range of changes. As Woodward (Ibid: 7) explains, the idea of insensitivity thus captures the intuitive idea that causal claims and

explanations   should   possess   a   certain   degree   of   ‘generalizability’   and   ‘context   independence’.  

Before moving on to discuss how the notion of insensitivity helps interventionism to overcome problems concerning cases of non-paradigmatic causation and causation by omissions, it is important to address the question of whether the conditions for determining the relevance of changes to background conditions for the assessment of insensitivity are problematically subjective. It is important to address this question if the notion of insensitivity is to be used to avoid the problems noted above. Moreover, as we will see, the issues that I discuss concerning subjectivity are of crucial importance to subsequent discussions in this chapter and in the next.

Now, a problem concerning subjectivity seems to arise since, as I explained above, the relevance of certain changes for assessing insensitivity can depend on context, pragmatics, the expectations of the subject and so on. For example, as Woodward notes, many generalizations in economics will be extremely sensitive to changes to the neurological processes of economic agents,

but it would seem strange to consider these changes as relevant for assessing the insensitivity of economic causal generalizations. Or, alternatively, it is possible for some changes to strike one individual as extremely close to actuality, but for the same changes to strike another individual as fairly far-fetched, given, for example, a difference in social expectations between the subjects. In other words, a potential problem arises since one could argue that by employing a similarity

metric   along   the   lines   of   Lewis’   notion   of   closeness   of   possible   worlds,   this  

account is simply open to the same problems that Lewis faces, which concern the apparent vagueness of the notions of closeness and similarity (Fine 1975).

However, as Woodward explains in the following passage, the concept of insensitivity is not problematically subjective:

“First,   as   emphasized   above,   one   of   my   primary   interests in the role of sensitivity is in using this notion to describe actual practices of causal

judgment.  It  is  an  empirical  question  to  what  extent  people’s  judgments  

of sensitivity depend on the factors I have described; to the extent that they do, it is not an objection to the account that some of these features

strike   us   as   “subjective.”   Second,   it   is   also   of   course   an   empirical   question   to   what   extent   there   is   intersubjective   agreement   in   people’s  

judgments of sensitivity; it may be that we are largely able to agree on such judgments despite their highly contextual and highly multifaceted character. Finally, one obvious response to worries about subjectivity and context dependence is to relativize judgments of sensitivity to particular sets of changes in backgrounds. Even if you and I disagree about whether such and such a departure B* from actuality is large or far-fetched, it may

be  an  “objective”  matter  (or  at  least  a  matter  about  which  we  may  expect  

far more agreement) whether some counterfactual or causal claim would hold under B*. Thus, even if we disagree about whether the introduction

of a solid steel barrier between Suzy and the bottle represents a large departure from the actual state of affairs, we can presumably agree that if such a barrier were introduced, it would no longer be true that if Suzy

were  to  throw,  the  bottle  would  shatter.”  (Ibid:  15)  

There are several points captured in this passage that are relevant to our discussion. Firstly, what this passage suggests is that judgements of insensitivity may not actually differ to as great an extent as one might initially think, but to the extent that they do differ, this is not fatal to the notion of insensitivity, since this notion is essentially a practical one that concerns the nature of our causal judgements and as such we should expect a certain degree of subjectivity to enter into these judgements. Secondly, this passage suggests that to the extent that there are differences in judgements about which changes are more or less relevant for assessing insensitivity, we can assume that whether the counterfactuals actually hold under those changes is not a subjective matter. Although this point is not captured in the passage above, most importantly, I suggest that this kind of subjectivity does not introduce a problematic kind of subjectivity into interventionism, since as I explained above (and as I explain in further detail in Section 4.5 below), whether or not some relationship or generalization qualifies as causal depends solely on whether that relationship or generalization is invariant under interventions and I suggest below that we have good reason to think that this question is entirely objective.

With the notion of insensitivity outlined, I will now demonstrate how this notion helps interventionism to overcome two standard problems that less developed counterfactual theories of causation face. These are the problems that arise from cases of non-paradigmatic causation and causation by omissions.

Firstly, consider the problem that it is possible, according to interventionism, for some relationship to qualify as genuinely causal in virtue of the fact that there is counterfactual dependence of the right kind, namely invariance under interventions, even though those relationships strike us as un- paradigmatically causal (or even non-causal). One might reach this conclusion,

for  example,  in  the  case  of  the  claim  relating  the  scratching  of  Suzy’s  nose  to  the  

bottle shattering. One could argue that these kinds of cases actually illustrate that counterfactual dependence is not sufficient for causation, since they appear to illustrate that it is possible for there to exist counterfactual dependence of the right kind without causation.

The notion of insensitivity helps interventionism to avoid this problem, since it explains how it is possible for some relationship to qualify as genuinely causal, even though it may be judged as un-paradigmatically causal, or even non- causal, given that it is fairly sensitive.37 When faced with examples of this kind there is therefore no reason to conclude that counterfactual dependence is not sufficient for causation, since our causal judgements that these cases are somewhat problematic and non-paradigmatic are explained by the relative sensitivity of those claims.38

37 _{Note that this also explains how certain background conditions (such as the presence of oxygen} in the environment) can strictly qualify as causal according to interventionism, whilst striking us as somehow unparadigmatically, or problematically causal.

38 _{There are of course those who will simply dig their heels in and argue that these cases are so} un-paradigmatic that they should not qualify as causal at all. However, the point of this

A similar problem arises for interventionism as a result of cases of causation by omissions.39 _{Remember that according to interventionism,}

omissions can qualify as genuine causes, so long as there is counterfactual dependence of the right kind between the variables. Moreover, I argued above that the fact that interventionism can accommodate cases of negative causation, while the SP concept cannot, goes some way to undermine the assumption of SP. However, a problem seems to arise since it appears that counterfactual theories of causation, including interventionism, deliver the result that most, if not all negative events and states can qualify as genuine causes, which in many cases seems highly un-intuitive. In order to illustrate how the notion of insensitivity

helps  to  overcome  this  problem,  consider  the  following  example  of  Woodward’s:      

“First,  consider

(5.1) My writing of this very essay was caused by my not being hit by a large meteor

and the associated counterfactuals,

(5.2) If I were not struck by a large meteor, I would have written this very essay

and

(5.3) If I were struck by a large meteor, I would not have written this very

essay.”  (Ibid:  24)  

discussion is not to convince those who are deeply sceptical about counterfactual theories of causation that they are wrong, but rather to illustrate that this problem can be dealt with within an interventionist framework, by appealing to the notion of insensitivity.

39 _{The problems associated with causation by omissions (in particular for counterfactual accounts}

of  causation)  are  captured  concisely  by  Beebee  (2004).  Although  I  cannot  discuss  Beebee’s  

arguments here, I believe that the notion of insensitivity addresses the problems that Beebee highlights in her paper.

Now, according to interventionism, there is a sense in which (5.1) is true, since it is true that intervening on whether Woodward is struck by a meteor is a way of intervening on the writing of the essay. However, as Woodward points out, it is also true that counterfactual (5.2) is highly sensitive40_{, in the sense that}

there are a range of relatively small variations to the situation, which would result in Woodward not writing the essay. For example, he may fail to have had the conversation with his colleague that gave him the idea for the essay, or he