El sistema APPCC en los países en desarrollo

Domain specificity theory is another approach in cognitive science which is concerned with the organization of knowledge in the human mind. This theory accounts for specialized155 learning devices in human cognition. In general terms, a cognitive capacity is domain-specific since it is within the functional structure of a single domain or a limited range of domains, and more importantly, it is not a general ability within the functional architecture of the general domains156. One could argue that this position is similar to that of Fodorian modularity of mind (Fodor, 1983)157, however it does not

153 _{This notion has a direct relationship with modality effect. According to Penney (1975), in the late}

1970s the concept of modality effect was introduced. It referred to differences in the learning and performance of stimuli presented in different modalities.

154 _{Modality specificity is different from category specificity. In accordance with Farah, Hammond,}

Mehta and Ratcliff (1989), studies of agnosia have unveiled the existence of two types of knowledge break down. The first type is the loss of knowledge in specific categories (living things, tools, etc.), regardless of the modality that is examined. The second type is the loss of knowledge in specific modalities (vision, tactile, etc.), regardless of the category of the stimuli that is tested. These data suggest the existence of at least two different organizations of knowledge, based on category and modality, in the brain.

155 _{Specialization is the separation of tasks within a system. For example, in DCT, imaginal and verbal}

coding subsystems are specialized for different tasks in the representational system; the representational system, in turn, is specialized for a particular task within a bigger system and so on.

156 _{General domain learning claims that humans have a global knowledge organization which is cohesive,}

interdependent and interconnected in all its parts, and internalized from human experience (and not from innate modules); therefore, development and conceptualization in one domain could result in changes in other domains.

157 _{A module has to possess the following characteristics (Elsabbagh & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; Fodor,}

1983): a) modules are specialized (domain specificity); they function solely with specific kinds of inputs, b) information encapsulation; encapsulation involves restrictions on the flow of information into a module; it means that a module does not need to be in contact with other psychological systems to function, c) obligatory firing; the operation of a module is mandatory, d) the operation within a module is unconscious and is not accessible for reflection, e) modules have shallow outputs; the inter-modular operational mechanisms are not discovered from the outputs, f) fixed neural architecture; they are localized in particular brain areas, g) ontogenetic universals; their development is bound to a given time schedule, h) fast speed; this would be due to information encapsulation and obligatory firing.

have all the properties that Fodor describes for a module in the human cognitive system. Instead, it could be a variant of the nativism approach158. Domain specificity theory is a theoretical stream against domain general learning theories (Siegler, 2006); they claim that humans develop a global knowledge structure which contains whole knowledge that is internalized from experience. In this way, cognitive domains are interdependent, and development in one domain influences others.

Modularity, innateness and brain localization159 are the correlated features to this approach (Khalidi, 2010). One of the most notable features of domain specificity theory is its direct link with modularity. In fact, owing to Fodor’s account (1983), domain specificity is one of the characteristics of a module in the human cognitive system, and as a result, all modular cognitive capacities are domain-specific. This link is more complicated in the case of innateness. Although there is a widespread assumption that there is a relationship between innateness and domain specificity, there is no convincing evidence to demonstrate this claim160 (Khalidi, 2010). However, an indirect relationship between them could exist. It is easier to tell whether and to what extent domain specific abilities are innate (Khalidi, 2001). Namely, the link between them is epistemic or evidential rather that intrinsic; the amount of explicit learning or relevant experience is more easily measured in the case of domain specific abilities than in the case of domain general capacities; since it is easier to eliminate some sources of information in the case of domain specific abilities (Khalidi, 2010). In the case of the link between domain specificity and brain localization, there are many studies which account for such a link (Khalidi, 2010). However there is no relevant evidence to demonstrate this link, since, for instance, there are various cognitive abilities that are modular and domain specific even though they are not situated in one region of the brain.

One important issue that has to be clarified here is the delimitation between a specific cognitive domain and a general cognitive domain. For instance, some linguists could argue that distinguishing a concrete sentence from an abstract one is located within a specific cognitive domain since it solely pertains to the domain of language and not to other cognitive domains. One can object to the mentioned claim and maintain that language itself is not a single domain but rather it is composed of distinct domains (Grenkowski, 2012) such as syntax, semantics, phonology, etc. Therefore, the opponent could claim that the indicated ability is located within general domain abilities since it is contained in several domains. This demonstrated that it is always possible to claim that a domain specific ability is in fact a domain general one unless there exist structured principles for delimitating the scope of a domain. However, in accordance with Khalidi

158 _{Nativism claims that certain abilities are native (biologically given) to human beings. In linguistics,}

nativism argues that natural language is a characteristic of the human species.The term universal grammar and its dichotomy (principles and parameters) also accounts for the biological link of linguistic abilities to the human species (Chomsky, 1986).

159 _{This approach claims that several brain areas exist and each of them is dedicated to a different}

cognitive function. It is true that the brain functions as a whole, but its functional architecture has a very precise localization (Lashley, 1929).

160 _{Perhaps the history of Evolutionary Developmental Psychology (EDP) could illustrate the link}

between innateness and domain specificity. EDP is an approach with the principles of Darwinian evolution, especially natural selection (Bjorklund & Blasi, 2005). Therefore, like evolutionary psychology, EDP is rooted in Darwin’s natural selection theory (Darwin, 1859). Despite the early integration of evolution and development in EDP, they were separated afterwards. One group of developmental psychologists who are in line with some aspects of evolutionary psychology are nativists. They claim that human children possess innate cognitive modules which enable them to acquire important abilities such as language. Therefore, they believe in an amodal abstract language system.

(2010), to be able to assign a given ability to general domains, human beings have to possess the ability to apply it in the new situations and for new cases. Hence, the number of the domains by itself cannot be an assumption against the specific domain theory. In summary, an ability is located within the cognitive architecture of a specific domain if the cognizer is not able to apply it in the new contexts and situations, and an ability is located within a general domain functional architecture if the cognizer is able to apply it to new and unseen contexts.

In literature, there are some studies relevant to the notion of domain specificity theory. Caramazza and Mahon (2003), in their investigation in the organization of conceptual knowledge, studied the case of patients with category specific semantic deficit. In these patients, the conceptual knowledge of one category in comparison with other categories is disproportionate and even selectively impaired. The categories, which were disproportionately impaired, were fruits/vegetables and artifacts. In addition, category specific semantic deficit is not associated with disproportionate deficits for a type or modality of knowledge. Caramazza and Mahon interpreted the results of their study in

favor of specific domain organization for semantic knowledge. In another study, Caramazza and Shelton (1998) investigated the animate and inanimate conceptual categories. In accordance with the results, they claimed that these categories were domain specific and hence could be selectively impaired in different cases of brain damages. In their study, they defend the domain specificity theory against the theory of category-specific deficits161. Similar to the previously mentioned study, they interpreted the results in favor of the domain specificity theory.