To address these concerns Mutch (2013) suggests that critical realism (Volkoff, Strong and Elmes, 2007; Strong and Volkoff, 2010) and in particular the
‘morphogenetic approach’ of Margaret Archer (1995) offers an alternative to agential realism as a theoretical foundation for research into sociomateriality.
Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p.13) consider critical realism to be part of the antipositivist movement, most closely associated with the works of Roy Bhaskar (1995). The use of the term critical in this context refers to a
‘transcendental realism that rejects methodological individualism and universal claims about truth’. A critical realist approach accepts the positivist epistemology that there is a ‘world of events that is out there waiting to be discovered’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.13), however they accept that knowledge about this world is socially constructed. It is argued that in rejecting a ‘correspondence theory of truth’, ‘reality is arranged in levels and that scientific work must go beyond statements of regularity to analysis of mechanisms, processes and structures, that account for the patterns that are observed’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.13).
According to Archer (1995, p.165) society is not a mechanism with ‘pre-set preferred states’; it is not a language with an ordered syntax, nor is it comparable to a cybernetic system capable of carrying out goal directed, feedback regulated, error correction’.
Society is considered to be an open system, because it is ‘peopled’, and being
‘peopled’ can always be reshaped through human innovativeness. Archer (1995) uses the term ‘morphogenesis’ to illustrate this social shaping as illustrated below:
‘Hence the use of the term morphogenesis to describe the process of social structuring; ‘morpho’ indicating shape and ‘genesis’ signalling that the shaping is the product of social relations. Thus morphogenesis refers to those processes, which change a system’s given form, state, or structure. Conversely, morphogenesis refers to those processes in complex system-environmental exchange, which tends to preserve or maintain a system’s given form, organisation or state’ (Archer, 1995, p.166).
Within the morphogenetic approach human and social elements of everyday life are considered to be ontologically distinct but none the less intricately interlinked, as they temporarily emerge from different strata as highlighted below:
‘the emergentist substitutes analytical dualism. Because the social world is made up, ‘inter alia’, of structures and of agents and because these belong to different strata, there is no question of reducing one to the other or of eliding the two and there is every reason for exploring the interplay between them world’ (Archer, 1995, p.62).
‘the central argument is that structure and agency can only be linked by examining the interplay between them over time, and that without the proper incorporation of time the problem of structure and agency can never be fully resolved’ (Archer, 1995, p.65)
Cruickshank (2012, p.73) argues that these ontological assumptions consider the world to be a ‘stratified open system’, in which ‘unobservable causal laws interact in contingent ways to produce change at the level of observable events’. Reality is held to be a ‘stratified’ property, which cannot always be reduced to the level of physics. Disciplines such as chemistry and biology are thus seen to ‘emerge’ from the level of physics but which are irreducible to the level of physics. In this context water is an emergent property of hydrogen and
oxygen but is irreducible down to these components and has its own properties. A critical realist stance research will not be taken to yield certainty in knowledge and theories are still ‘fallible interpretations that are open to criticism and revision or replacement in the future’ (Cruickshank, 2102, p.73).
The adoption of a critical realist perspective allows researchers to specify the nature of material properties whilst at the same time encompassing an appreciation of differing ‘levels and features’ (Mutch, 2013, p.37). In doing so this approach allows us to be ‘specific about the materiality we are engaging with and to enable our approach to cover the full range of instantiations’
(Mutch, 2013, p.37).
3.9.1 Implications for sociomateriality of adopting a critical realist approach
A summary of the concerns raised by adopting an agential realist perspective and the associated potential solutions of adopting a critical realist approach are summarised in Table 8 below:
Table 8. Problems for sociomateriality arising from agential realism
In conclusion Leonardi (2013, p.73) states the following:
‘a theoretical foundation of agential realism is in no way a wrong or bad turn, or in any way worse than a foundation on critical realism.
They are simply different and one may be better suited for particular contextual circumstances. By making comparisons of this kind and exploring their value for understanding technology and organising, scholars who examine the most practical of all phenomena may be able to find a path out the interesting, important and dense philosophical forest into the open fields of practical utility’
Scott and Orlikowski (2013) also respond to the criticisms raised by Mutch (2013). Rather than considering the concept of agential realism as a ‘wrong turn’, ontological presumptions surrounding non-separability, are considered to be a strength rather than a weakness.
Scott and Orlikowski (2013, p.78) argue that Mutch (2013) focuses a large part of his discussion of what they term first generation papers, which draw on the work of Barad (2003). This ‘critique by proxy’ is considered to be problematic and cannot be considered ‘credible evidence against the original work’. A central theme of the argument developed by Mutch (2013) revolves around the inability of the relational ontology developed by Barad (2003) to adequately deal with ideas that are central to critical realism i.e. those of emergence and stratification. Scott and Orlikowski (2013, p.79) argue that this is unsurprising as highlighted below:
‘Berating agential realism for supplying “a shaky foundation” to social science (Mutch, 2013, p. 35) is simply misplaced. Suggesting as much is akin to censuring critical realism for offering a shaky foundation to geological analyses.
Although the sociomaterial approach is considered a ‘wrong turn’ by Mutch (2013), Scott and Orlikowski (2013, p.79) argue that it is unclear why the critical realist approach should be considered the right turn. It is argued that a level of critique, which opts for ‘exclusionary declarations’, is unhelpful and at odds with what the work is trying to achieve.
In conclusion Scott and Orlikowski (2013, p.80) call for a settling of the differences as highlighted below:
‘The challenge and opportunity is to turn unsettled and unsettling ideas into inspiration, and differences into analytical edge for deepening understanding so that we might understand the world anew. It flows from this that ruling out novel perspectives and stifling innovation is likely to undermine any field of study’.
Scott and Orlikowski (2013, p.80) counter the criticism of Mutch (2013) by asking that ‘scholars engaged in studies of information systems and organisations adopt ‘whatever theory they find works best for the research they pursue’ rather than ruling out novel perspectives.