We have spent a lot of effort analyzing turn play when the SB checks back only mediocre made hands. Why have we done this? It is not only because it leads to the PvBC situation that is so useful and tractable. The dynamic initiated by polarized c-betting is right at the heart of modern HUNL strat- egy. Understanding and attacking a player’s flop c-betting strategy is very important, and of course, you must understand the situation from the SB’s perspective as well. We will discuss these issues further in Chapter 14, but let’s take a first pass at it now.
Initiative and Less Common Turn LInes
help him play the various parts of his range profitably on later streets? We have seen over and over that a polarized range is almost always more prof- itable to play than a range of mediocre hands with the same average equity. Generally, it is also easier to play. One does not tend to face many hard deci- sions when holding the nuts, and air is relatively simple to play as well. To be slightly more quantitative, recall the EV distributions in Figure 11.3. One of the surrounding exercises involved comparing the EV distributions to the equity distributions in that K♥-8♠-3♦-2♣ turn spot. Of course, if there were no betting and both players just checked down, the EV and equity distributions would map directly onto one another, since all the hands of both players would simply realize their equity in the pot. So, in comparing the two distributions, you saw which hands benefit from the betting ac- tion. And of course, it is a zero-sum game, so if some hands benefit, then others must lose. When you performed the comparison, you saw that value hands tend to earn much more than their equity in the pot, and the EV of the nuts was significantly more than the pot itself. You also saw that air tended to capture more or less just its equity in the pot (i.e., nearly zero). So, the extra EV gained by the value hands comes at the expense of the bluff-catchers.
A hand’s playability relates to how easy it is to realize its equity in the pot. It is very easy to realize all the equity of air, since it has none. We simply give up the hand or put in a bluff when it has at least zero expected profit. It is also easy to capture all our equity in the pot with the nuts – it’s hard to do too badly as long as we don’t fold. However, it is often very hard to ef- fectively contest the pot with our middling hands. These generally do worse than if they could just check down. Thus, we often say that particu- larly strong and particularly weak hands (and pre-flop holdings that tend to make particularly strong or weak hands post-flop, such as suited con- nectors) have good playability, while middling hands (and pre-flop hold- ings that tend to make middling hands post-flop, like K-3o) do not.
The primary message here is that weak hands do not really care if there is betting action, while strong holdings tend to gain value at the expense of mediocre made hands when there is betting. This is one of the primary benefits of being in position, at least on the river. When the SB faces a bet-
Expert Heads Up No-Limit Hold ’em, Volume 2
or-check decision there, he can bet a polarized range and check back his middling holdings. This lets him capture all of his equity with hands that just want to see a showdown while still getting a bet in with all those hands that benefit from it. The idea behind c-betting a polarized range on the flop is more or less the same. The SB bets particularly strong and par- ticularly weak hands, but his mediocre holdings would prefer to just go directly to showdown.
Unfortunately for him, in contrast to the river case, checking back the flop does not get the SB directly to showdown. We have seen over the past couple of chapters that after the SB defines his range as bluff-catchers, the BB gets the best of the situation, even if the SB plays the later streets perfectly. We have also seen that the multi-street PvBC situation is in some sense even worse for the bluff-catching player than the river-only case. Additionally, in the extreme limit represented by the ideal PvBC situation, position does not matter, so when a SB checks back only bluff-catchers, he is giving up much of his positional advantage. So, when a SB c-bets polar and narrowly defines his checking-back range, he puts himself in a potentially poor spot.
However, there is an upside: His c-betting range is polarized and thus eas- ily playable. Thus, this common approach to c-betting works by sacrificing the playability of the SB’s checking-back range in order to enhance the playability of his betting distribution. It makes him vulnerable after he checks back the flop but works quite well against BBs who do not take ad- vantage. When we find ourselves facing such a SB, it is hard to combat him by attacking his c-bets. That part of Villain’s strategy is artificially rein- forced. Instead, we have to apply pressure after he checks, because that is where he is exposed.
Characterizing and attacking the SB’s checking-back range is the key to OOP play versus many opponents. Once we begin attacking his check- backs on the turn and river, Villain will need to begin balancing that range. We will gain immediately when he begins missing bets with his value hands. Additionally, if he c-bets less value, he will have to c-bet fewer bluffs as well. Many players adjust incorrectly by focusing on play versus the SB’s c-bets while approaching his checks relatively passively. Perhaps this is be- cause the SB checks back less often, so it seems less important, or it is
Initiative and Less Common Turn LInes
harder to get good data about his range there. However, this is playing right into the SB’s plan! He wants to play large pots with his c-betting range, while taking his checking range to showdown. Perhaps BBs play passively since they figure the SB has at least some showdown value so he is likely to call at least once and maybe twice, but we saw in Section 10.4.2 how to play against the call-and-re-evaluate approach, and we make even more versus these opponents on average than we do versus someone with a more balanced strategy.
Now, we are getting a bit ahead of ourselves. Flop play has its own chapter and we will return to these points there. For now, I just wanted to give a bit of context to show where our previous results fit into the overall picture of post-flop play. It will be important in the future once we take another step up the decision tree and consider play on the flop. Remember that good early-street play depends on a solid understanding of later-street situa- tions. For now, however, try to characterize the SB checking-back ranges of opponents in your games. Play around with some larger turn and river bet sizings in these spots. At many stack sizes, choosing a standard bet size of around the full pot would not be unreasonable, and making it significantly smaller without a good exploitative reason could cost you a lot of money.
How does board texture affect the dynamic we have discussed in this section? Consider a particularly volatile flop. Do many SBs still have a “polarized” c-betting range here? If so, is the BB’s best counter facing a check still to lead the turn aggres- sively? On which turn cards is this the case and on which not? Then, how will SB’s readjustment work? Will he begin to slow- play the flop more often? With which hands?