2.1.1. Dimensions and measures
Before developing an index of the intensity of vote buying, let us turn to a more collective form of clientelist exchanges, namely club goods. Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016: 23) define club goods as “patronage that is provided for the collective benefit of bounded social groups rather than for individuals.” In this study, the presence of club goods in the 2014 elections is measured by the responses to one specific survey question. That question was: “During the run-up to April 9th 2014 election, have you observed candidates or political parties offering people in the neighbourhood goods or gifts or assistance?” In terms of the available responses, a number of options were provided. If respondents gave an affirmative reply, they could point to the kind of club goods provision they observed, such as assistance in building/renovating houses of worship (mosque, church,
etc.); assistance in building/renovating schools, madrassahs, religious boarding schools,
or other educational institutions; assistance for certain community groups (e.g. religious groups, women’s groups such as Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK, Family Welfare Guidance groups), youth groups, farmer/fishermen groups, etc.); assistance in
building/repairing roads, bridges, irrigation systems, etc.; and assistance in providing sports fields/equipment/uniforms.
In addition, respondents were free to mention other types of assistance that were not listed in the options. In analysing the data, I used a dichotomous measure of club goods. Based on this measure, respondents who responded affirmatively to the occurrence of club goods were assigned a value of 1, while 0 indicates those who responded negatively to such collective patronage in their neighbourhood.
2.1.2. Prevalence of club goods provision
Having discussed the definition and measure of club goods, we now turn to discuss the prevalence of such collective patronage distribution in Indonesia. Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016: 23) distinguish two sub-categories of club goods based on their targeted recipients: first, donations to community associations, and second, donations to communities living in particular low-level government units like villages, hamlets, neighbourhoods (RW,
Rukun Warga), or sub-neighbourhoods (RT, Rukun Tetangga). Indeed, the provision of
club goods seems to be an effective electoral strategy because Indonesia has a extremely dense and rich associational life (Grootaert, 1999: 24). The Local Level Institutions (LLI)
Study3 accounted for 14 different kinds of institutions in Indonesia, ranging from broad
national level organisations with many local branches, including religious organisation such as NU and Muhammadiyah, to non-religious but nationally constituted bodies such as PKK and very local groups, such as a motor taxi group, motorcycle club community or animal lovel association (Grootaert, 1999). Using data from the World Values Survey 2005-2009 dataset, Lussier and Fish (2012: 74) conclude that the intensity of organisational membership in Indonesia is ranked fifth among all countries across the world and tops all Southeast Asian countries surveyed. Further, approximately 84 percent of Indonesians belong to at least one organisation (Lussier and Fish, 2012: 74).
Prior research also suggests that club goods are common because this type of patronage strategy is often viewed as possessing more social legitimacy than vote buying (Aspinall, 2016; Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016; Hamdi, 2016). A widely held view among candidates is that club goods are not considered as proscribed vote buying
3The LLI Study is a series of comparative research organised by the World Bank’s Social Development
Department which aimed to investigate local level institutions and social capital in a number of developing countries, including Indonesia (Grootaert, 1999).
because this mobilisation tactic provides benefits for the public and does not collide with any legal rules (PKB’s Hanif Dzakiri, Interview, 26 August 2014). The PPP’s Arsul Sani explained the typical modus operandi of doing club goods (Interview, 31 October 2014). At the beginning, candidates identify respected figures in their
own electoral districts who command a group of followers (punya massa). They
then visit (sowan) the houses of such influential figures to seek implicit or explicit
endorsement, while handing out standard gifts such as sarungs, batik shirts, or other gifts. To reinforce the support and to win the electoral support of their followers, candidates deliver club goods to the institution or group associated with such popular leaders, often framing the donations in religious and social assistance terms (Aspinall, 2016). In short, most candidates I encountered suggest that unlike vote buying which is legally proscribed and is often associated with negative social stigma, club goods in Indonesia are often seen in a positive light. Indeed, they are thought of them as
religious alms (sedekah) or as part of community service rather than as bribes.4
Figure 2.1 Club good practices in the 2014 legislative election (%)
Question: During the run up to the last April 9th 2014 election, did you observe candidates or party workers offering people in the neighborhood goods or gifts or assistance in these forms? A list of examples were provided and the answer can be more than one: 1. Assistance in building/ renovating houses of worship (mosque, church, etc); 2. Assistance in building/renovating schools, madrassahs, religious boarding schools, or other other educational institutions; 3. Assistance for certain community groups (e.g. religious groups, PKK, youth groups, farmer/fisherman groups, etc); 4. Assistance in building/repairing roads, bridges, irrigation systems, etc; 5. Assistance in providing sports fields/equipment/uniforms; and 6. Other types of assistance or donation (specify:...). Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014.
This dominant discourse among politicians corresponds with the results of my voter survey. Of the 1,210 respondents surveyed, 27.4 percent stated that some candidates or brokers distributed donations or assistance for public benefit in their village or to community associations there during the campaign (Figure 2.1). This is a substantial figure, given that almost one out three Indonesians thus reported that their community had been targeted for the provision of club goods. Approximately 54 percent reported that their community had not received offers of club goods from candidates or parties, while 18.5 percent of them had no opinion or declined to answer.
In terms of which kind of assistance was provided most frequently, the two top-ranked club goods were donations to build, renovate or repair community infrastructure such as roads, bridges, or irrigation systems (11.9 percent), and the building or renovating of houses of worship, most typically mosques (10 percent). Provision of assistance for certain community groups such as religious groups, youth groups, and farmer/ fishermen groups, was also common (4.3 percent), alongside similar assistance in providing sports fields, equipment or uniforms (2.6 percent) and repairing or renovating schools, religious boarding schools, or other educational institutions (2.5 percent). Also, 3.6 percent of respondents mentioned other types of donations or assistance such as sound systems, repairing water wells and so on. It is clear, therefore, that in addition to vote buying, club goods have become an important electoral campaign tool for candidates.