EL TERRITORIO, UNA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL DEL ESPACIO

One of the first attempts to articulate non-anthropocentric ethics was to extend the conventional ethical theories to cover nonhuman animals or sentient beings. Terms such as pathocentrism, which comes from the Greek word pathos, meaning pain or suffering, have variably been used.

However, the term sentientism, which involves the capacity to experience pain or pleasure, is commonly used.

Classical Utilitarianism pioneered by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) seems to have set the stage for extending moral status to non-human animals. In criticising Kant’s moral theory for restricting moral status to rational human beings only, Utilitarianism argued that strict application of the Kantian moral theory may also exclude some humans, for example, those who, for one reason or another, can no longer exercise their rationality, such as those who are mentally challenged or those in a coma or even infants. Instead, utilitarianism extends moral considerability to any sentient (conscious) being, that is, any being that is capable of experiencing pain/suffering or pleasure. According to Jeremy Bentham (1789:17.283, as quoted in O’Neill et al., 2008:96), “the question is not, can they reason or can they talk? But, can they suffer?” Meaning that pleasure is good and pain is bad regardless of what being is experiencing it (O’Neill et al., 2008). So, for the classical utilitarian, the capacity to experience pleasure or pain was seen as the appropriate criterion for ascribing moral status. Utilitarians claim that there are many human beings or persons who are no longer rational but it would be considered immoral to treat them as mere things. Thus construed, utilitarianism offers us an egalitarian principle at the level of sentience as the criterion for moral considerability. All

26

creatures that are capable of experiencing pleasure or pain should therefore be accorded moral status.

Peter Singer, an ardent defender of animal liberation, took utilitarian principles a step further by arguing that “a being deserves moral consideration if and only if it can meaningfully be said to have interests of its own” and that “[a] moral agent is one who gives equal consideration to the interests of all affected by some action” (O’Neill, et al., 2008:97). By equal consideration of interests, it does not mean that sentient beings should be treated equally, but rather their same interests should be considered equally (Singer, 1986). For example, since a pig, just like a human being, has an interest in avoiding suffering, the interests of both in avoiding suffering or pain should be considered equally. Thus, according to Singer, only humans and nonhuman animals or sentient beings can have interests of their own. This means that non-sentient beings like trees, stones, etc. are not morally considerable because they cannot be said to have interests or a good of their own. Singer’s theory is based on two assumptions: the first one is that the interests of sentient beings should be equally considered; and the second one, which is based on the utilitarian principle, is that we are obliged to bring about the maximum possible degree of interest-satisfaction. In other words, for Singer, it might be justified to sacrifice the interests of some individuals if that will bring about maximum interest-satisfaction for others.

Singer’s theory, and classical utilitarianism (which basically are consequentialist) in general, have been counter-criticised by Tom Regan and Kantians on the ground that utilitarianism allows or gives room for the possibility of “the treatment of beings as means to some greater total good such as increasing total welfare” (O’Neill, et al., 2008: 98). They argue, to the contrary, that Kantian moral theory, if extended to non-human entities, has a far greater potential for the protection of the non-human entities than utilitarianism, especially because Kant’s moral theory is deontological or rights based. Thus, once it can be established that living entities other than humans have inherent value and hence have certain rights, it becomes wrong to inflict intentional suffering on them, even if that leads to total greater welfare or maximisation of interests (O’Neill, et al., 2008).

Tom Regan thus argues from a deontological perspective or a rights view that moral considerability should be accorded to “all beings that are ‘subject-of-a life’, that is, those beings with beliefs, desires, perception, memory, emotions, a sense of future and the ability to initiate

27

action, and psychological identity overtime” (see Regan, 1983/2004, Ch. 7). Regan gives a more expansive account of personhood in indicating that what makes a being a person is that they are

“experiencing subjects of a life, that is, they are conscious creatures that have individual welfare that is important to them regardless of their usefulness to others” (Engel, 2008). Alternatively, unlike Singer, Regan argues that there are moral limits to what we can do to an experiencing subject of a life. The implication of this is that a consistent application of the categorical Kantian imperative requires that people respect all experiencing subjects of a life, whether they are human or nonhuman, as inherently valuable, and never treat them as mere means. Thus, Regan’s theory is superior to Singer’s in that his approach imposes moral limits on the treatment of entities regardless of the overall consequences, while Singer’s theory may allow for the sacrifice of the interests of some individuals for the greater interests-satisfaction of others (Cochrane, 2008).

However, an ethics based on sentience has been accused of being too biased to animals, completely leaving out the plant kingdom. They are also charged of being overly individualistic when it comes to practical policy issues of protecting or preserving species and wilderness/habitats and ecosystems. There are instances where certain animals become so numerous that they become a threat to the integrity of the ecosystems, in which case, prudence dictates to kill some of these animals. Sentientism will not allow this because all sentient beings have equal moral worth. Some scholars have even questioned whether sentientism/animal ethics is an environmental ethics at all because of its narrow focus on animals (Callicott, 1980; Sagoff, 1984). Furthermore, others scholars, like VanDeVeer & Pierce (2003) have noted that the implications of animal ethics may interfere with natural processes; for example, the prey-predator relationship, because strict application of the principle implies that we ought to save a deer, for instance, from being preyed upon by a lion or a mouse from being eaten by a cat.

Now, the very fact that environmental ethics began from a pre-occupation with granting moral status to animals is one of the indications of its western cultural bias. Concern for the rights of animals presupposes some higher level of altruistic thinking where most people no longer worry about basic survival needs. Further, sentientism, particularly animal ethics, implies that killing animals for human consumption is unethical. Looked at from an African perspective if put into practice, animals ethics thus construed would deny most poor Africans their major source of

28

protein or food, unlike their western counterparts most of whom may have the luxury of options.

Africans use both domestic and wild animals for food. Therefore, this type of ethic would be unlikely to find support among Africans, in particular peasants who are directly dependent on nature for their survival and wellbeing. Furthermore, the talk of animal rights or animal liberation is something that may be difficult to understand among most Africans who in most cases see animals (wild animals particularly) as a threat to their lives and wellbeing (Songorwa, 1999; Mhlanga, 2001; Sifuna, 2010). I understand that other societies, even in the west, have the same problem with dangerous wild animals threatening people’s security and property (viz.

wolves and bears), but the difference regarding Africa is that western societies have more financial and technological capacity to deal with these problem animals than their African counterparts. In fact, in some African societies, as is evident later in the case study, many people believe that it is they who need to be liberated from the threat of wild animals rather than the animals being protected from humans. Indeed, in many parts of Africa, wild animals do still have the power to wreak havoc on people’s lives and property because many people in Africa live close to wildlife areas with very rudimentary self defense tools.⁸