Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (“PWC”) manufactured the engine that was used by a commuter aircraft which crashed in Kentucky.291 Representatives of a passenger who was killed brought a products liability action against PWC in Georgia.292
290 460 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (en banc). 291 Id. at 95.
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application
The basis for the trial court’s denial of PWC’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is not discussed. In finding a lack of personal jurisdiction and reversing, the Georgia Court of Appeals first analyzed whether PWC was a “resident” foreign corporation according to the definition of “non-resident” in the long-arm statute. It held that PWC was not a “resident,” because “PWC is not authorized to do or transact business in Georgia, does not have any offices or employees in Georgia, and does not have a registered agent for service of process in Georgia.”293 Thus, because PWC was a nonresident, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether the long-arm statute allowed for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Since the aircraft crash occurred outside Georgia, the cause of action did not arise from the defendant’s activities within Georgia as required by the long-arm statute. Thus, “Georgia has no basis to assert jurisdiction over PWC, a nonresident foreign corporation, because the cause of action did not occur in Georgia, and no other basis exists therefor.”294 The dissent argued, however, that general personal jurisdiction was available over the defendant.295
b. Model Long-Arm Application
The first inquiry is whether PWC’s activities within Georgia were continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. PWC had not registered for authorization to transact business in Georgia, but it did business with at least two customers there, including three to four million dollars of business a year with one of those customers.296 Also, an affiliated company, P&WC Aircraft Services, Inc., operated a service station in Atlanta, Georgia, to which PWC shipped spare parts.297 Additionally, PWC sent employees to the state for customer relations and marketing.298 These activities were more than merely occasional, but were ongoing, and continuous and systematic activities by PWC with the forum.
The second inquiry is whether or not the cause of action arose from PWC’s forum activities. In this case, PWC manufactured its engines in Canada and the aircraft crash occurred in Kentucky. Therefore, the
293 Id. at 96. 294 Id. at 97.
295 “It is my view that PWC is subject to a general jurisdiction in the courts of Georgia due to its continuous and systematic commercial activities in Georgia.” Id. at 98 (McMurray, P. J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 99. 297 Id. 298 Id.
products liability action did not arise from PWC’s activities within Georgia, and the case must be further analyzed under subsection (3)(B)(3). Under subsection (3)(B)(3)(ii), it must then be determined whether the continuous and systematic contacts are of such quantity as to support the conclusion that PWC is present in the forum. The numerous, ongoing contacts described above are such that, at least arguably, PWC should be considered present in Georgia. Therefore, the case appears to satisfy the minimum contact requirement of Quadrant III.
Under subsection (3)(C)(3), in a Quadrant III case, there is a rebuttable presumption that the defendant is prejudiced by maintenance of the action within the forum. This presumption can be rebutted, however, under subsection (3)(C)(3)(b), if the plaintiff establishes that the defendant’s contacts with the forum demonstrate that the defendant has engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of “doing business” in the forum as to support the conclusion that it is present in the forum. This places an appropriate burden on the plaintiffs seeking to invoke general personal jurisdiction to compile a competently detailed and factually adequate record of the nonresident defendant’s forum activities. In this case, the numerous continuous and systematic contacts discussed above appear to be the kind of information required for a court to support the notion that PWC is “doing business” within Georgia. The proper analysis, therefore, focuses on a qualitative assessment of PWC’s in-state activities, which is the only defensible way to evaluate whether PWC would be prejudiced by maintenance of the action within Georgia, and personal jurisdiction would be validly exercised over the corporation.
The difference in outcome under the Model Long-Arm statute illustrates how it properly characterizes the quantity of contacts as continuous and systematic, unlike the Georgia courts, which, due to the constraints of the Georgia long-arm statute, do not recognize the significance of the quantity of contacts when the cause of action does not arise out of them.
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise Regulation Principles
The need for corrective justice in this type of case is strong. The manufacturer of an aircraft engine clearly creates a nonreciprocal risk to those traveling in an aircraft—the risk of death or serious injury due to an engine failure. Although the allegedly defective part was manufactured in Canada and the aircraft crash that the cause of action is based upon did not occur in Georgia, the state has an interest in
regulating PWC and effectuating the corrective justice principle because of the extent of business that PWC does within Georgia and the presence of its products in the air over the state. Admittedly, this is not a circumstance where the cause of action lies within the heart of the overlap between the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles because the alleged tortious act and injury occurred outside the state, but the importance of ensuring that PWC’s products shipped into Georgia are safe helps to push this case from the limb into the area of overlap.
D. Quadrant 4—Single or Occasional Contact + Unconnected Cause of