Elementos fundamentales del non bis in ídem en Colombia, en el marco del estado social

Table 10 shows results on the relationship between bank MFIs’ dual performance outcomes for ROA, ALB, NAB, and PFB and the funding source mix metrics (debt-to-assets ratio, equity- to-assets ratio, donation-to-assets ratio, and deposit-to-assets ratio). Again, I describe the models at regression level, and then analyze the coefficient estimation results.

Of the five model scenarios, A and B do not seem significant at the regression level for all the performance outcomes, except for ROA for model B. The rest of the models show high significance. Focusing on model E, the regression level F-statistics are highly significant at

F(29,159) = 12.1, p < 0.001 for ROA. The within R2 at the aggregate legal charter level is .52.

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Table 11: Bank MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix

Dependent variables:

Models: A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E

Independent Variables

Debt Relative to Assets Ratio -0.026 -0.039 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.345 0.386 0.320 0.433 0.452 -3.824 -3.754 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.046 -0.066 -0.054 -0.051 -0.051

s.e. (0.043) (0.043) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.933) (0.914) (1.124) (1.123) (1.118) (4.051) (3.991) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.061) (0.055) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067)

p-values 0.547 0.370 0.899 0.896 0.895 0.712 0.673 0.776 0.700 0.687 0.346 0.348 0.629 0.758 0.744 0.449 0.228 0.432 0.448 0.445

Equity to Asset Ratio -0.007 0.004 0.019 0.024 0.024 -0.506 -0.711 1.118 1.421 1.371 -9.045 -9.844 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.049 0.056 0.040 0.054 0.052

s.e. (0.050) (0.051) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.737) (0.825) (1.417) (1.584) (1.564) (9.261) (10.066) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.073) (0.070) (0.086) (0.077) (0.076)

p-values 0.881 0.932 0.509 0.423 0.422 0.493 0.390 0.431 0.371 0.382 0.330 0.329 0.367 0.260 0.241 0.505 0.425 0.646 0.486 0.498

Donations to Assets Ratio -1.344* -1.371* -0.257 -0.259 -0.260 2.525 2.667 3.438** 2.171* 2.030 8.207 8.490 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** -0.111 -0.145 -0.147 -0.192** -0.199**

s.e. (0.729) (0.725) (0.226) (0.226) (0.226) (2.352) (2.194) (1.535) (1.280) (1.250) (8.660) (8.829) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.099) (0.092) (0.090) (0.078) (0.082)

p-values 0.067 0.060 0.256 0.253 0.252 0.284 0.226 0.027 0.092 0.106 0.344 0.337 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.263 0.116 0.105 0.016 0.016

Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.014 -0.036 -0.005 0.003 0.004 0.479 0.675 1.068 1.512 1.655 -2.759 -1.949 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.030 -0.071 -0.054 -0.041 -0.031

s.e. (0.036) (0.036) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.608) (0.526) (1.375) (1.344) (1.387) (3.093) (2.389) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.063) (0.055) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) p-values 0.702 0.326 0.804 0.879 0.882 0.432 0.200 0.438 0.262 0.235 0.373 0.416 0.587 0.948 0.869 0.634 0.204 0.426 0.540 0.640 Age: New - -0.033*** -0.026** -0.028** -0.028** - 0.378 0.505 0.493 0.477 - 1.551 0.000 0.000 0.000 - -0.045* -0.074*** -0.082*** -0.083*** S.E. (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.425) (0.462) (0.459) (0.462) (1.587) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) P-values 0.009 0.033 0.017 0.017 0.376 0.276 0.285 0.303 0.329 0.397 0.278 0.297 0.079 0.004 0.001 0.001 Age: Young - 0.010** 0.005 0.001 0.001 - 0.041 -0.003 -0.013 -0.011 - 0.587 0.000 0.000* 0.000* - 0.019 -0.005 -0.013 -0.013 S.E. (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.121) (0.183) (0.168) (0.168) (0.603) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) P-values 0.032 0.280 0.769 0.768 0.736 0.986 0.938 0.948 0.331 0.318 0.098 0.097 0.174 0.696 0.384 0.383

MFI & Macro Level Controls Included No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Time Dummies Included No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes

Financial Intermediation Dummies Included No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes

Constants 0.027 0.041 0.105* -0.036 -0.036 1.781*** 1.640*** -7.466 -12.177 -12.175 6.336 5.694 0.012*** 0.007** 0.007** 0.522*** 0.548*** 0.871*** 0.739** 0.741** s.e. (0.035) (0.035) (0.062) (0.089) (0.090) (0.496) (0.420) (5.639) (10.507) (10.514) (4.482) (3.871) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.057) (0.050) (0.208) (0.308) (0.307) p-values 0.433 0.236 0.094 0.685 0.685 0.000 0.000 0.187 0.248 0.249 0.159 0.143 0.000 0.047 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.017 Overall 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 Between 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 Within 0.25 0.28 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.16 0.16 F 1.50 4.20 11.50 11.90 12.10 0.80 0.80 2.30 2.50 2.40 0.20 0.20 11.00 6.30 6.00 1.20 2.00 2.50 3.80 3.70 Number of Observations 1,192 1,192 947 947 947 1,200 1,200 930 930 930 1,209 1,209 931 931 931 867 867 750 750 75

Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*)

Standard errors (s.e.) in parentheses, and p-values below s.e. calculated based on robust standard errors

Where :

ROA is Return on Assets,

ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita

NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets

PFB is the Percentage of Female Borrowers

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• Bank MFI Financial Performance and Funding Source Mix.

At the aggregate bank MFI level, none of the funding source mix metrics significantly relate to ROA. Thus, on average, funding seems to be unimportant for bank MFIs’ financial performance.

Grouped by age, important associations become noticeable. The donation-to-assets ratio is negatively associated with ROA for young and mature bank MFIs. A unit increase in the donation-to-assets ratio relates to a 125.4% and 24.7% ROA reduction for young and mature bank MFIs, respectively. Also, a unit increase in debt- and deposit-to-assets ratios are associated with a 5.3% and 3% ROA, respectively, for mature bank MFIs. All other relationships between ROA and funding metrics are not significant.

• Bank MFI Social Performance and Funding Source Mix.

The regressions for Bank MFIs’ social performance outcomes are all very significant at F(29,156) = 2.35, p < 0.001; F(29,156) = 6.03, p < 0.001; and F(29,138) = 3.67 < 0.001 for

ALB, NAB, and PFB, respectively. The within R2 are .11, .45, and .16 for ALB, NAB, and

PFB, respectively.

At the aggregate bank MFIs level, there seem to be no significant relationships between ALB and the funding source mix metrics. However, when grouped by ages, important associations arise that are worth analyzing. For young bank MFIs, ALB is positively associated with all funding source mix metrics except the donation-to-assets ratio, with a unit increase in debt-, equity-, and deposit-to-assets ratios associated with an ALB of $18.9, $18.6, and $17.9, respectively. So, as long as the funding source is not donations, an

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increase in funding may increase ALB size by a similar amount. For mature bank MFIs, however, the donation-to-assets ratio positively associates with ALB.

Regarding NAB, on average, a unit increase in the donation-to-assets ratio associates with only a 0.023 increase. Further analysis of bank MFIs by age group shows that donation impacts NAB positively only for mature bank MFIs. Although debt- and deposit-to-assets ratios also have significant associations with NAB for mature bank MFIs, these relationships are negative.

All associations between PFB and funding source mix metrics are not significant on the average, except for the negative relationship with the donation-to-assets ratio. An increase of one unit in donation is associated with an average decrease of 20% in PFB overall, and a 101.6% decrease for young bank MFIs.

Table 11 provides further details on the variability between performance and funding source mix metrics for bank MFIs.

• Bank MFI Performance, Funding Source Mix, and the MLCT.

I did not find evidence of the MLCT at work in bank MFIs. Although a strong significant difference exists between financial performance of new bank MFIs compared to mature ones, I did not find a significant difference between young and mature MFIs’ ROAs. On average, new MFIs attain 2.8% lower ROA compared to mature MFIs. Young bank MFIs’ ROA does not significantly differ on average from that of mature bank MFIs.

Also, while new bank MFIs have, on average, an 8.3% lower PFB than mature bank MFIs, there appears to be no significant difference in PFB for young and mature bank MFIs. So, instead of three-stage performance outcomes, I can identify only two: from new to mature.

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Table 12: Bank MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix by Age

Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature

Debt Relative to Assets Ratio 0.003 0.105 0.006 -0.053** 0.452 1.178 18.918** -0.610 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003** -0.051 0.051 0.027 -0.185*

S.E. (0.022) (0.113) (0.057) (0.021) (1.118) (0.856) (8.202) (0.862) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.067) (0.121) (0.186) (0.095)

P-values 0.895 0.357 0.924 0.015 0.687 0.174 0.024 0.481 0.744 0.903 0.449 0.022 0.445 0.675 0.884 0.054

Equity to Asset Ratio 0.024 0.033 0.025 0.051 1.371 1.306 18.577** 2.097 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.052 0.092 0.391* -0.056

S.E. (0.029) (0.106) (0.060) (0.045) (1.564) (0.798) (9.114) (1.777) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.076) (0.115) (0.212) (0.076)

P-values 0.422 0.758 0.681 0.260 0.382 0.107 0.046 0.240 0.241 0.296 0.148 0.576 0.498 0.426 0.070 0.461

Donations to Assets Ratio -0.260 -0.824 -1.254*** -0.247** 2.030 2.272 12.926 3.766* 0.023*** -0.006 -0.005 0.026*** -0.199** 0.794 -1.016*** -0.126

S.E. (0.226) (0.499) (0.262) (0.106) (1.250) (3.334) (8.398) (1.928) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.082) (0.686) (0.331) (0.096)

P-values 0.252 0.104 0.000 0.021 0.106 0.499 0.129 0.053 0.000 0.358 0.186 0.000 0.016 0.253 0.004 0.193

Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.004 -0.021 -0.018 -0.030* 1.655 0.503 17.914** 0.282 0.000 0.005 0.001 -0.003** -0.031 0.341 -0.197 -0.168

S.E. (0.025) (0.100) (0.050) (0.018) (1.387) (1.062) (8.070) (0.984) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.067) (0.203) (0.169) (0.103) P-values 0.882 0.833 0.723 0.091 0.235 0.638 0.030 0.775 0.869 0.182 0.285 0.033 0.640 0.100 0.249 0.107 Age: New -0.028** - - - 0.477 - - - 0.000 - - - -0.083*** - - - S.E. (0.012) (0.462) (0.000) (0.024) P-values 0.017 0.303 0.297 0.001 Age: Young 0.001 - - - -0.011 - - - 0.000* - - - -0.013 - - - S.E. (0.004) (0.168) (0.000) (0.014) P-values 0.768 0.948 0.097 0.383 Constants -0.036 0.711** -0.112 -0.142* -12.175 -2.037 -14.070 -20.799 0.007** 0.012 -0.006 0.007** 0.741** -0.015 -0.779 0.812** S.E. (0.090) (0.342) (0.241) (0.075) (10.514) (5.432) (19.784) (15.626) (0.003) (0.015) (0.007) (0.003) (0.307) (0.729) (0.673) (0.360) P-values 0.685 0.042 0.642 0.060 0.249 0.709 0.480 0.186 0.045 0.433 0.357 0.014 0.017 0.984 0.253 0.026 Overall 0.45 0.19 0.32 0.36 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.00 0.40 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.13 Between 0.56 0.16 0.20 0.51 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.39 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 Within 0.52 0.88 0.67 0.52 0.11 0.70 0.44 0.19 0.45 0.60 0.40 0.60 0.16 0.65 0.58 0.23 F 12.11 . 16.48 52.12 2.35 . 2.21 2.27 6.03 . 3.01 157.83 3.67 . 44.94 3.75 No. Obs 947 106 172 669 930 106 170 654 931 106 170 655 750 86 124 540

Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*)

Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors

Where :

ROA is Return on Assets,

ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita

NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets

PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers

Models incldue macroeconomic indicator control variables and MFI firm levels control variables

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