EMISIONES Y RESIDUOS

Sarsaihgraha.—A "summary of essences" sarasamgraha), is the name of a commentary on the Tarkikaraksa by Varadaraja himself. Varadaraja wrote also a commentary on Nyayaku- > sumdfijali called Barsaingraha-tika.

Laghudipika.—Jnanapurna is the author of a commentary on the Tarkikaraksa called Lagbudipika, "a light lamp." He seems to have flourished in about 1200 A.D. as he was a disciple of Visnu Svamin,' who lived in about 1200 A.D. He mentions Jayanta and Visvarupa.

Kiskantaka.—A commentary on Tarkikaraksa called Niskan-taka, the thornless, was composed by sage named Mallinatha, who lived in Kolacala. The sage in his commentary on Kiratar-juniya mentions Pijusavarsa whose date is unknown. Mallinatha must have lived before saka 1580 or A.D. 1658, when a manuscript of the aforesaid commentary on Kiratarjuniya was copied. He seems to have preceded also Dinakara Misra, whose commentary on Baghuvamsa was composed in 1385 A.D. Mallinatha is gener- ally supposed to have lived in the 14th * century A.D. Mr. A. 0. Burnell thinks that Mallinatha's son lived during the reign of Pratapa Rudra, of the Kakatiya dynasty in 1310 A.D.

A History of Indian Logic13 KESAVA MISBA (ABOUT 1275

A.D.).

Kesava Misra was the author of a Nyaya treatise called Tarkabhasa. He was a native of Mithila and a preceptor of Govardhana Misra who wrote a commentary on Tarkabhasa, called Tarkabhasa Prakasa. Padmanabha Misra, author of Kiranavali Bhaskara and Kanada-rahasya Muktahara, was an elder brother of Govardhana. Hence it follows that Kesava Misra, Padmanabha and Govardhana were contemporaries. Sir Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar in his Reports of Sanskrit Manuscripts, 1882-1883, observed Cinna Bhatta was the author of a commentary on Tarkabhasa called Tarkabhasa Pravesika and that he lived in Vijayanagar at the Court of King Harihara at the latter half of the 14th century. Padmanabha, brother of Kesava, is said to have been younger to Vardhamana whom he mentions in his Kiranavalibhaskara. So Padmanabha lived between the beginning of the 13th century and end of the 14th century A.D. Probably he lived at the end of the 13th century A D.

14. Tarkabhasa—TECHNICALITY OF LOGIC. Categories—ipadartha.

Kesava Misra opens his work thus—" In order that even dull people may get admittance into the science of Logic, I bring out this Tarkabhasa (Technicality of Logic) replete with concise arguments."

The Tarkabhasa deals with the sixteen categories of the Nyaya sutra, viz. (1) pramdna, (2) prameya, (3) Tarkabhasa incorpo- sdwSayd, (4) prayojana, (5)

vitandd, (13) ftetvabhdsa, (4) chala, (15) jati, (16) nigrahastham. The second

A History of Indian Logiccategory, namely prameya, includes (a) atman, (Ъ} баггга, (с) indriya, (d}

artha, (e) buddhi, (/) manas, (g) pravrtti, (A) dosa, (i) pretyabhava, (j) phala, (k) duhkha, and (6) apavarga. The word artha, in the Nyaya sutra signified five objects of sense, viz. (1) gandha (sniell), (2) rasa (taste). (3) rupa (colour), (4) sparsa (touch), and (6) eabda (sound). In order to incorporate the

Vaisesika categories into Nyaya, Kesava Misra explained artha as signifying (1) dravya, (2) guna, (3)

karma, (4) samanya, (5) vieesa, and (6) samavaya. Though the sixteen categories of the Nyaya are

included in the six categories of the Vaisesika, the two sets of categories are separately stated and the Vaisesika categories are explained identically with artha. Kesava confesses that he adopts this overlapping division for a special purpose. The scheme of combination of the two sets of categories is shown below:—

(1) pramBna,(2) prameya, (3) аатйауа, (4) prayojana, (5) drstanta,(6) siddhanta, (7) avayava, (8) tarka, (9) nirnaya, (10) vada, (11) jalpa, (12) vitandS, etc.

(1) atman .(2) Sarira, (3) indriya, (4) artha, (5) buddhi, (6) manas, (7) pravrtti, (8) dosa, (9) pretyabhava, (10) phala, (11) duhkha, (12) apavarga. (I) dravya, (2) guna, (3) karma, (4) samanya, (5) visesa, (6) samavaya.

Instrument—karana.

Under the first category, Kesava defines instrument (karana) as a cause which is most effective in bringing about a result. A thing is said to be the cause (karana) of another thing, if it is a necessary antecedent of the latter, that is, if it necessarily exists before the latter and does not bring about anything else, e.g. threads constitute the cause of a cloth. Suppose an ass had existed at a place where a cloth was made ; the ass, whose existence there was not necessary, is not a cause of the cloth ; and the ass is an irrelevant antecedent. Similarly the colour of the threads is not a cause of the cloth, inasmuch as it brings about something else, viz. the colour of the cloth. In so far as the cloth itself is concerned, it is produced by the threads alone.

An effect (karya) is defined as that necessary consequence which is not brought about by something else, e.g. a cloth is an effect of threads.

Cause—karana. The cause is of three kinds as follows:—

(1) The material, constituent or inherent cause (samavayi karana) is that in which an effect inheres, that which constitutes A History of Indian Logicthe effect or that which forms the material out of which the effect is produced, e.g. threads are such a cause of the cloth. Inherence (samavaya) is the relation of two things which one, as long as it is not destroyed, continues to subsist in the other. The relation of inherence (samavaya) exists between its parts and a whole, the qualities and substance, action and an actor, the individual and a class, its specific qualities and the eternal substance.

(2) The non-material, non-constituent or non-inherent cause (asamavayi kara.na)—is that which inheres in the material cause and whose efficiency is well known, e.g. the conjunction of the threads is a non-material cause of the cloth, the colour of the threads is a non-material cause of the colour of the cloth. Colour inheres in threads and its efficiency in producing the colour of the cloth is well known.

(3) The efficient, instrumental or general cause is that which as a cause is distinct from both the preceding ones, e.g. the loom is the instrumental cause of the cloth. Of the several causes the most efficient is called an instrumental (nimitta) cause.

Perception—pratyaksa. Perception (pratyaksa) is of two kinds :—

(1) Nirvikalpaka, non-determinate, non-effective or abstract, and (2) savikalpaka, determinate, reflective or concrete. The Buddhists admit only the first kind of perception and reject the second kind. They say that our perception is certainly indeterminate and individual, it has for its object an individual which alone can come in contact with our senses. A'determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyaksa) is according to them an impossibility, because it has for its object a generic entity which cannot come in contact with our senses. We can perceive an individual cow but cannot perceive the cowness generic to

all individual cows. In fact the Buddhists altogether deny a genus or generic entity. If, for instance, the genus cowness at all exists, it is to be defined as that which is excluded by non-cowness, i.e. which is not horse-ness, tigerness, etc.

Now if we are unable to perceive cowness because it pertains to all cows, how can we perceive non- cowness which covers a still wider area ? Kesava's reply to the objection of the Buddhists is that even a genus is to be regarded as an entity, like an individual, which is, as such, capable of coming in contact with, our senses.

Inference—anumana.

Inference is consideration from sign. A sign (lingo) is that which indicates the predicate (sadhya) by the force of their

A History of Indian Logicinvariable concomitance, e.g. smoke is a'sign of fire, inasmuch as there is an invariable concomitance of smoke with fire in the form "wherever there is smoke there is fire." Consideration (paramarsa) is the knowledge that the sign pervaded by the predicate abides in the subject. Inferential knowledge (anumiti) is the knowledge which is derived through consideration, e.g. this hill has fire because it has smoke, which is .in invariable conconu-tance with fire. Invariable concomitance (vydpti) is the constant association of the sign with the predicate, e.g. the co-presence of smoke with fire. The concomitance or co-presence must be natural and not conditional (aupddhika) '

Comparison—upamdna.

Comparison or analogy (upamdna} is the knowledge of a certain thing as similar to another thing, derived through the remembrance of an indicative declaration on the subject, e.g. a man who has heard from a forester that a bosgavaeus (gavaya) is like a cow, goes into a forest and sees an animal like a cow. Remembering the declaration of the forester, he ascertains that the animal he sees is a bosgavaeus. This knowledge is analogical or comparative knowledge derived through an analogy or comparison.

Word—sabda.

Word (sabda), if it is the assertion of a trustworthy person, is a means of right knowledge, e.g. the Veda is a means of right knowledge, inasmuch as it was spoken by God who is supremely trustworthy.