Although the scope of Vietnamese activities in Thailand had increased significantly by the end of 1945, 1946 was the year during which Thailand's importance to Vietnam took on new meaning as the French moved to retake the rest of Indochina. Having increased their military presence in southern Indochina by late 1945 and early 1946, the French stepped up their diplomatic campaign to gain Chungking's agreement to withdraw its troops from northern Indochina. Chiang Kaishek, competing for control of North China with the Chinese Communists, was increasingly receptive to a deal with the French, knowing it would allow him to divert much needed troops from Indochina to northern China. The French prodded Chungking by offering to abandon their colonial concessions in China. One of the first significant indications of a change came in early February, when the Chinese allowed around two thousand French-led troops to cross into northern Laos on their way towards northwestern Vietnam.79 By 8 February, the gravity of this security threat to Hanoi was clear as French-led troops occupied the
Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 31 December 1990, Washington, D.C. When I interviewed Dlnh in late 1989, I asked him about a certain Dr. Hai (who we shall meet in chapter 4) about whom I had learned from an interview published in the Thai paper, Suphap Burnt, in February 1946. Dlnh said that this Dr.
Hai was the head of the VNS after WWII. As we shall see in chapter 4, a Le Hy can definitely be documented as the DRV official in charge o f the VNS from 1946. In Vietnamese, Hy's name can also be correctly spelled as "Hi," with no change in the Vietnamese pronunciation. However, when read in English, "Hi" may have been pronounced as "Hi," as in the greeting in English. Thus, the "Hai" (as transliterated from the Thai spelling, "lü") said to have worked in Thailand in late 1945 may have been the same person as the "Hy" (Vietnamese spelling) who headed the VNS in 1946.
'Declaration o f the Foreign Office of the Provisional Government o f the Republic o f Viet-Nam,' (Bangkok: Vietnam News Service, September 1945), p. 2.
David Marr, 'Vietnam 1945,' p. 174; Nguyen Kien Giang, op. cit, p. 160; and Tpnnesson, Vietnamese Revolution, pp. 292-94 and 300.
northwestern town of Lai Chau.80 This was followed by a Sino-French Accord on 28 February. In this agreement, Chungking agreed that its forces would be withdrawn from northern Indochina and replaced by French troops. In exchange, the French renounced their economic concessions and extra-territorial rights in China and granted the Chinese special trading privileges in Vietnam.81
In early 1946, the French adopted a two-track policy that pressed the Chinese diplomatically to withdraw their troops from Indochina and began political action toward the Vietnam ese.82 The Sino-French agreement marked the culmination o f the first goal. The second came on 6 March, when the French signed an accord with Ho Chi Minh in which they agreed to hold a referendum on Vietnamese unification and recognised Vietnam's status as a free state (£tat libre) within the French Union and the Indochinese Federation. The Vietnamese allowed, among other things, the French to station fifteen thousand troops in northern Vietnam. By placating the Vietnamese with the 6 March Accord, French authorities could then turn their attention to retaking Laos and forcing the Thais to return the Indochinese territories.
To the D RV, the signing o f the Franco-Sino Accord had im portant strategic implications.83 With the Chinese agreeing to withdraw, the Vietnamese realised that one o f the m ajor obstacles deterring a French attack on northern Indochina would soon be removed. According to Vietnamese communist sources, the ICP was faced with two choices immediately after 28 February: either they could take up arms against the French or they could pursue a peaceful course of action by entering into negotiations with them. One reason for advocating dialogue was that the Vietnamese were militarily unprepared to begin armed struggle in M arch.84 Secondly, it was felt that if a policy o f nation-wide resistance were adopted, it would encounter combined Franco-Sino military opposition.85 Lastly, by gaining a reprieve through negotiations with the French in March, the Viet Minh could concentrate on strengthening their military and political position in Nam Bo and facilitating the withdrawal of the Chinese. On 5 March, a meeting o f the ICP Central
8 0 Cam Trong, Ngir&i Thai & Tay Bac Viet Nam [Thai Peoples in Northwest Vietnam], (Hanoi:
NXBKHXH, 1978), p. 522; 'Chi Thi cua Ban Chap Hanh Trung l/omg Däng ve "Tinh Hinh vh Chu Truong," 3 March 1946' [The Party Central Committee's Directives concerning the "Situation and Policy"], VKD, 1945-1950, p. 41; and Nguyen Kien Giang, op. cit., p. 160.
81 Nguyen Kien Giang, op. cit., pp. 158-60; Chen, op. cit., pp. 140-42; Marr, 'Vietnam 1945,' pp. 174-75;
and Stein Tpnnesson, T he Outbreak o f War in Indochina 1946,' (Dissertation, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, Fall 1982), pp. 31-32 [Hereafter, cited as The Outbreak o f War1] .
8 2 T h e Outbreak o f War,' pp. 69-72, especially p. 70 and fh. 6, p. 326; and Giang, pp. 158 and 161.
83 See: 'Chi Thi . . . "Tinh Hinh vh Chü Trucmg," VKD, 1945-1950, pp. 4 0 4 6 and Dang Bich Ha, op. cit.,
p . 177.
8 4 Nguyen Kien Giang, op. cit, p. 162 and 'Chi Thi . . . Tinh Hinh va Chu Trucmg,'" VKD, 1945-1950, pp.
43 and 4 4 4 5 .
Committee approved a policy called "peace in order to advance" (hba de tien)ß6 The next day Ho Chi Minh signed the 6 March accord.
Despite the benefits derived from the "peace in order to advance" policy for the Vietnamese, the 6 March Accord (as well as the Sino-Franco Accord) effectively weakened Hanoi's "Lao buffer" in the west, to say nothing o f possible negative repercussions on Viet Minh-Lao Issara relations.87 Four days after the 6 March Accord, Major General Alessandri launched an offensive on all of Laos above the 16th parallel. With troops, tanks, and planes from Saigon, he quickly retook Savannakhet on the 10th. Although Viet Minh and Lao Issara forces tried to defend the cities they had occupied since the end o f WWII, their concentration in urban centres made them easy targets for superior French firepower. On the morning of the 21st, the French began an attack on Thakhek. According to a variety of accounts of this battle, French-flown Spitfires strafed the city in support of a ground attack. Thousands of Lao and Vietnamese inhabitants fled across the Mekong River to Thailand as Lao-Vietnamese forces attempted to hold the city, but to no avail. Hundreds were probably killed in this battle, many of them machine- gunned while trying to flee across the river to Nakhon Phanom.88
On 24 April, the French retook Vientiane, overthrew the Lao Issara government, and established a pro-French government in its place. With the capture of Luang Prabang by mid-May, the French had completed their reoccupation of Laos. In all, the offensive had sent around fifty thousand refugees (mostly Vietnamese) fleeing into Thailand.89 There
86
87
88
89
Nguyen Kien Giang, op. cit., p. 170. For further details of the March "peace in order to advance" policy,
see: Vö Nguyen Giäp, M ay Van De Ve Dircmg Loi Q uin Sir Cua Ta [Several Problems concerning Our
Military Policy], (Hanoi: NXBST, 1970), p. 34; 'Chi Thi cua Ban Chap Hanh Trung LTomg Däng ve "Hba de Tien" (9 March 1946)' [The Party Central Committee's Directives concerning 'Peace in order to
Advance"], VKD, 1945-1950, p. 55; and Dang Bich Ha, op. cit., p. 177.
For an indication of Lao dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese signing of the 6 March accord, see: 'Letter 2: Note on the Subject of the Resignation of Prince Souphanouvong by Katay Don Sasorith, Minister of
Finance, May 12, 1949,' translated and reproduced by Brown and Zasloff, op. cit, p. 351.
The effect of this battle on Vietnamese activities in Thailand will be discussed in the next chapter.
Sources for the Battle of Thakhek come from: Sichana Sisan, op. c it, pp. 17-20; T he Birth,' pp. 433 and
436; Thao Oun Chananikon, op. cit, pp. 218-20; CVDCQ, pp. 166-67; Suwannarat Chaiyawong, Than
Prath an Suphanouvong baepyang Patiwat Khaophacao Dramsai' [President Souphanouvong as the
Revolutionary in Whom I Believe], in Suphot Dantrakun, op. cit, pp. 196-222; US, DOS, 'Raid on Tha
Baw and Situation Vientiane, Nong Khai,' 31 May 1946, USNA; Ciru Quoc, 6 May 1946, No. 232; and
Gunn, op. cit, pp. 169-70. Geoffrey Gunn, who correctly points out the importance of the Battle of
Thakhek for Lao history, incorrectly puts the date of the battle on 31 March (p. 169). Gunn seems to
overlook the strategic implications for Laos of Franco-Vietnamese negotiations. It was probably no
coincidence that Savannakhet was attacked by the French a few days after the 6 March Accord. Unfortunately, inaccuracies detract from Gunn's book, stemming in part from his considerable over- reliance on French intelligence sources at the expense of making more reference to Lao, Thai, US,
and/or Vietnamese sources. For a particularly confusing explanation of his use of SuretS reports, see:
Gunn, op. cit., p. 43.
Thai, Vietnamese, and American sources put the number of refugees fleeing to Thailand at around
50,000. See the following sources: 'Raid on Tha Bo,' p. 15; Suphap Burnt, 29 April 1946; and Hoang
Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 287. Peter Poole, who has done considerable research on the Vietnamese in
Thailand, puts the number of Vietnamese refugees fleeing to Thailand in 1945 and 1946 at 46,700. See:
Peter A. Poole, 'Notes and Comment, Thailand's Vietnamese Refugees: Can They Be Assimilated?'
were now only two obstacles blocking restoration of French power to all of Indochina: Bangkok and Hanoi.
Having signed the March Accord and retaken Laos, French attention shifted away from the Franco-Vietnamese conflict to the Franco-Thai dispute. In April, Thai representatives travelled to Dalat to discuss the future of the Indochinese territories with the French High Commissioner, Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu. The French demanded return of the Cambodian and Lao territories which Bangkok had gained through the help of the Japanese in 1941. The Thais, however, held out for a readjustment of the border according to historical considerations and proposed that a referendum be held to determine the future status of the disputed territories. The talks broke down at the end of the month. A few days later, the first of two serious incidents broke out along the Thai-Indochina frontier directly related to our discussion of Vietnamese resistance activity in Thailand.