Since the demise of the Soviet Union and Cuba’s withdrawal from revolutionary internationalism abroad, the FAR has had little contact with the international community. Following the evacuation of the Russian Lourdes intelligence collection facility in late 2001, only a few if any Russian military personnel are believed to remain on the island. There are perhaps only a dozen or so Cuban military attaches serving in foreign capitals and probably even fewer foreign military representatives in Havana. Military cooperation or exchanges with other countries are now the exception.
Ironically, one of the most notable examples is the ongoing exchange that occurs at “the fence line” at the US Naval Base at Guantánamo.78 These talks began in the mid-1990s and were conducted initially between the U.S. base commander (a Navy captain) and a Cuban brigadier gener- al who headed the FAR Guantánamo area division. In 1999, the Cuban side upgraded its representation. Brigadier General Jose Solar Hernandez, deputy chief of the Eastern Army and a Communist Party Central Committee member, has been meeting with the U.S. base commander. They discuss local issues with the objective of minimizing the possibili- ty of incidents and reducing tensions between the military forces located at close proximity. In this seasonally arid region of Cuba, an informal fire warning agreement is in effect. “Coincident firefighting maneuvers” have been conducted by both sides, involving helicopters carrying water bags. Each side is reportedly prepared to provide medical support to the other in emergencies, for example, by evacuating burn victims to the closest hospital.
“Fence line” talks reached a higher plateau in early 2002, when the U.S. base was being prepared to incarcerate suspected Al Qaeda terror- ists. The Cuban government was informed in advance of the decision to use the base, and General Solar was advised about the U.S. plan and what
his troops should expect to observe so that the Cuban government would not be surprised. A few days later, Havana issued a favorable statement and not long after, Raul Castro told journalists that if any Al Qaeda sus- pects were to escape and reach Cuban territory, they would be returned to Guantánamo. With the exception of semi-annual migration review ses- sions between the two governments, these talks are the highest level reg- ular meetings between U.S. and Cuban officials. They apparently are con- ducted without acrimony and with only a minimum of political posturing by the Cuban side. They provide an excellent foundation for an expand- ed military-to-military dialogue some time in the future.
In addition, since late 2000, MININT’s Border Guard Troops have institutionalized regular contact with a U.S. Coast Guard officer stationed in Havana. Other contacts between high level FAR personnel and retired U.S. senior officers have been sponsored by the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. Since 1987, seven or eight U.S. delegations have visited Cuba, and on at least two occasions, members met with one or both Castro brothers. Until the last year or two, the initiative for these contacts was entirely on the American side, but since then, Cuban coun- terparts have appeared to be more interested in upgrading and intensify- ing the exchanges. A counterpart Cuban defense research center has been more assertive, for example, in proposing ideas for joint research.79 Nonetheless, all of the contact has been in Cuba; no MINFAR officers have been allowed by their government to travel to the United States.
These limited contacts will provide useful launching points once the political transition begins. The post-Castro military will need to be rein- tegrated into regional and international security arrangements. Cuban per- sonnel would probably be welcome and effective participants in interna- tional peacekeeping missions, perhaps especially in African countries where they have had extensive experience. Cuban military academies and schools should be opened to foreign faculty and students. Cuban officers and non-commissioned personnel should receive training in nearby coun- tries and in Europe. Finally, personnel at all levels should receive inter- national training in counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics missions that ought to be among the principal new preoccupations of the country’s post-Castro armed forces.
End Notes
1Domingo Amuchastegui, 1999, “Cuba’s Armed Forces: Power and Reforms,” in
Cuba in Transition (Washington, D.C.: Association for the Study of the Cuban
Economy), 111.
2Andrei Shoumikhin, 1995, “Russian Vicissitudes and Cuban ‘Scenarios’: Evolving
Paradigm of Interrelationship.” International Research 2000 (March), 13.
3An opinion survey of 1,023 recently arrived Cuban émigrés conducted in 1998 and
1999 indicated that more than two thirds of the respondents cited the FAR as one of the official organizations they hated the most. Only one individual cited the FAR as the institution “most loved.” Those surveyed obviously were alienated from the regime and not representative of the Cuban population at large, but their negative views of the military might nonetheless be indicative of attitudes that would openly contend and perhaps become organized during the post Castro transition. See US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the University of Florida (UF), 1999, “Measuring Cuban Public Opinion: Project Report,” USAID-UF, September.
4FBIS-LAT-94-151, August 5, 1994, 5. 5FBIS-LAT-94-152, August 8, 1994, 35. 6FBIS-LAT-94-151, 32.
7Jorge Dominguez, 1978, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press), 342 described the “civic-soldier” in revolutionary Cuba in whom “civilian and military lives are fused.”
8Michael Radu, 1996, Collapse or Decay? Cuba and the East European Transitions
from Communism (Miami: Cuban American National Foundation), 28-29.
9Thomas S. Szayna & F. Stephen Larrabee, 1994, East European Military Reform
After the Cold War: Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: National
Defense Research Institute, RAND), 19.
10 Mark Kramer, 1998, “The Restructuring of Civil-Military Relations in Poland
Since 1989,” in Civil-Military Relations: Building Democratic and Regional Security
in Latin America, South Asia, and Central Europe, ed. David R. Mares (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press).
11Larry L. Watts, 2001, “The Crisis in Romanian Civil-Military Relations,” Problems
of Post-Communism (July/August).
12Irving Louis Horowitz, 1995, “Military Autonomy and Dependency,” International
Research 2000 (March), 5, says “My own surmise is that the armed forces would
serve as a passive rather than active agent in any concerted uprising.”
13Amuchastegui 1999, 113.
14 Henry W. Goethals, 1995, “A Visit to Cuba 1995: Interviews with Cuban
Government Officials,” International Research 2000 (March), 4.
15 The constitution states: “In the event of the absence, illness, or death of the
President of the Council of State, the First Vice President replaces him in his functions.”
16Louis Perez, 1976, “Army Politics in Socialist Cuba,” Journal of Latin American
Studies, 8:2 (November), 259.
17 The term and the concept of an elite group in the leadership particularly close to
Raul Castro were developed by Edward Gonzalez, 1979, “Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies,” in Cuba in the World, eds. Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press) and other works.
18 Brian Latell, 1986, “Cuba after the Third Party Congress,” Current History,
December.
19The long time head of communist East German foreign intelligence has written that
“Raul’s friends teased him for his punctuality and called him ‘the Prussian.” Markus Wolf, 1997, Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest
Spymaster (New York: Random House), 311.
20Mikhail Zubatkin, 1995, “Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba: Role and Position,
Today and Tomorrow,” International Research 2000 (March), 2.
21 USAID-UF 1999, 100.
22A former FAR army major, interviewed in Miami in September 2002 expressed
harsh views of Raul Castro. He described him as “dictatorial” and one who inspires fear but not admiration.
23No general officer is known to have defected since May 1987 when Air Force ace
General Rafael del Pino flew to Miami.
24For comprehensive analyses of the military during the decades of the 1960s through
the 1980s see: Jaime Suchlicki ed., 1989, The Cuban Military Under Castro (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami).
25 Defense Intelligence Agency, 1979, Handbook of the Cuban Armed Forces
(Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency), 1-12.
26 Maj.Gen. Edward B. Atkeson (ret. USA), 1996, “ A Glimpse of the Cuban Military
in 1996,” Landpower Essay Series, AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, No. 96-4 (May), 352.
27 Piero Gleijeses, 2002, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa,
1959-1976 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press), 212.
28Mario Vazquez Rana, 1993, “Interview with Raul Castro,” El Sol de Mexico, April 21. 29Vazquez Rana 1993.
30 Phyllis Greene Walker, 1995, “The Missions and Doctrine of the Cuban
Revolutionary Armed Forces,” International Research 200, (March), 6.
31 Phyllis Greene Walker, 1996, Challenges Facing the Cuban Military, Cuba
Briefing Paper Series, Number 12, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University (October), 2.
32Maj. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson, (ret. USA), 1995, “Castro and Cuba — Dug in and
Dangerous,” Army (June), 313.
33Domingo Amuchastegui, “The Military in Cuba,” unpublished manuscript, 4. 34Amuchastegui IBID, 9.
the Transition,” Problems of Post Communism 48:6 (November/December), 23, cites a Cuban government source.
36Frank O. Mora, whose several works on the Cuban military have added signifi-
cantly to the literature, coined this useful term.
37Frank O. Mora, 2002, “Raul Castro and the FAR: Potential Future Roles in a Post-
Fidel Cuba,” unpublished manuscript, 4.
38Domingo Amuchastegui, 2002, Interview by the author, Miami, January 29. 39Greene Walker 1996, 2.
40Atkeson 1995, 313. 41Amuchastegui 1999, 113.
42Later, in August 1994 at the height of anti-regime violence, he stated publicly that
“beans are worth more than cannons.” FBIS-LAT-94-151, p. 5.
43Amuchastegui 1999, 113.
44 Amuchastegui 1999, 114 and Humberto Leon, 1995, “The Military Chiefs –
Biographic Information,” International Research 2000 (March), 5.
45 Shoumikhin 1995, 11. Shoumikhin, a long time close observer of the Cuban
Revolution, was President of the Center for Conflict Resolution in Moscow in 1995. He emphasizes that Castro will not allow civilians to “obtain real national promi- nence, especially if that fame were to result from successful economic reforms...”
46Domingo Amuchastegui, “FAR: Mastering Reforms,” Cuba in Transition, Volume
10, 2000, p. 436.
47Amuchastegui 2000, 438.
48Maj.Gen. Edward Atkeson (ret. USA), 2002, Interview by Author, April 23,
Arlington, Virginia.
49Mora 2002, 9.
50Juan Carlos Espinosa describes this new FAR model as “a technocrat-soldier” with
greater autonomy and greater access to the international dollar economy.
51Espinosa 2001, 24.
52Juan Carlos Espinosa and Robert C. Harding III. “Olive Green Parachutes and
Slow Motion Pinatas: The Cuban Armed Forces in the Economy and in Transition,” unpublished manuscript.
53Mora 2002, 12.
54Amuchastegui 1999, 14 and Amuchastegui 2000, 439.
55Humberto Leon, 1995, “Impact of the Economic Crisis in the Cuban Revolutionary
Armed Forces (FAR),” International Research 2000 (March),7.
56Mora 2002, 13. 57Mora 2002, 13.
58Granma, May 18, 2001, cited by Juan Carlos Espinosa 2001, 23.
tance to transition dynamics include: 1) the new agricultural missions that have reduced soldiers to lives of rural peonage; 2) resentments lingering since Cuba’s long and bloody intervention in Angola as well as lesser involvements, including the one in Grenada that resulted in October 1983 in numerous Cuban deaths and casualties; and 3) opposition to the “War of All the People” doctrine introduced in 1980, the mobilization of the MTTs, and the enormous, wasteful spending on tunnels and other fortifications.
60Evidence of the influence of glasnost and perestroika on FAR officers is scattered
and mostly anecdotal. Richard Millett, 1993, “Cuba’s Armed Forces: From Triumph to Survival,” Cuba Briefing Series, Number 4, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University), September, among others, has used the term. Also see, Leon 1995, 3; and Goethals 1995, 2.
61Goethals 1995, 2. 62Radu 1996, 35.
63Domingo Amuchastegui, 2002, E-mail correspondence with the author, October. 64Szayna and Larrabbee 1995, 33.
65Szayna and Larrabbee 1995, 34.
66 Dale R Herspring, 1992, “Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Eastern
Europe: The Potential for Praetorianism,” Studies in Comparative Communism 25: 2 (June), 106-7.
67Herspring 1992, 117. 68Mora 2002, 13. 69Shoumikhin 1995, 14.
70Juan del Aguila, 1998, “The Cuban Armed Forces: Changing Roles, Continued
Loyalties,” in Cuban Communism, eds. Irving L. Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ), 518.
71Kramer 1998, 104-106.
72Juventud Rebelde, October 16, 1994. 73Mora 2002, 16.
74See Title II, Section 205 (a) of Helms-Burton. 75Leon 1995, 8 argues that it would.
76These and other figures are from World Bank, 2002, World Development Indicators
2001, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank).
77Ricardo Donate-Armada, 1995, “Preliminary Analysis of Retirement Programs for
Personnel in the Ministry of the Armed Forces and Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Cuba,” Cuba in Transition, 5.
78This section is derived in part from discussions with knowledgeable officials of the
Office of Cuban Affairs, US Department of State in May 2002.
79Bruce Blair, Director, Center for Defense Information, 2002, Interview by Author,