El teorema principal

Generational Category Number of Percentage of

Respondents Respondents First generation

1 ' s : aged 12 or more on arrival 141 18

Second generation

2a ’ s : aged less than 12 on arrival; foreign-born of two 1's

47 6

2b's : native born of tv/o 1's 137 24

*2c' s : native-born; one parent a 1, one parent a non-Syrian-Lebanese

9 1

Third generation

3a's : native-born of two 2 a 's 30 4

3b's : native-born of two 2b's 53 7

3 c ' s : native-born of 1 and 2a 67 9

3 d 's : native-born of 1 and 2b 47 6

3 e ' s : native-born of 2a and 2b 18 2

3 f 's : native-born; one parent 2a or 2b; generation of other parent unknown

29 4

*3g*s : native-born; one parent a 2a, 2b; one parent a non-Syrian-Lebanese

43 6

3 h ' s : native-born but unknown if second or third generation

18 2

Fourth. generation

4a' s : native-born; one parent a 3a to 3 e ; one parent a 1, 2a, 2b,or 3a to 3c;

51 7

4b' s : native-born; one parent 3a to 3e; one parent non-Syrian-Lebanese

26 3

TOTAL 766 100

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considered second generation because of the father's foreign birth or

fourth generation because of the mother's third generation status? In

all cases such as these, I followed the procedure of assigning respondents

to the biological generation which came after the parent who had been in

Australia the longest* For example, in the case previously discussed,

all children were categorized as fourth generation. There were two main

reasons for this decision. Since none of the families in the study had

returned or intended to return to Lebanon to live, it was assumed that

the values and behavior of the third generation parent and (usually) her

family would be more influential than those of the first generation

parent and (usually) his family. Secondly, it is biologically illogical

for a third generation person to produce second generation children, but

not incongruent for a first (or second) generation individual to hove

third or fourth generation offspring. However, it is worthwhile to

distinguish analytically between these children produced from inter-

generational marriages and children born from parents of the same generation.

Biological generations and occupational generations were not

considered to be equivalent. A respondent could be third or fourth

generation biologically but second generation occupationally. The reason

for this is that most inter-generational marriages were between first

generation males and second and third generation females w'ho had never

entered the labour force. In analyzing social mobility, a few respondents

who were third of fourth generation biologically, were classified as second

generation members of the work force. In examining generational differences

on non-occupational variables, the three generational categories employed

were:

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2) second generation : all 2's

3) third and later generations : all 3's and 4's

3*8 Presentation Of Data

In most transgenerational studies data is usually presented in one of two ways«, The first approach is to analyse the data chrono­ logically according to some arbitrary temporal divisions. The

problem with this technique is how to determine cut-off points. Does the researcher use decades or events such as wars to categorize the data? Another difficulty is that certain institutions may remain inert for long periods of time while others alter very quickly. A second tack is to consider each generation separately and then compare differences. But as we have just seen generations are not always neatly separated. How does one compare the first generation Syrian migrants who came to Australia in the 1890's with the ones who arrived in the 1920's, let alone contrast them with their descendants? In the present study I analyse some of the data chronologically and generat- ionally. However, most of the data is presented in an historical fashion in which the processes of institutionalization and de-instit­ utionalization are examined. My conceptualization of institutions is broader tihan Turner's (1974: 2), who emphasizes their structural properties. Following Smucker and Zdjerveld (1970)» 1 view institut­ ions as meaning-structures. These authors note that an institutional s true ture can remain relatively stable while the meaning conten ts

change dramatically. Conversely,meanings can stay comparatively fixed while structures alter. A concrete example of the former pattern is

the changes that have occurred in the Swiss Guard:

The Swiss Guard of the Vatican was instituted in the Middle Ages as an obviously necessary bodyguard for the pope. Viewed over time, this institution did not undergo much change in its outer-appearance and structural form. Even today the members of this 'body-guard' are still

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dressed and armed in a medieval manner and are supposed to perform medieval roles in the defence of the Pope* However, it is clear that this institution continues to exist as a ceremonial survival. The Swiss Guard is a bodyguard in name only, because its real meaning today is to be part of the ritual embellishments of the papal glory. Through a process of ceremonialization, this

institution has remained structurally the same for centuries, whereas its meaning content has changed most radically. What has happened is, of course, a qualitative change which can occur only because of the dialectic nature of institutions.

Institutions can continue in history as independent forms which may be 'filled u p 1 with new meanings (Smucker and Zijerveld '1970* 379)»

It seems to me that this historical approach to social change is ideally suited to the study of ethnic identity (meaning) and ethnic organization (structure). It is obvious that a group’s ethnic symbol can change without de-institutionalizing the structural components. For example, Francis (19^7: 15) notes that:

... allegiance to some external object is the most essential factor in the formation or revival of ethnic groups. But the object shifts from period to period,

from country to country. It may be a monarch, a religion, language and literature, other forms of higher culture, a political ideology centered around some type of government, a class, a ’race’. The type of catalyst apparently changes, as culture and the interests and ideas of man change - but, it seems, there is always a catalyst necessary to join the

elements together in an ethnic group ... factors which have contributed to the formation of an ethnic group will lose their significance once a certain degree of group cohesiveness has been reached - or will be, later on, replaced by other factors not present in the beginning but contributing to the preservation of the group.

This is why many scholars adhere to a "structuralist” definition of ethnic groups. Because of the arbitrariness of cultural symbols, it is often claimed that structural properties are the major defining attributes. We have already seen that structural compartmentalization can occur even though cultural differences barely exist. American

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sociologists often refer to this phenomena as "acculturation without assimilation" or "structural pluralism without cultural pluralism". Also, solidarity can be high at the very time a group's symbol has nearly vanished. An example of this pattern is the independence

movement of the Irish in the late 19th century. Claims for sovereignty reached their peak at the same time English had replaced Gaelic as the Irish language (Spicer d971)• Similar trends can be detected among Basque, Welsh, Scottish, and Assyrian nationalists.

The most obvious example of a population that has maintained its basic "group" identity despite structural transformations is the Jews. In their diaspora they have widened their contacts with other ethnic populations while still retaining the essential features of their Judaic tradition. Other examples are given by Horowitz (1975) in his

discussion of processes of "ethnic fusion" and "fission". He refers to the process of "proliferation", which occurs when a new group comes into existence without it or the "parent group" losing their identities. In certain West Indian slave societies for instance, "whites" and

"blacks" produced separate "mulatto" or "brown" groups through

procreation. Another illustration given by Horowitz, is the emerging "Muslim" ethnic group in Bosnia comprised of an amalgam of Muslim

Serbs (most Serbs are Greek Orthodox) and Muslim Croats (most Croatians are Roman Catholic).

In analyzing historical trends it is not my intention to dwell on what happened to the Syrian-Lebanese in Sydney between say, 1880 and World War I, and then between World War I and World War II. Rather, I will focus on the ethnic institutions themselves. My aim is to analyse how and why ethnic institutions - that is, identities and

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structures - were transplanted, maintained, and broken down or reconstituted. In short, I will be attempting to explain the processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization in a given ethnic population. Central to this analysis is the concept degree of institutional enclosure defined in chapter two.

I will also be examining Hansen's "theory" of the third generation return«. According to Hansen, the sons and daughters of the first

generation experience conflict about their ethnic identity. Embarassed by their heritage, they reject their parents' customs and fervently embrace the culture of the host society. Hansen (1952: 494) states that often, "Nothing was more Yankee than a Yankeeized person of foreign descent". It is the grandsons and granddaughters (who do not have an ethnic identity crisis) who return to the ethnic fold and show an interest in their ethnic culture and history. In Hansen's (1952: 495-496) words: "Anyone who has the courage to codify the laws of history must include what can be designated as the principle of the third generation interest ... The theory is derived from the almost universal phenomenon that what the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember".