The Cuban missile crisis occurred on 23 October 1962, three days before Takasaki and Matsumura left for Peking.34 Once the storm had passed it became evident that there had been a profound change not only in American policy towards the Soviet Union, but also in policy towards China. Within weeks of the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, the United States, flushed with new confidence, shifted its attention to the Far East and began a campaign to rally its Asian and Pacific allies for a confrontation with the Peoples' Republic. At a meeting of the United States - Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in December, President Kennedy strongly requested Japanese co operation in policies to 'contain' Communist China. The Americans criticized Japan's indulgent attitude towards Peking and attacked her lack of enthusiasm for improving ties with South Korea and the Chiang Kai Shek regime. A week later the Assistant Secretary of State,
Mr Harriman, told correspondents from the Mainichl Shimbun that the United States could not approve of Sino-Japanese trade,38 On 9 January
1963 the United States renewed a request first made unsuccessfully in 1961 that American nuclear-powered submarines be permitted to call at
Japanese ports»5 Finally, at the Security Consultative Committee
meeting of 19 January 1963, the United States urged Japan to think out the implications of the Chinese nuclear program and co-operate more
positively with the Western camp. In particular, the United States
hoped to see increased Japanese economic aid to South Vietnam and other nations engaged in the struggle against Communism.38
The Kennedy and Harriman statements were the opening shots in a campaign whose ultimate objective was to align Japan more closely
with American policies in Asia. This campaign, conducted against the
background of Chinese nuclear development, succeeded in aggravating the factional strife already existing in the Liberal-Democratic Party.
Yet it did not produce concrete results until the unrelated play of factional politics brought about new alignments, and illness or death removed from the scene the principal opponents of fuller co-operation with the United States.
5. Initial Japanese reactions to the new emphasis in American policy, December 1962 - October 1963
The Japanese Government at first pretended to misunderstand
the new direction of American policy. The Foreign Ministry's official
translation of Kennedy's speech to the Joint Committee on Trade and Economic affairs avoided use of the usual Japanese word for 'contain'
(füji komu), replacing it by 'soshi suru', 'to limit' or 'to check'.39 After the Kennedy statement, Ikeda told the press that while it was
'natural' for Japan to join hands with the other nations of the Free
World, the President had actually been speaking of 'checking the expansion of Stalinism'. This should not be linked to the question of trade with China, which was a matter for Japan to settle independently.40 On his return from the Joint Committee meeting in Washington Foreign Minister Ohira, explaining how United States hostility to China had increased because of the Cuban crisis and the Sino-Indian border conflict, stated that
Japan has an alliance with the United States and extensive ties of co-operation with that
country«, Therefore there will be no problems
at all even if Japan, to a degree not inimical to these relations, sorts out her affairs with Communist China, conducts trade, establishes cultural and economic ties. This is the
Government's view, and there will be no need to change it in the future.141
While it was 'natural' to oppose further expansion of
Communist power, there were no plans for Japanese-American consultations on future policy towards the Peoples' Republic.
These were the attitudes of Ikeda, Kono and the dominant coalition. The impact of Kennedy's stand on the dissident right wing
factions was significantly different. Shortly after the Trade and
Economic Affairs Committee meeting, Satö returned from a tour of Europe and North America stressing the intensity of the East-West conflict, the need for Free World unity and the desirability of 'caution' in relations with China.42 By the spring of 1963 controversy over Sino- Japanese relations was becoming acute within the Party's official organs, above all in the Foreign Affairs Research Council. The right wing
argued that the 'world trend' was to make approaches to the Soviet Union
and isolate China. Japan should, accordingly, abandon efforts to
improve ties with Peking. She should co-operate faithfully with the
United States. Naturally, a line was drawn at actual military co-operation.
The pro-China factions, in contrast, maintained that for historical, geographical and economic reasons Japan would be obliged to improve relations with Peking, whatever the trend of American policy.43
Apart from the fact that anti-confrontationist views were strong in the dominant factional alliance, certain international develop ments in the spring and summer of 1963 improved the position of those
favouring a flexible China policy. The visit of the American special
envoy Christian Herter in April made it clear that the United States was not interested in increasing imports from Japan. Washington declined to recognize any 'special relationship' with Tokyo, announcing that her foreign trade policy was determined 'from a global standpoint'.144 Many Japanese business and political leaders were also disturbed by the rapid
growth of Chinese trade with Western Europe and the United Kingdom. The
opportunity to exchange views on the China question with another American ally. Home reportedly made a favourable impression by
appealing for joint efforts to persuade the United States that a more positive approach to trade with the Peoples' Republic was ultimately in the interests of the Free World,45
It was these factors that lay behind Ikeda's epoch making decision of August 1963 to permit the export of a vinylon plant to China on a deferred payment basis,46despite American threats that the provisions of the Export Control Act would be applied to Japan if the negotiations were carried through.47 Within months a number of similar contracts were either being negotiated or examined. Despite the
explosive reaction of Taipei,48 the hostile attitude of Washington and the cautious stand of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, trade continued to expand during the autumn and winter of 1963. In September the Japan Economic Research Council (Nihon Keizai Chösa Kyögikai), an influential research organ operated jointly by Keidanren, Nikkeiren, Nisshö and
Döyükai, released a report explicitly recommending increased trade with Communist block nations.49
In October 1963, in symbolic culmination of these developments, the largest Japanese trade fair ever held in China was opened in Peking. The president of the sponsoring organization, which employed a staff of over 300 Japanese in the Chinese capital, was the former Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan. More than 500 companies contributed exhibits to the value of 170 billion yen. Over 1000 Japanese visited Peking for the fair itself, including representatives of political parties, religious groups and cultural organizations. The grand opening banquet was attended by 400 Japanese and 600 Chinese guests. In the company of Ishibashi
Tanzan, the Chinese Premier Mr. Chou En Lai and other distinguished Chinese leaders moved among the guests, shaking hands, chatting with visitors and drinking toasts.50 Yet what appeared to be the beginning of a new era in Sino-Japanese relations was, in fact, the end of a brief Indian summer.
6. Postponement of visits by American nuclear powered submarines,