7 E.g., T s ’ai:2.6b, 4.3b. The fact that the pirates seem to have put an economic as well as domestic value on the women of Chia-hsing is a testimony to the importance of women in the economy of the area.
8
9
T s ’a i :2.10b. T s ’a i :2.6 a .
damage. As their numbers grew from year to year, although their quality as a fighting force was somewhat dissipated, the grief they caused the local population must have substantially increased. However, except for the coastal area and a few inland places where pirates were camped for considerable periods, most parts of the prefecture suffered only a few swift, if devastating, attacks during the whole four years of pirate incursions. This uneven distribution of the burden of the pirate attacks was largely offset by the measures taken by the government to resist them. The most obvious and burdensome of these measures was the quartering in Chia-hsing prefecture of an enormous inflow of troops.
Compared with the attention given to the depredations of the pirates in the accounts, mention of the troubles caused by troops is less common and is couched in more general terms. From smal] hints and occasional specific evidence a picture of the burden caused by the presence of troops begins to emerge: after allowance is made for the bias of the accounts against the pirates it is possible to see that from a peasant’s point of view, a soldier and a pirate were much the same thing.
Few local inhabitants had had any direct experience of armed conflict, but no-one in Chia-hsing who knew the old tales of war could doubt that their countryside would suffer from the presence of troops. Even so, they were not prepared for the degree of rapaciousness and violence which at times they suffered from the incoming troops. Even early in 1554, cases of looting were widespread.10 In 1555, when there was a meeting of commanders at Hai-yen, troops numbering in tens of
thousands were said to have been camped at Chin-shan.*11 In the latter days of the crisis, in the middle months of 1556, troops numbered at least twice as many as the highest estimate of pirates.12 In the final
10 Chia-hsing fu chih 1878:42.18a, biography of C h ’en Tsung-k’uei.
Ch’en was transferred to the Chia-hu military circuit from Fukien in early 1554. He found that incidents involving troops were already "as many as the spines of a hedgehog". He had plans to reduce the incidence of trouble caused by troops, but could not get on with his superiors and was transferred.
11 T s ’ai:3.3a.
12 Hucker, "Hu Tsung-hsien*s campaign against Hsü Hai, 1556", pp.286-7. Hucker calculates that there were roughly ten thousand troops in
c i r c u i t i n s p e c t o r , L i u T ’ a o , c a u s e d s u c h t r o u b l e i n P ’ i n g - h u c i t y t h a t t h e p o w e r f u l t r i u m v i r a t e Hu T s u n g - h s i e n , G o v e r n o r J u a n 0 a n d I n s p e c t o r o f A r m i e s Chao W e n - h u a , w e n t t h e r e t o r e s t o r e o r d e r . 13 The i n c o m i n g t r o o p s , who w e r e a s g o o d a s f o r e i g n e r s t o t h e l o c a l p e o p l e , n e e d e d f o o d a n d s h e l t e r . A l t h o u g h t h e y w e r e s u p p o s e d t o be p r o v i d e d w i t h a t l e a s t a mi nimum o f b o t h , t h e e x p e r i e n c e d o n e s among t h e t r o o p s knew t h a t t h i s mi nimum o f t e n f a i l e d t o m a t e r i a l i z e , a s p r o f i t s f r o m t h e r a t i o n s s e t a s i d e f o r t h e m d i s a p p e a r e d i n t o t h e s l e e v e s o f t h e i r c o m m a n d e r s a n d o f f i c i a l s . Men l i k e t h e s e h a d l e a r n e d t o l o o k a f t e r t h e m s e l v e s by l i v i n g o f f t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . T h e r e w e r e p l e n t y o f t r o o p s t o o who t o o k f u l l a d v a n t a g e o f a n y c h a n c e t o i m p r o v e t h e i r f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n o r a f f o r d t h e m s e l v e s a l i t t l e g o o d f o o d o r e n t e r t a i n m e n t a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e l o c a l p e o p l e . W r i t i n g some y e a r s l a t e r i n t h e W a n - l i e d i t i o n o f t h e H s i u - s h u i d i s t r i c t g a z e t t e e r , a l o c a l s c h o l a r s a i d : W h e r e v e r t h e y w e n t t h e ' g u e s t - t r o o p s ’ , b o a s t f u l a n d s w a g g e r i n g , r o b b e d a n d p l u n d e r e d . F o w l s a n d d o g s s c a t t e r e d a n d w e r e s i l e n t , p e d l a r s c l o s e d down t h e i r s t a l l s . They do t h e i r w o r k w i t h t h e i r e y e s o n l y on b o u n t y f o r t h e c a p t u r e o f t h e p i r a t e s , a n d t h e n f i g h t o v e r t h e r e w a r d . Th e y r e m o v e t h e i r h e a d - g e a r ( b y w h i c h p e o p l e c o u l d t e l l t h e y w e r e s o l d i e r s ) a n d c r e a t e d i s t u r b a n c e s . 14 One i n c i d e n t w h i c h o c c u r r e d a t H a i - y e n , a town w h i c h h a d h e a v y c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f t r o o p s t h r o u g h o u t t h i s p e r i o d , i s r e p o r t e d by T s ' a i C h i u - t e : E a r l y o n t h e e i g h t h d a y ( o f t h e s e c o n d m o n t h o f 1 5 5 5 ) a d e t a c h m e n t o f ' g u e s t - t r o o p s ' came n o r t h a l o n g t h e c o a s t b l o w i n g h o r n s t o a n n o u n c e t h e i r p r e s e n c e . When t h e y a r r i v e d a t H a i - y e n , t h e y c l a m o u r e d o u t s i d e t h e n o r t h g a t e , ( b u t ) t h e g u a r d s w e r e p o s i t i o n a l d e f e n c e , a n d a n o t h e r t e n t h o u s a n d a v a i l a b l e f o r t a c t i c a l w a r f a r e i n t h e C h e - h s i s e c t o r when llu T s u n g - h s i e n b e c a m e S u p r e m e Commander i n e a r l y 1 5 5 6. T h i s n u m b e r h a d i n c r e a s e d by a p p r o x i m a t e l y a n o t h e r t e n t h o u s a n d by t h e c l i m a x o f t h e c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t Hsii H a l i n t h e s e v e n t h a n d e i g h t h m o n t h s . The p i r a t e s i n 1556 w e r e s a i d t o n u m b e r t e n t h o u s a n d , m o r e r a t h e r t h a n l e s s . The t o t a l f i g u r e s g i v e n i n T s ’ a i C h i u - t e ' s a c c o u n t a r e e i t h e r w r o n g l y t r a n s c r i b e d o r c o m p l e t e l y i n a c c u r a t e o n h i s p a r t , e . g . 4 . 1 0 b . 13 T s ’ a l : 4 . 8 b . 14 llsiu -L 'h u i hs'icn c h ih 1 5 9 6 : 2 . 1 9 a .
suspicious and would not receive them. Some military officials arrived and handed over their permits to enter, from which (the guards) learnt that they were soldiers of Shantung. Once the officers had entered the city, the troops dispersed outside the walls, and went about stealing, raping and demanding food, no
less than if they had been pirates. The people had no way of redressing their grievances. Later (these troops) were sent into battle at Chia-hsing. Incomparably stupid and cowardly, they absconded as they were about to go into battle. In this futile manner the military funds for our prefecture were eaten up. 1 5
The disgust of this native of Hai-yen in contemplating the men who were sent to protect them from the pirate menace is understandable. Not only did the troops behave no better than pirates, but local people had been burdened with extra taxes to support them. What seemed shameful to a scholar was a basis for cynicism and despair among the people who were the victims.
For those who had wealth to lose, especially those whose large country estates made them a target, there was certainly a distinction between pirates and troops. While the rape of a peasant’s wife or the loss of his small store of grain might escape the notice of the
authorities, the molestation of a well-known and wealthy family would not. While the pirates concentrated on large stores of grain and other goods and on the valuables from wealthy private houses, the troops, when forced to fend for themselves, concentrated on those people who had least chance of obtaining official attention. This distinction cannot be taken too far, but as a tendency in the troops' behaviour it was magnified by the far greater number of troops compared with pirates.
The size and regularity of the pay of incoming troops became a matter of local concern both for officials and the local population,
although strictly it was a matter for the regional commanders and the circuit level officials. Although officials below that level had some duties involving troops and military installations permanently stationed within their districts, they were not otherwise responsible for the well-being of troops transferred to their district to handle temporary military crises.
1 5
Magistrates and prefects were responsible for the collection of taxes and also of the special levies which were to pay for the defence effort. They therefore had a general interest in keeping troop unrest to a minimum to keep their tax-payers undisturbed at their job of earning a livelihood.
When troops were stationed near towns, it was in the interest of business people, including the owners of small shops and eating stalls as well as the proprietors of larger establishments, to see that the troops were properly paid and fed. The alternative was to suffer petty thieving and brawling from frustrated and hungry men.
Thus both local officials and local people were interested in minimizing the trouble caused by troops by guaranteeing as far as
possible that they were properly provided for. Ordinary incoming troops were supposed to be paid five fe n a day;16 occasionally a particularly experienced group would receive a higher daily amount plus extra
allowances; for example T ’ang K ’o-k’uan's 300 P*i troops who were capable, bat tie-hardened and experienced in fighting pirates in Fukien, were to be paid eight fe n a day plus meat and wine every ten days.
The distribution of rations was also a responsibility which devolved upon the local civil officials. The public granaries associated with their administrative towns were used to house grain brought in to help feed the troops, or to reserve grain which was made exempt from tax. When the town was under threat of attack, the accepted behaviour for an official was to distribute arms and rations from the granaries and store houses to both locally-stationed soldiers and
civilian recruits who were being made to man the walls. To maintain the minimum of morale under an attack, a guaranteed supply of food from a safely-guarded store was Important.
The regular supply of food to troops presupposed that the government had acquired the ability to pay for such rations through taxation. The troops not only had to be endured as unpleasant guests
16 Ts*ai:2.12a; Li, Yii~Wo ehu~k3 o -e h iin, p.28. 17 Ts *ai:1.6a.
whose keep had to be carefully provided for, but they had to be paid for as well. The court, heavily committed to the financing of defence of the northern border areas, had already fully committed the ordinary taxes of the south-eastern provinces to help pay for defence in the north. There was no alternative but for the wealthy south-east to pay for its own defence, in addition to its regular taxes.
The general extra levy of 0.103 taels per mu imposed in 1554 on the south-eastern provinces, was said to have caused widespread distress