Elementos de un modelo de integración

‘States take uncommonly invasive measures to shape what can be said and shown of war, armed with a battery of justifications. Sensitive information must be kept from enemy hands; bereaved relatives must be protected from the sight of their loved (…), ‘morale’ must be maintained – on the home front as at the front line. ‘The ‘fog of war’ hints at more than the atmospheric and perceptual murk that envelops battlefields. It also alludes to the haze of deception that commonly masks why war is waged and how is fought’.105

Both the independence and the monopoly of the BBC were established before the war by Royal Charter in 1927. However, in 1935 the Committee of Imperial Defence decided that, in case of war, the government would take over the control of the BBC and all broadcasting.106 _{A year}

later the same conclusion was drawn by the Ullswater Committee. It was also decided that the MoI would be responsible for censorship of all BBC broadcasts. In addition, Reith and an official of the Post Office, Thomas Gardiner, had reached an agreement that, if war broke out, the BBC Board of Governors would be ‘out of commission’ and the BBC Director-General and his Deputy would represent the board whilst the MoI would issue censorship guidelines.107 _As

102 _{Davies, N., Europe: A History (London: Pimlico, 1997), p. 1027.}

103 _{Schmidt, D., The Folly of War: American Foreign Policy: 1898-2005 (New York: Algora Publishing,}

2005), pp. 189-91; Briggs, op. cit., p. 580.

104 _{Newcourt, op. cit., p. 236.} 105 _{Carruthers, op. cit., p. 8.} 106 _{Briggs, op. cit., p. 77.} 107 _Ibid.

Seaton points out, it is surprising that the BBC, which echoed the government appeasement policy, was secretly preparing for the war. 108

Reith considered the agreement a notable achievement because, although Director-General was going to be responsible to MoI, he would not be subordinate to it. However, the removal of the Governors was met with criticism; it was understood that special measures had to be applied in time of war, but it was felt that it was equally important to maintain the perception of the BBC as an independent institution. As Briggs points out, given that no specific arrangements were outlined, the extent of the control over broadcasting was open to government interpretation and, in consequence, both the BBC and the government had gone to war without knowing what their relationship would be and, more importantly, what role the BBC was going to play.109

A few months before the outbreak of the war, the BBC job was defined as to:

‘mediate information and to convince the educated minority through ‘subtle and indirect’ propaganda and for the less educated masses having simple and direct massages focused on a defined object and appealing to instinct rather than reason’.110

Despite the many voices inside Whitehall advocating for the control of Broadcasting House, the BBC continued to argue for its independence and recognition of its prominence in supporting the war effort. According to Briggs, in the initial stage of war, authority and responsibility remained in hands of the BBC, while censorship was defined as ‘indirect, informal and

voluntary’.111 _{Yet, as Carruthers observes, during the Phoney War, under the blanket of security}

and military secrecy, the BBC was prevented from broadcasting important information and, whilst regular programming was suspended, the BBC ‘crank[ed] out hours of organ music and unedifying diet’.112 _{Whilst the BBC was formally independent, it had clearly ‘entered into}

gentlemen’s agreement’ with the government to accept official guidelines in their treatment of public affairs, requiring it to conform to official policy.113

In fact, the first two years of the war were not the BBC’s ‘finest hour’, primarily because the state did not recognise its potential.114 _{The relationship between the Corporation and the}

government was not defined until Brendan Bracken became MoI in July 1941. Bracken recognised the importance of the BBC and saw its independence as a vital factor in winning

108 _{Curran & Seaton, op. cit., p. 118.} 109 _{Briggs, op. cit., p. 83.}

110 _{Cited in Somerville, 2012, p. 47.}

111 _{Briggs, A., The Golden Age, of Wireless (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 650-1.} 112 _{Carruthers, op. cit. p. 69.}

113 _{Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 156.} 114 _{Mansell, op. cit., p. 56.}

public trust.115 _{Rather than control, he sought to establish cooperation with the BBC and}

therefore restored the number of Governors and appointed Home and Foreign Advisers to the BBC, Ryan and Kirkpatrick, with the task to carry out official policy. The power struggle between the BBC and the MoI, however, continued until the end of the war.

The extent to which the BBC could exercise its independence remains a subject of debate among scholars. While Briggs claims that that censorship was based on the principle of

voluntarism, Lockhart, argues that ‘there were times (…) when there was more political warfare on the home front than against the enemy’.116 _{In particular, the Admiralty pressed for a}

complete silence regarding war issues and its relationship with the BBC remained very tense throughout the war. Yet, according to Lord Normanbrook, the BBC did not always follow the MoI directives.117 _{Whilst Briggs, Mansell and Walker argue that the BBC managed to maintain}

a very substantial measure of independence, Seaton points out that:

‘“Bias” and opinion are fundamental conditions of the production of news, not accidental pathologies. Hence the work of the BBC during the war has been viewed with greater scepticism. A belief in its independence is little more than a self-adulatory part of the British myth’118

It is understandable that security measures had to be applied during the war. Yet, by the same token, the government used its ‘emergency powers’ to censor broadcasts. Therefore, Seaton’s conclusion that the BBC was as independent as the war circumstances allowed is arguably more persuasive.119 _{On the other hand, the BBC knew that it was bound by ‘silken cords’ which}

sometimes felt like ‘chains of iron’.120 _{Yet, not many people knew that incoming cables from}

the Press Association and Reuters were routed directly into the MoI at their Bloomsbury headquarters, allowing MoI censors to excise ‘damaging’ material before wire service subscribers received the cables on which many radio broadcasts were based’.121 _Moreover,

broadcasts in foreign languages had to be approved in advance by the security and policy censor, whilst the so-called switch censor present during transmission had permission to stop the broadcast if variation from the script occurred.122 _{As Taylor points out, this pre-censorship}

not only allowed the BBC to be seen as a truth telling station but it was ‘so efficient that many British and overseas observers were not aware of what was taking place; instead everyone

115 _{Briggs, op. cit., 1995, pp. 31-32.} 116 _{Lockhart, op. cit., 1972, p. 96.}

117 _{Lord Normanbrook, INF, 1/869, 9 July 1941, cited in McLaine, op. cit.} 118 _{Curran & Seaton, op. cit., p. 139.}

119 _Ibid.

120 _{Expression used by Sir Allan Powell, 8 December 1943; cited in Briggs, op. cit., 1995, p. 31.} 121 _{Pronay, N., & Spring, D. W., Propaganda, Politics and Film, 1918-45 (London: Macmillan, 1982);}

Carruthers, op. cit.

believed that the BBC was telling the truth’.123 _{On the other hand, editors and reporters became}

their own censors because of their ‘patriotic consciousness’; it was not necessary for officials to develop policies in this area as colleagues checked each other ‘for any infractions of the

officials’ rules with hawk-like vigilance’.124