Elaboración y Ejecución de Procedimientos y Políticas

The failure of top-down prescriptive development policies to tangibly improve the lives of people in the Global South resulted in the emergence of alternative development in 1980s. While a myriad of approaches can be construed as fitting within such an ‘alternative’ approach, each is underpinned by a shift away from the macro, growth-based initiatives which characterise mainstream development. This involves focusing on the local, with the aim of empowering the subjects of development, so that interventions are responsive and representative of differing socio-cultural settings (Pieterse, 1996). As Tandon (2000: 320) describes:

“The alternative development approach relied substantially on conscientisation and the collective mobilisation of the marginalised themselves. Non-formal education, community organising, and local leadership-building were the kinds of interventions that this alternative development approach of NGOs signified. This contrasted with the mainstream development paradigm which focused on growth in GNP and macroeconomic development”.

Alternative development, as such, has been highly influential with international development agencies, NGOs and development practitioners (Kapoor, 2002; Kamat, 2004), representing something of a new orthodoxy. Examples of such approaches include ‘development from below’, ‘human well-being’ and ‘participatory approaches’ (Leys, 1996; Esteva and Prakash, 1998). These approaches aim to put at the forefront “local contexts, needs and realities” (Banks and Hulme, 2012: 12) by empowering people to use their local knowledge to achieve equitable and relevant outcomes (Berkes, 2004). This focus on the local, resulted in increasing interest in instigating development practices at the community level, with community driven development being “amongst the fastest growing mechanisms for channelling development assistance” (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 1) . However, it must be noted that there is little consensus on what is meant by the term ‘community’, with

understandings ranging from geographical or administrative boundaries, to qualities based on shared identity and norms (Mathie and Cunningham, 2003; Bhattacharyya, 2004). Mansuri and Rao (2004: 8) note the difficultly in adopting a clear definition when they reflect:

“Defining the geographic or conceptual boundaries of a community is not always straightforward. Administrative boundaries can be meaningless where settlement patterns are distinct from such boundaries or where increasing mobility or temporary migrations have transformed the community boundaries. In many cases, factional, ethnic, or religious identities may further complicate the picture. Second, an unqualified use of the term often obscures local structures of economic and social power that are likely to strongly influence project outcomes”.

It is evident that any notion of a simplified community is frequently nothing more than “an ideal masquerading as social fact” (Blackstock 2005:42). This has an important influence on how alternative development strategies manifest in practice, once they touch ground in the Global South, which I will now address.

One of the strongest advocates and key architects of alternative development was Robert Chambers (1997: 188), who pioneered Rapid Rural Appraisal and the need for participation in development practice. Chambers described his approach thus:

“In an evolving paradigm of development there is a new high ground, a paradigm of people as people...On the new high ground, decentralization, democracy, diversity and dynamism combine. Multiple local and individual realities are recognized, accepted, enhanced and celebrated. Truth, trust, and diversity link. Baskets of choice replace packages of practices. Doubt, self- critical self-awareness and acknowledgement of error are valued...For the realities of lowers to count more, and for the new high ground to prevail, it is uppers who have to change.”

The premise of Chambers’ approach is the importance of participation to empower communities to take control of their own development. It therefore is an appealing

23 solution to the failure of traditional development approaches, offering an opportunity for a more inclusive means of development. As Dumaru (2010:753) notes it is essential that:

“Care is taken to ensure that the decision-making process… [is]… driven by the community and is beneficial to their interest, in particular those with the least power”

Moreover, Chambers challenged development practitioners to immerse themselves in communities they aimed to help; that is, to understand the lives of local people through “having fun” and “being nice to people” (Chambers, 1997:207), whilst utilising this knowledge to encourage culturally appropriate forms of development. This approach, although appealing as a panacea for failed development initiatives, must however be viewed as a continuation of the flawed logic that underpins Western led development. This is because the premise of participatory approaches is that development is an apolitical challenge that can be solved through improved knowledge and expertise. In implementing these ideas in communities of the Global South, however, they come up against existing socio-economic structures that reflect political choices and outcomes. As Mowforth and Munt (1998: 240) note in relation to participatory tourism development:

“The push for local participation comes from a position of power, the first world: It is easier to promote the principles of local participation on paper, from a distance, than to practice them.”

Mowforth and Munt (1998) elude to how participatory approaches are imbued with idealistic notions of democracy which struggle in the messy and uneven reality of community life. This is because, despite the enduring imagery of communities in the Global South as being harmonious and homogeneous, such communities are often stratified and heterogeneous (Berner and Phillips, 2005). As Leach et al., (1999: 230) note communities tend to consist of actors of varying “gender, caste, wealth, age, and origins”. The uneven and unequal power of actors that makeup of a community tends to be overlooked by the idealism of participatory development, but is essential in

understanding its failure to achieve its expected outcomes. This is because although participatory development aims to achieve consensus on decisions for the community, the diverse array of priorities and opinions, means it may not be possible to reconcile competing community members’ interests. Moreover, despite the mantra of ‘putting the last first’ (Chambers, 1983), evidence suggests that those marginalised in the communities may not have equal involvement in the process. As Leach et al., (1999) note, “different social actors have very different capacities to voice and stake their claims”, the result being the entire process can become co-opted by local elites to protect their own priorities (Kapoor, 2011). In addition, the scope of community involvement can also be limited by the nature of the development apparatus. This is because the requirements of foreign donors tend to ensure that community members are only empowered to make decisions that fit within a small pre-defined remit (Fergusson, 1994). The result is that external agencies take on the paternal role of outlining the available options, silencing radical voices within the community (Tosun, 2000). Goldman’s (2001) analysis of the World Bank is a prime example of this form of co-optation. He highlights how the Bank changed its procedures to incorporate more local voices in its assessment of a project’s viability, yet only incorporated certain types of knowledge while dismissing others as illegitimate or irrational. These critiques indicate how, despite their popularisation, participatory methods can also become little more than a spectacle to satisfy external donors and in turn do not automatically challenge the structural causes of poverty or inequality. The difficultly in transforming the rhetoric of alternative approaches into reality, can further be seen from the example of community natural resource management. Community natural resource management aims to empower local people to use their own knowledge systems, to conserve their local resources, whilst satisfying their livelihood needs, therefore offering an alternative to Anglo-European conservation policies, which relied on restricting local access to natural resources in order to ensure their preservation, so called “fortress conservation” (Dressler, 2010: 6). However, despite its appealing rhetoric, a review of the literature reveals frequent disappointment with its outcomes for development and conservation. For example, Kellert et al. (2000) examined five case studies in Nepal, United States and Kenya using six social and environmental indicators: equity, empowerment, conflict resolution, knowledge and awareness, biodiversity protection and sustainable

25 utilisation. This analysis concluded that there was little evidence of traditional knowledge systems being incorporated into these projects and that power and economic benefits tended to fall into the hands of community elite. Dressler et al,.(2010) similarly note through six case studies, how rather than reflect diverse local social and environmental contexts, its implementation takes the form of a technical exercise to achieve policy makers desired outcomes. Conclusions such as these appear frequently in assessments of alternative development approaches. This is because notwithstanding the change of emphasis, alternative development represents a continuation of the belief that development is an apolitical problem with technocratic solutions (De Vries, 2007). As a result, rather than empower local communities and embracing local knowledge systems, communities tend to be incorporated into a bureaucratic development apparatus, which reinforces existing power structures (Dumaru, 2010; Kothari, 2005). The ability of a knowledge system from the Global South to influence, or find space, within such development processes, is the subject of exploration in this thesis.

It could be argued that the appeal of alternative development approaches to some development practitioners is that they can be seen as fitting into dominant neo-liberal understandings. This is because they encourage individuals to find solutions to their own livelihood needs, rather than focusing on the role of the State (Walsh, 2010; Kamat, 2004). Moreover, they further empower NGOs, which, as civil society actors, position themselves as being ideally suited for bottom up localised development. However, despite the appeal of localised development, there is considerable evidence that rather than benefit all community members, these are often in fact captured by a community elite. As Dasgupta and Beard (2007: 233) note:

“Community governance is particularly vulnerable to elite capture because participants enter the process from unequal positions of power: they have asymmetrical social positions, disparate access to economic resources, varying levels of knowledge of political protocols and procedures and different literacy rates”

The ability of particular individuals to capture the benefits of development initiatives for their own personal gain, indicates how even ‘well-meaning’ policies can result in disappointing outcomes for communities. The attributes of community elite that enable them to capture the benefits of development programmes are explored further in Chapter Six. It uses ‘forms of capital’ to explain individuals’ involvement in volunteer tourism projects and the benefits they receive from these.

2.1.4.1 Social Capital

Interest in the human side of development led to a recognition of the importance of social relations to economic development. Influential work in this area is Robert Putnam’s (1993) book ‘Making Democracy Work’. In this, he argued that there is a positive correlation between economic performance and social capital, which he defines as the “networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995: 66–67). The valuing of traditional societal structures and relationships as a development tool represented a radical shift in development orthodoxy, which up to this period considered these features an impediment to economic prosperity (Agrawal, 1995). Subsequently, social capital has been referred to as the “missing link in development” (Harriss and Renzio, 1997: 921) and quickly established itself in the lexicon of the World Bank, its appeal stemming from its ability to act as a bridge between sociological and economic perspectives on development (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).Thereby providing an alternative to the World Bank’s failed development policies, whilst not challenging its existing governing structures (Bebbington, 2002). The emergence of social capital as a development tool was of particular interest to development practitioners in indigenous communities (Bebbington, 1997). This is because cultural features associated with these communities, such as “extended-family networks, norms of reciprocity and dense associations” were now classified as important for economic development (Andolina et al., 2009: 11). The incorporation of social capital into the lexicon of development therefore significantly shifted how development practitioners perceived indigenous societal structures. The concept’s growing importance to understandings of indigenous development is therefore worthy of detailed consideration, and is explored further with the aid of empirical evidence in Chapter Six of this thesis.

27 The utility of social capital as a development tool is highly contested within academic discourse. Its advocates identify it as a means of enhancing collective empowerment (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Adger, 2003), as Bebbington (1997: 195) indicates in his study in the rural Andes. He credits social capital with creating the conditions that allow rural farmers to manufacture high-value products for market, creating what he terms ‘islands of sustainability’, stating:

“the social capital inherent in indigenous organisations, in both their traditional and modern forms, allowed forms of collective action and economies of scale that the brokers’ networks alone would have been unable to do anything about”.

However, critics of the utility of social capital as a development tool, such as Harriss and Renzio (1997), highlight how it fails to recognise the exclusive nature of some network groups and romanticises the community level. It also often underplays the manner by which certain social movements have more political power than others. Moreover, the concept of social capital is critiqued as a tool of the neo-liberal agenda, with a focus on social relationships which fails to challenge the structural causes of poverty and inequality (Fine, 1999; Cleaver, 2005). Supporting this assessment, Cleaver (2005) draws on ethnographic work in Tanzania to argue that, despite its popularity, social capital is overly simplistic and does little to help the poorest in society. The focus on the ‘personal’ and ‘local’ as a form of alternative development is one that is embraced by volunteer tourism, which in turn packages these aspects and sells them to the consumer, as will subsequently be discussed.