El Plan Beveridge: modelo inglés de protección social

As the quest for a Palestinian homeland has gradually gained a certain credibility and respectability, the aim to get worldwide public attention for the Palestinian problem has been abandoned. This has resulted in reducing the number of attacks on civil aviation by the Palestinian groups.

Other Middle Eastern Muslim terrorist groups, however, began to adopt aviation terrorism as their lactic on a large scale from the late 1970s. Since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came into power in Iran in Februaiy 1979, ten'orism has been employed as a tool of foreign and interior policy by revolutionary Iran. The phenomenon gained impetus in the early 1980s, when the Hezbollah organization started to operate in Lebanon and in the international arena, and Shia terrorism became one of the most prominent expressions of international terrorism. A variety of tactics including aircraft hijacking have come to be associated with Iranian-sponsored international terrorism. During the 1980s, Shia terrorists were involved in at least 13 aircraft hijacking incidents. In most cases, aircraft hijackings developed into serious crisis situations involving many states. Diverse states thus have been confronted with complex political and diplomatic challenges associated with attacks against civil aviation by Shia terrorist groups. The challenges have been connected with the fact that the initiators and supporters of the teiTorist attacks were other sovereign stales. Moreover, the systematic employment of hijacking tactics and the high lethality of the attacks have provided great dilemmas for the targeted states, which have

of the attacks have provided great dilemmas for the taigeted states, which have had to cope with intense public pressure to safeguard the hostages.

The ah’craft hijacking by Shia fundamentalist groups was launched in late 1970s. When the Shia Muslim leader. Imam Musa Sadr, disappeaied in August 1978 while on a visit to Libya, Amal, which was founded in mid-1970s in an attempt to ensure adequate representation for the Shia population in Lebanon, began to launch actions against Lebanese leftists and Libya. The disappearance of Musa, in fact, prompted Amal to launch a campaign of aircraft liijackings to gain the release of its leader. The fiist attack occuned on January 16, 1979, when a Middle Eastern Ahlines(MEA) was hijacked by six members of Amal. The hijackers demanded the release of theii* leader and a news conference was held in Beirut by hijackers to publicize their d e m a n d .This incident was followed by more than 6 other ah'craft hijacking attempts with the same aim of releasing Imam Musa Sadr. This series of aircraft hijackings by Amal failed to cause a great impact on international affahs possibly because of the mysterious ch'cumstances around the disappeai ance of its leader.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah which was established in early 1983 under the influence of Islamic revolution in Iran launched its aviation terrorism campaign against moderate Arab states and the West. Its fiist operation was the successful hijacking of an aeroplane of Ah France to Teheran. The hijackers demanded the release of Lebanese prisoners in French prisons and the withdrawal of French troops from Chad and Lebanon.The next major operation by Hezbollah was the hijacking of a Kuwaiti Ahlhies aeroplane to Telnan in 1984. The hijackers

^72 U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal AcisTnvQlvmg C ivil Aviation: January-December 1979. P. 1

173 U.S. Depaiiment of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal Acts Involving C ivil Aviation: Januai y-December 1983. P. 16

attacks against U.S. and French installations. Kuwaiti authorities refused to meet this demand and the hijackers were overpowered by Iranian security forces.^^^ Like previous hijackings by Amal, the aim of releasing 17 Lebanese prisoners featured on several occasions including another Kuwaiti aircraft hijacking in 1988.1^5 As one of the most sophisticated terrorist organizations, Hezbollah provides a great threat to civil aviation. This has been demonstrated by incidents such as a TW A 847 aircraft hijacking in 1985, which w ill be discussed in Chapter IV in detail. More recently, in the wake of the assassination of Hezbollah leader. Sheikh Abbas Musawi, by Israeli forces in February 16, 1992,1^® it is not difficult to anticipate that terrorist action aimed at revenge w ill be escalated by Hezbollah. At Musawi's funeral, Hezbollah vowed that they would avenge.i^^ This suggests a strong indication that Hezbollah might revert to international tenorism including attacks against civil aviation in reaction to the death of their leader. In fact, a revenge operation was begun on March 7, 1992, when the top security officer, Ehud Sadan, at the Israeli embassy in Turkey was killed by Hezbollah terrorists who planted a bomb in his car. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for this attack. A caller on behalf of the Islamic Revenge Organisation told one newspaper that "We have given an answer to the I s r a e l i s . I t is believed this was a reference to Israel's assassination of

^74 U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal Acts Involving C ivil Aviation: January-December 1984. P. 17

175 por more information and useful analyses on this incident, see Robin E. Hill, op.cit, PP. 56-94

176 The Times, February 17, 1992 177 The Guardian, February 18, 1992 178 The Sunday Times, Mai'ch 8, 1992

Musawi. Another much more serious and destructive car bomb attack against an Israeli embassy to avenge Israel’s killing of Musawi occurred on March 17, 1992, in Buenos Ahes, Ai gentina. As a result of the attack, 29 people were killed and more than 240 people were injured. Hezbollah also claimed responsibility.

In addition to the threats by Shia Muslim ten orists, it is extremely important to note that the recent Gulf conflict maiks a point of divergence in international terrorism as targets include airports and civil airliners.^*® When civil aviation was thieatened by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf Wai*, both the nature of the threats and its targets were cleai\ Although the intention to use international terrorism as an auxiliary weapon in the Gulf Wai came to nothing thanks to the combined efforts of the coalition governments, there is still a danger.^®^ The prime taigets aie the carriers and airline facilities belonging to high profile states such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, Germany and France. Furthermore, in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the new conspicuously pro-Western allegiance of moderate Ai ab states brings forth new targets. The civil aviation of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait, all of which actively support the U.S. and U.K.-led alliance, may be tai'geted due to the Arab political divisions following the Gulf crisis. The aii’ports in the major Western states, however, aie unlikely to be the main targets for the sophisticated tenorists, although they w ill continue to be at considerable risk. There is a great possibility that terrorists would find and exploit the weak links in the international aviation network. In this respect, a major enhancement of ^79 The International Herald Tribune, March 21-22, 1992

180 "Airport go on war footing", Aii port Support. February 1991, P. 5 "The Changing Tln eat", Ahports International. March 1992, P. 17

counter-teiTorist measures should be concentrated on the vulnerable ahports in Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean states.