How can technological risks be managed? Residual risk management begins with the supplier at the design and manufacturing stage. For the purchaser, OHS legislation requires them to provide plant so that, as far as is practicable, employees are not exposed to hazards. The implications are that the onus is on firms to evaluate technology to minimize these residual risks prior to purchase which requires them to establish pre-purchase evaluation criteria that consider both the safety and performance of the technology. The evaluation stage uses the information that is currently available from the supplier and industry sources as the basis for equipment selection.
The firm should also require its suppliers to provide advice about the risk factors associated with the technology, during the operational life of the equipment, so that these risks can be managed effectively. Reiterating, the criteria for technology selection include the safety and reliability of the equipment, production capacity, cost, back-up parts, service and training, and the provision of supplier information. In addition, the firm needs to establish techniques for the monitoring of technological performance and safety to identify unforeseen residual risks. These risk management strategies are summarized in Table 4.1.
In Table 4.1 there are a number of strategies described for both residual and entropic risks associated with the interface between technology and other system factors. The residual risk resulting from the interaction of technology with the physical environment can be managed using a number of risk reduction techniques. The first is to identify potential hazards and design the work environment to maximize the fit with the technology to reduce such hazards. For example, in large earthmoving equipment there is a vision shadow that prevents the operator from having a full view of the surroundings. This is a residual risk associated with this type of technology. The physical environment can be adapted to compensate for this. In open pit mining operations, for instance, earthen barriers are built at the edge of roadways to reduce the likelihood of vehicles being driven over the edge of the level/bench. Additional lighting can be provided to working areas to increase visibility at night. Wherever the firm uses mobile plant, the physical environment has to be designed, as far as practicable, to minimize the residual risks associated with the interaction of these two system factors.
Fixed technology also introduces residual risk. To mitigate this, it must be installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and relevant employees trained in its safe operation. It may also be appropriate to develop additional workplace-specific safety standards to manage any residual risks, for instance, gas appliances, such as hot water systems and stoves, have a residual risk because a delay in ignition can cause a flash flame to exit the appliance.17 When lighting these appliances, particularly for the first time or after an interruption of the gas supply, it is important to follow the manufacturer’s instructions. In its procedures, the firm will also have to specify which of its employees are authorized to carry out the task. The case involving the electrocution of a technician (Chapter 3) which resulted in the principal firm being penalized for
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allowing access to non-authorized persons, is an example of the need for strict controls to manage the risks associated with technology.
When installing or using technology, potential catalysts from the physical environment which may trigger inherent risks into imminent danger, also need to be considered. For example, when moisture is present where electrical appliances are being used, there is a high risk of electric shock.
A case is the death of a boilermaker who was electrocuted at a Western Australian ship-building company.18 The deceased had been using a standard manual metal arc welding machine to repair the internal workings of a ship. He had been in a confined space for almost 3 hours and the
Table 4.1 Strategies to manage the risks associated with technology
Source of risk Risk management strategy
Residual risk
Design and manufacturing • Pre-purchase evaluation of safety and short-comings performance record of technology options
• Using supplier relationships to obtain up-to-date information about safety performance
• Monitoring of technology’s performance and safety
Technology/physical • Effective design and planning of work environment interaction environment
• Pre-installation evaluation of risk factors and potential hazards
• Installation of technology in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions
• Development of workplace-specific safety standards to manage any residual risks Technology/process • Evaluation of suitability of technology for the
interaction process
• Standardization of technology
• Modifications of process in the short term to manage residual risk
• Modification of technology to compress residual risk in the longer term Technology/human • Purchase of ergonomically-designed, resources interaction operator-friendly technology
• Modification of existing technologies to fit the operator
• Job design
• Modification of work practices Entropic risk
Wear and tear • Proactive scheduled maintenance
• Regular monitoring of condition of technology
• Planned replacement of parts/equipment prior to rapid rise in entropic risk
• Reactive maintenance Technology/operator • Pre-operation training
interaction • On-going refresher courses where necessary
• Organizational culture which reinforces desired behaviors
• Systems to correct undesirable behaviors
Technology 103 workplace temperature may have been as high as 60°C. When found, his gloves and clothing were wet with perspiration and a new electrode rod had been fitted in the electrode holder. As a result of this case, the coroner handed down a requirement for the installation of voltage reducing devices (VRDs) on all alternating current welding equipment used for industrial purposes. This example highlights the need to anticipate activities that involve the combination of technological and environmental factors that translate residual risks into imminent danger. It would also have been appropriate for work practices to be modified, for example regular breaks from the task, given the extreme conditions involved.
A further source of inherent risk is the interaction between technology and processes. As summarized in Table 4.1, these risks can be managed in a number of ways. The first is to determine the suitability of the technology for the process. An example of this is dewatering pumps that do not have a cut-off device fitted to prevent them from cavitating (pumping dry) for extended periods.19 Such pumps are not appropriate where the pump is not closely monitored by an employee. The result can be the build up of hot water in the delivery hose and if the worker is unaware of the continued operation without a flow of water through the pump, serious scalds can occur. To remedy this, firms can modify work practices using JSA to ensure that the correct shut-off procedures are followed. In the longer term, this residual risk may be compressed through the modification of the technology. The technology–process interface is managed primarily by following the manufacturer ’s instructions;
specifically, only using the technology for purposes for which it is designed and enforcing the recommended operating procedures. Long-term solutions to these residual risks involve better technology designs such as an automatic cut-off when the pump starts cavitating.
To manage residual risk, firms should standardize technologies as much as possible. For example, mining companies usually purchase a fleet of the same make and model of haul truck rather than having a number of different suppliers or products. This standardization also applies to tools and other equipment. The advantage is that a consistent approach can be used to reduce the residual risks caused by the interaction of the technology with other system factors. Information gathering and dissemination processes, such as training, are also less complex when equipment is standardized and it is also often more cost-effective.
Using systemized technologies reduces the variety of processes that need to be undertaken in the workplace in terms of both equipment operation and maintenance. Residual risk is reduced because workers are able to develop specialized KSAs in the use and servicing of the technology. As a result, the demands on the employee are also minimized.
For example, if a pool of light vehicles consists of all the same type of vehicle, drivers are more easily able to adjust to the minor variations in performance of each car. On the other hand, increasing the variety of vehicles used places greater demands on operators. In an activity where the driver is accustomed to an automatic transmission vehicle and on occasion drives a manual transmission vehicle, this leads to higher demands in the latter case. The driver has to remain conscious of the type of vehicle being operated, otherwise he may stall the car when braking and create
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a hazard. Reducing workplace complexity by having standardized technologies that allow defined procedures based on JSA to be developed, therefore, reduces residual risk.
There is also inherent risk at the technology/human resources interface.
This has attracted considerable attention in recent decades with the concurrent rise in job simplification, such as positions that only involve data entry. As a consequence of reducing the variety of tasks undertaken in a given job, the times of exposure for certain work activities have increased. In data entry roles people are sitting in front of computers for longer and they have fewer opportunities to move around whilst performing productive work.
There are a number of strategies that can be employed to manage the residual risk at this interface. The first approach is to minimize the level of residual risk by purchasing equipment which best fits the needs of the operator. As far as practicable, therefore, technology should be ergonomically designed. It should also have minimal levels of negative characteristics, such as emissions, vibrations and noise that affect the worker’s physiological or psychological health. In firms with established equipment, it may be possible to modify these technologies to make them more operator-friendly and to compress residual risk levels. Often simple solutions can be found to increase user comfort, for example, raising computer visual display units (VDUs) to eye level by placing old telephone books underneath them, or having a small cushion on the seat at the base of the spine to support the lower back.
Job design can also be used to minimize the potential consequences of residual risks. This includes rotating workers so that they undertake a variety of tasks, for instance, in a factory, employees on a food manufacturing production line may be shifted between jobs that require sitting and standing, or that require sorting and moderate lifting. Job rotation is an effective means of managing such risks. Job enrichment that involves building a variety of tasks into a job14 can also be used to manage residual risk caused by the repetitive use of the same muscle and tendon groups. An example is the enrichment of typing pool positions into secretarial roles. This reduces the length of time spent continuously typing by providing other tasks including answering telephone enquiries, delivering documents and filing.
In addition to changing the types and variety of tasks undertaken, work practices can be modified to reduce the impact of residual risks on worker health and safety. Modifications include providing rest breaks and encouraging exercise that counters the physical stress caused by repetitive use of the same physiological systems. An issue that has become contentious in recent years is the monitoring of the pace at which employees work. In computerized offices, for example, some companies are using electronic systems to monitor the logging errors or keystroke rates of typists.14 This in turn, puts the worker under additional pressures to work continuously at a higher pace, thereby increasing the stress and severity of the residual risk associated with computer usage.
In addition to residual risks, the firm has to control entropic risks associated with technology. These stem from two main sources – wear and tear and the equipment/operator interface. The management of wear
Technology 105 and tear requires both proactive and reactive responses. Firstly, it can be addressed through scheduled maintenance. For plant and equipment this is done in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions, as a minimum, with additional upkeep geared to the specific demands of the firm.
Maintenance can also be triggered when changes are identified during routine inspections. Specifically, the supervisor should assess the current level of wear, anticipate the remaining life of components and evaluate the rate of degradation. An example is where a team leader uses his experience to evaluate the condition of truck tires and to forecast when they need to be changed. Subsequent routine inspections are used to ensure that the components are still in an acceptable condition and to revise this forecast if necessary. Maintenance is planned to maximize the utilization rate of the technology without compromising safety.
Regular inspections help to prevent wear and tear from rising to an inadmissible level of entropic risk. Equipment failures are inevitable unless influenced by the frequency, thoroughness and extent of maintenance activities.20 A further two incidents involving small aircraft illustrate that routine inspections and maintenance, together with residual risk assessment and compression, are important means of reducing the probability of undesirable events. On 4 September 2000, eight lives were lost when a Beechcraft King Air 200 flying from Perth to Leonora in Western Australia crashed. The investigation determined that the pilot and passengers were most likely incapacitated due to hypobaric (altitude) hypoxia resulting from the cabin being under-pressurized and their not receiving supplemental oxygen,21 suggesting that the mask deployment system had failed. Although the investigation could not be conclusive about the cause of depressurization, there did appear to be some parallels with the Payne Stewart case that occurred in October 1999. The Perth ‘ghost plane’
continued to fly on autopilot for 5 hours before crashing in Queensland.
In October 2001, an incident involving an aircraft of the same make and model occurred. In this case, a complex set of variables was involved.
In the first instance, the aircraft’s air conditioning system had failed to operate properly after a history of problems with six instances of maintenance recorded since January 2001. In response to the oppressive heat and humidity on the day of the incident, the pilot attempted to speed up proceedings and did not complete the pre-take-off and after-take-off cabin pressurization checks.22 He had neglected to undertake the required regular inspections and adjustments of on-board systems. This reduced the effectiveness of the aircraft’s cockpit warning system that would ordinarily have alerted the pilot to lack of cabin pressure. In addition to highlighting the need for routine system checks as part of standard work procedures, the case lead to the mandatory fitting of aural warnings to operate in conjunction with the cabin altitude alert warning system on all Beechcraft Super King Air and other similar aircraft. These incidents indicate that it is imperative that hazard information is shared to ensure that incidents are not repeated and that firms in the relevant industry take necessary remedial actions.
The latter case also raises the importance of reactive maintenance to counter wear and tear and to return technological systems to the required standard of operation. This is the least preferred approach because it
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means that the technology has been allowed to reach substandard safety and productivity. It is a major concern because the failure to anticipate or to monitor entropy often is the cause of accidents. An example is the case where a box assembly fell from a drilling rig at a mine in the Western Australian goldfields causing severe head and other injuries to a driller.23 The box assembly was usually attached to the drill head and was designed to cope with the high air pressures and abrasive nature of the drill cutting process. The box, weighing approximately 300 kg, broke away from its welded-support fitting and the attachment bolts also sheared off from the drill head. The contributing factors that caused the box to fall were that one of the welded-support brackets had failed prior to the day of the accident and the remaining weld broke on the accident day. In addition, two of the attachment bolts to the drill head had sheared off the day before and had not been replaced. Further, the box had been substituted before the accident. The old design had a safety link that involved attaching a safety chain to the rig, whereas the new box did not have this attachment and also was intended for a different type of rig arrangement.
The case illustrates how entropic risk can escalate and lead to an accident.
It highlights the importance of responding quickly and effectively to such risks. According to the entropy model, corrective action should have been taken in the presence of entropic risk. Maintenance strategies should also have been developed to prevent future degradation. These particular problems could have been identified through workplace inspections, specific hazard inspections and incident investigations, in addition to spot checks at any time during the work cycle.
Given that technology degrades, the firm has to decide when to take corrective action to remedy this condition. The key objective of these decisions is to ensure that risk is maintained below the ‘acceptable’ level and can be managed effectively. To meet the required duty of care, managers have to take the demands on the operator which are caused by this entropic risk into consideration, in addition to the impact on work processes and the physical environment. For example, if road conditions on a construction site are slippery as a result of heavy rain, it is more critical for truck tires to be in a sound condition to allow for good traction than in dry conditions. If the level of traffic on the site is high, the stopping capacity of the truck becomes a major safety issue to allow the driver to respond quickly to the actions of other vehicles. The definition of ‘safe’ in terms of equipment condition therefore has to take these secondary factors, such as physical environmental conditions and driver competency, into consideration.
The decision to take corrective action therefore depends on two issues.
The first is the actual condition of the technology, for example, the air-conditioning and oxygen deployment systems in the small aircraft discussed previously required immediate corrective action because of the severity of the risk. The second is how critical this condition is when combined with the risks associated with other system factors – other technologies, processes, the physical environment and human resources.
This relationship was shown in the example about the truck tires given in Fig. 4.2. When road conditions are less favorable the state of the tires becomes increasingly important as a risk control factor.