El voto partidista: Enfrentamiento entre dos coaliciones

22. In terrain that is difficult to pass or which can only be negotiated by climbing it is often possible to observe and fire over large areas, wide gaps and open flanks by securing a few points, and positions on ridges and crests. In carefully chosen positions outposts, sentries and patrols can also contain a large number of en-emy for a long time.

Figure 3-2. Securing a Mountain Area which is Difficult to Cross Fig 3-2: SECURING DIFFICULT MOUNTAIN TERRAIN

23. In snow it is usually advantageous to deploy, in addition to outposts and sentries, patrols on skis using cleared routes who are also to determine whether the en-emy has penetrated the area.

24. If an enemy has penetrated through a defensive perimeter into terrain which can-not be monitored adequately the unit concerned would be obliged to close the gap and seek out the enemy. Once the enemy has been observed he should be destroyed, where possible by mortars and artillery, or failing this attacked. If the enemy has made progress in conditions of restricted visibility, it would often not be possible to engage him until any clouds and fog have dispersed.

25. Units and sub units in valley locations should ensure that they have protection from the enemy by positioning troops on the surrounding slopes and peaks. In good visibility slopes and peaks on the opposite side of the valley can often be sufficiently monitored by using a few well positioned troops. Unoccupied adjacent valleys in the rear or in the flank of a unit where the enemy could land unnoticed or could launch a surprise attack are to be monitored and the valley entrances se-cured. In mountainous areas that are difficult to traverse securing key points and terrain should be achieved before the main body of troops pass through, (See Fig 3-2).

26. Movement of troops at night or in restricted visibility will be dangerous in low cloud if a sudden clearance exposes the assaulting troops to enemy observation and fire. Smoke should be available on call even though winds are unpredictable.

Advancing at night or in bad visibility should generally be at a slow pace in order to maintain control and to prevent troops becoming spread out in difficult country.

Routes should be marked and objectives limited. The final stages of an advance should, whenever possible, be along ridges with the aim of assaulting from higher ground. The ideal timing for an attack is a night approach march with a dawn assault.

SECTION 4. RECONNAISSANCE

27. Reconnaissance in mountainous areas is an absolute pre-requisite for troop move-ment, the deployment of forces and for combat. Terrain which may well be vital ground in combat should where possible, be reconnoitred by the commander and as many sub unit commanders as possible.

28. If the situation allows only for partial reconnaissance or none at all, documents such as maps and aerial photographs, (see below) guide handbooks and route descriptions plus any information from other civil authorities (eg. forestry and water board offices, road maintenance services) and the local population should be utilized.

a. Aerial Imagery. Aerial imagery has particular utility in mountainous areas. It can be used to update often inadequate mapping, for route reconnaissance, and vertical cover can "see" into dead ground. At the tactical level, stereographic cover can be used to determine intervisibility between two or

more points, and to produce "dead ground" studies from predetermined points, thus reducing time spent on the ground setting up OPs.

b. Tactical Air Reconnaissance. Imagery from tactical air reconnaissance mis-sions (normally conventional panchromatic cover, although Infra-red and thermal imagery is increasingly available) will be up-to-date and show all relevant detail. Cover can be small scale, from high-level missions, showing a large ground area in less detail, or large scale, normally from low-level missions, which gives good detail but of a smaller area. However, the ad-vantages of current cover have to be offset against the risk to scarce assets, and Operations Security (OPSEC) considerations.

c. Strategic aerial Imagery. Strategic imagery is obtained from high-level re-connaissance flights or from satellites. It can be conventional panchromatic or radar cover, and will generally be small scale. Commercial satellite im-agery is increasingly available, although its small scale means that its main use is for updating or supplementing mapping.

29. In an initial reconnaissance, the commander would normally make a survey of the terrain by helicopter if this is appropriate. For detailed reconnaissance, the com-mander would use reconnaissance parties and teams incorporating where pos-sible mountain guides and sometimes logistic reconnaissance teams. Recon-naissance teams carry out closely defined tasks, normally a search for the usable paths and dominating positions for individual weapons or sections in terrain that is difficult to pass or in climbing terrain.

30. Reconnaissance can be accelerated if it is carried out at low altitude from helicop-ters. If individual objects (eg. bridges, tunnels) are to be investigated more closely then teams can be landed in the adjacent area and recovered later.

31. If terrain that is predominately a climbing area or is difficult to pass needs to be reconnoitred the commander should deploy more specialist troops who have been trained in these duties. (RM, SAS or Airborne Pathfinders if available).

32. It is seldom possible to reconnoitre disjointed mountainous terrain comprehen-sively from a single point. The commander may well need to reinforce any recon-naissance resources, in conjunction with other combat arms, by making a wide-spread deployment of observers from armour artillery, infantry and aviation units, (see Fig 3-3)

33. If area reconnaissance is to be carried out , patrols should be equipped to remain on duty for several days at a time. Often it is then advantageous to transport them by helicopter for at least some of the way towards their patrol area and to supply them from the air for the duration of their reconnaissance.

34. Patrols are often the only sub units available to respond rapidly in the area away from the main forces. Often only they are able to react quickly enough to develop-ments in the situation at the front, on the flanks or in the rear. They can then give

Figure 3-3. Observation of an Area Fig 3-3: OBSERVATION OF AN AREA

the main forces, the time necessary to deploy suitable counter measures. Patrols in mountainous terrain can also be given additional tasks such as:

a. Gaining important terrain and keeping it until reinforced.

b. Slowing down the progress of an enemy c. Containing the enemy

d. Keeping in contact with the enemy e. Launching a surprise attack.

35. Reconnaissance should determine the following:

a. The locations of enemy dismounted forces, long range flat trajectory weap-ons, artillery and mortars.

b. Alternative enemy positions.

c. The routes which the enemy can move forces and use transport.

d. The natural obstacles and where the enemy has laid any barriers or mines.

e. Sections of terrain which can be observed by the enemy.

f. Locations for helicopters to land.

g. The direction from which an enemy can conduct counterattacks.

h. The approach routes which provide the best cover from view and fire.

l. The paths which can be used to by pass enemy obstacles, barriers and positions.

m. The best positions for support weapons. The most favourable observation sites for the FOO and sub units of the artillery and mortars.

n. The routes to be used by medical services.

o. The climbing risks inherent in the terrain.

SECTION 5. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS