El papel de los docentes de Inglés Técnico

Despite the fact that security is challenged in Afghanistan, the core insurgent faction remains the Taliban movement. To date, there have been many attempts to negotiate with the Taliban and reach a settlement, but these attempts have not proven to be successful. Talking to the Taliban became official policy once it was realized that defeating the Taliban was no option anymore (Qassem, 2014). Talking with the Taliban became official policy in 2009, after President Obama took office. Since then, the official US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan was in line with the Afghan government’s efforts to open the doors of negotiation to the Taliban who were willing to abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens (Semper, 2009:21). Karzai’s efforts to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table consisted of bringing together handpicked delegates from all over the country that would give the government a strong mandate to talks with the Taliban. In 2010 Karzai introduced the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) and the High Peace Council was established, which would open and lead the dialogues with the Taliban (Chandra, 2011: 843). After the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani by the Taliban, the Chairman of the High Peace Council, hopes for reconciliation flourished. Nevertheless, Karzai stated that indeed Rabbani’s death was a tragic loss, but it would not imply the end of continuation of the efforts to bring peace in Afghanistan (BBC News, 2011).

From 2010 till 2012, the US held intermittent meetings with the Taliban Political Commission. It is said that Mullah Omar had authorized this commission to carry out outreach domestically and internationally. The talks were suspended by the Taliban by the end of 2012 because of atrocities committed by the US army in Afghanistan (Qassem, 2014: 373). When the Taliban opened their office in Qatar, it seemed to be a promising year, but this too failed to deliver its promised outcome (idem). Shortly after Ashraf Ghani was inaugurated as the President of Afghanistan in

45 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague 2014, he visited Pakistan several times to improve the relations between the two countries (Destradi, 2015). President Ghani made many concessions, such as withdraw the request of heavy weapons from India (by former President Karzai). In return, Ghani wanted to have equal concessions from the Pakistani establishment. This included Pakistan’s effort to pressure the Taliban to negotiate directly with the Afghan government (idem).

The Taliban leadership (based in Quetta, Pakistan and often referred to as the Quetta Shura) avoided and delayed Pakistan’s request, and instead announced their largest spring offensive ever on April 2015, and Pakistan did not show any opposition (BBC, 2015). President Ghani and President Karzai both called the Pakistani involvement a betrayal of the people of Afghanistan. Given the frustration among the Afghan government, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief General Raheel Sharif went to Kabul in May to halt the deteriorating relations. This eventually led the ISI (Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence) flying out three former Taliban members to Urumqi, China. The three figures all served as ministers during the Taliban regime in Afghanistan from 1996 till 2001, but they have no current relation or influence to the Taliban Political Commission. The Taliban leadership was quick to reject the meeting as they posted an official statement on their website (Daily Times, 2016).

Pakistan’s pressured on the Taliban leadership based in Pakistan continued and eventually this led to Taliban’s deputy leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, to authorize senior Taliban leaders to meet with an official Afghan delegation on July 7th in Murree, Pakistan (BBC, 2015). The Afghan delegation was led by Haji Din Muhammad, a senior member of the High Peace Council. The Taliban delegates were Mullah Abbas Akhund, Abdul Latif Mansur, and Ibrahim Haqqani (idem). The first two are said to be part of the liaison committee of the ISI, and Haqqani is the leader of the Haqqani Network that is often referred to as ‘a veritable arm of Pakistan’s ISI’ (CNN, 2015). This meeting was chaired by Pakistani diplomats, high-ranked observers from ISI, and also observers from the US and China were present (idem). While the UN, China and US described the meeting as a breakthrough, the Taliban Commission’s spokesperson said that the Taliban delegates had participated as hostages of Pakistan (BBC, 2015). This was followed by an article published on the Taliban website, which stated that ‘When the dust settles, the much hailed talks between the Taliban officials and Ghani-administration officials in Islamabad will be

46 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague revealed as nothing more than Pakistan delivering a few individuals from the Islamic Emirate to speak in their personal capacity’. The Taliban Political Office too issued an stated that it was open for negotiations, but only on Taliban’s terms and without Pakistan’s involvement (Shahamat, 2015).

After Mullah Omar’s death announcement in July 2015, the talks were postponed by the Taliban leadership, and with the fragmentation within the Taliban it only remains a question to what extent future talks may deliver a positive outcome. The latest news with regard to the negotiation process is Taliban’s refusal to take part if the conditions they have set are not met. These conditions are the exit of the foreign troops, lifting curbs on Taliban leaders, and the release of Taliban fighters from prisons (Daily News, 2016; Shahamat, 2016).