4. Libro a libro
4.4. El viento (1951) El inaprensible paso del tiempo
So in the latter half of Lee Teng-hui’s rule, there was medium adverse power shift across the strait while domestic constraints were weak. Consequently sovereignty assertiveness rose to a limited extent. During this period, Taipei apparently became more skeptical of the one China policy, and Taiwanese officials frequently referred to “one China” as a “political trap” for Taiwan, as MAC chairman Chang King-yuh did in November 1996 and the Premier Vincent Siew did in December 1997. Toward the end of 1996 the MAC issued an analysis of the PRC’s tactics of using “one China” to claim its jurisdiction over Taiwan. The MAC pointed out that the PRC attached so much importance to its “one China principle” just to negate the reality of the ROC’s existence. Moreover, the “one China principle” connoted opposition not only to Taiwan independence, but also to pragmatic diplomacy, the U.N. campaign, acquisition of advanced weaponry from foreign countries, or even defining the presidential election as realization of popular sovereignty. In February 1997 the Government Information Office under the Executive Yuan warned that if the PRC’s “one China principle” were accepted, then it amounted to
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a “verbal annexation” of the ROC, and it was better to talk about “one divided China” than simply “one China”. (Academia Historica, 2000)
In early 1998 Beijing and Taipei took positive steps toward resuming dialogue, which was suspended by the former in response to Lee’s Cornell visit in June 1995. Five years after the first Koo-Wang talk in Singapore in 1993 the heads of the SEF and ARATS met again when Koo Chen-fu paid a visit to Beijing in October 1998. Although the
resumption of the dialogue and Taipei’s willingness to discuss political issues were to Beijing’s pleasure, Taipei did not shy away from emphasizing the fundamentals of its position or soften its tones. In June 1998, two months after the SEF and ARATS already met in Beijing in preparation for Koo’s visit, the MAC claimed that the essence of cross- strait conflict was the PRC’s attempt to annex the ROC. This was in stark contrast to the MAC’s 1994 formulation that the essence of China’s division was a competition between systems. During the meeting with his counterpart, Wang Daohan, Koo Chen-fu stressed once again that “one divided China” was not only a historical fact, but also political reality.
The real revolutionary redefinition of Taiwan’s status and the nature of cross-strait relations had yet to come. On July 9, 1999, three months before Wang Daohan’s scheduled visit to Taipei, Lee Teng-hui brought forward the famous “special-state-to- state theory” when he was conducting an interview with Deutsche Welle:
“Since the PRC’s establishment, the Chinese communists have never ruled Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu, which have been under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China ... Since our constitutional reform in 1991, we have designated cross-strait ties as nation-to-nation (guojia yu guojia), or at least
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as special state-to-state ties (teshu de guoyuguo de guanxi), rather than internal ties within ‘one China’ between a legitimate government and a rebellion group, or between central and local governments.” (Kan, 2011a, p. 61)
The new formulation was read by many as formally scrapping the one China policy. Referring to the special state-to-state theory, The New York Times reported, “Taiwan has abandoned the political formula that has long helped avert war with China, declaring today that it will no longer adhere to the principle that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan are two parts of the same country.” (The New York Times, July 13, 1999) It also dashed any hope of cross-strait dialogue during Lee’s presidency and China concluded that Lee was unmistakably a separatist and regarded his move as “an attempt to fundamentally change the status of Taiwan as a part of China.” (The Taiwan Affairs Office, 2000)
4.6 Conclusion
Taiwan’s security environment has been fundamentally reshaped after the Taiwan Strait crisis: the Taiwan scenario had become the key component of the PLA’s military
modernization ever since and Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy encountered much stronger pushback from an alarmed Beijing; meanwhile, the Clinton administration’s perceived political tilt toward Beijing generated considerable anxiety in Taipei. On the other hand, Taipei could take comfort from that fact that Beijing’s military and diplomatic pressures were just off to the start and Washington strengthened its military ties with Taipei. On the domestic side, the Asian financial crisis did not hurt Taiwan’s economy as much as it did to other Asian economies, Taiwan’s fiscal situation improved, and Lee Teng-hui’s power was further strengthened through elections and constitutional reform, making resource mobilization more viable an option in response to the changed security environment. As a
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consequence of the moderately adverse power shift and weak domestic constraints, Taiwan’s sovereignty assertiveness rose to a limited extent in the late 1990s.
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