EMISORES DE CALOR

The evidence reviewed by the Select Committee confirms the findings of HPSCI and SSCI that, despite the deteriorating threat environment in eastern Libya, the IC had no

intelligence indicating a specific threat to U.S. interests in Benghazi leading up to the attacks. As HPSCI explained in its bipartisan report publicly released in November 2014:

Relevant documents confirm that the IC did not possess intelligence indicating planning or intentions for attacks on the Benghazi facility on or about

September 11, 2012. And thus the IC did not fail to provide such warning. Furthermore, the Committee did not find evidence to suggest the IC could have collected intelligence to warn of the attacks.1

In its January 2014 report, SSCI also concluded:

To date, the Committee has not identified any intelligence or other information received prior to September 11, 2012, by the IC or State Department indicating specific terrorist planning to attack the US facilities in Benghazi on September 11, 2012.2

Witnesses interviewed by the Select Committee confirmed that there was no advance warning of the attacks. The CIA Deputy Chief of Base, who was the second-most senior intelligence officer in Benghazi, explained:

So, you know, again, I don’t—again, my sense is, my assessment is that had there been some massive preplanned operation going on there to attack the special mission, I am pretty sure we would have gotten wind of it. Now, I can’t say that with a hundred percent certainty. But my assessment was judging on what I knew then and more significantly what I know now, having worked in a different war zone and having run operations like this, we had really good coverage there. You know, the work that the Chief of Base had done and the other officers was really significant. And I really think if this thing had been a massive preplanned operation, we would have gotten wind of it.3

The Director of the CIA Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA) confirmed: “We did not have intelligence that would have enabled us to provide tactical warning of the attack.”4

None of the witnesses before the Select Committee provided any information indicating that the attacks were the result of significant advanced planning. As HPSCI previously reported: “The sophistication of the attacks does not necessarily imply lengthy-preplanning.”5

As SSCI explained:

Although it may never be known with complete certainty, it is possible that the individuals and groups involved in the attacks had not planned on conducting those attacks until that day, meaning that specific tactical warning would have been highly unlikely.6

Both HPSCI and SSCI noted in their reports that after the attacks, there were

uncorroborated allegations about a possible unsuccessful attempt to warn officials on the day of the attacks. According to the SSCI report:

Although it did not reach the U.S. Intelligence Community until after the attacks, it is important to note that a former Transitional National Council (TNC) security official in Benghazi, [Redacted], had received information of a possible imminent attack against the mission facility in advance. The official said that approximately four hours prior to the attack, he attempted to notify the Libyan Intelligence Service (LIS) that an attack was expected, but he was unable to reach two contacts he had in the LIS as they were out of the country. The CIA has been unable to corroborate the official’s claim that he attempted to provide the LIS with advance warning about the attack.7

HPSCI noted the same allegation in its report, stating: “This specific report by [redacted] to the Libyans—if it even occurred—remains uncorroborated.”8

Similarly, both HPSCI and SSCI were provided with an unsubstantiated allegation that an individual told the U.S. government after the attacks that he attempted to warn the CIA in Benghazi shortly before the attack, but was unable to reach the Chief of Base via telephone.9

The Select Committee received additional evidence regarding this allegation and the CIA’s actions to investigate it. This new evidence confirmed that upon learning of the allegation after the attacks, appropriate CIA personnel documented and reported on the allegation at the time in accordance with established collection practices. The new

documentation also confirmed that the allegation had been investigated by the CIA at the time, and that the CIA found no evidence to corroborate it.10

In addition, the Chief of Base told the Select Committee that in order to check the veracity of the allegation, he reviewed the call information and found no record that this individual attempted to reach him via telephone shortly before the attacks:

Q: Do you know if he [the individual who made the allegation] tried to contact [the U.S. Government]?

A: He never did.

Q: He never contacted [the U.S. Government]? A: He never contacted either phone.

Q: How do you know?

A: Because we went back to look at the call information.11

A senior official at CIA headquarters also confirmed that the allegation had been investigated and could not be corroborated: “And to my point earlier, before the Deputy Director even asked us about that claim, we had already checked into it and determined that there wasn’t. We had no record.”12

Despite the lack of advance warning, Democratic Members join with previous

investigations in noting that in the months preceding the attacks, the Intelligence Community produced several reports regarding the overall deteriorating security environment in eastern Libya. While this information was widely disseminated and available to executive and legislative branch officials, nothing in these reports led anyone at the time to recommend that State Department officials depart Benghazi.

Evidence reviewed by the Select Committee confirmed the HPSCI and SSCI findings that the IC reported on the deteriorating threat environment in the months preceding the attacks. As HPSCI pointed out:

[D]uring the 12 months preceding the attacks, CIA published 54 pieces of finished intelligence analysis related to the security situation in eastern Libya, the groups operating there, and the capabilities of the Libyan security services. In numerous analytic products, CIA specifically highlighted the threats to Western interests in eastern Libya. For example, CIA published a WIRe [World Intelligence Review electronic] article in June 2012 titled “Attack on British Diplomatic Convoy Underscores Risks to Western Interests,” which included an accompanying chronology of attacks against Western interests since April 2012.13

However, information about the identities and motivations of the attackers was often lacking. When asked about an intelligence report issued about two weeks before the attacks, the Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA) explained that the CIA did not know who conducted many attacks, including the June 6, 2012, attack against the Special Mission Compound: “We did not know who many of these attacks were conducted by. … I don’t believe that we ever actually definitively determined who was responsible for that [June 6, 2012] attack.”14

In its December 2012 report, the ARB acknowledged the deteriorating security environment, explaining:

Benghazi’s threat environment had been generally deteriorating since the “gelatina” bomb was thrown over the SMC fence on April 6, but was not judged to have reached a critical point before September 11.15

The ARB also found:

While the June 6 IED at the SMC and the May [International Committee of the Red Cross] attack were claimed by the same group, none of the remaining attacks were viewed in Tripoli and Benghazi as linked or having common perpetrators. … This also tempered reactions in Washington. Furthermore, the Board believes that the longer a post is exposed to continuing high levels of violence the more it comes to consider security incidents which might otherwise provoke a reaction as normal, thus raising the threshold for an incident to cause a reassessment of risk and mission continuation.16

The ARB determined that while State Department personnel were aware of the

security incidents, “[t]he Ambassador did not see a direct threat of an attack of this nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative trendline of security incidents from spring to summer 2012.”17

Evidence obtained by the Select Committee corroborated the finding of the ARB that the Ambassador and his security personnel did not anticipate an attack of the scale and intensity of the September 11, 2012, attacks. For example, on August 15, 2012—just weeks before the attacks—security experts on the ground in Benghazi held an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting at the Special Mission Compound that specifically discussed the deteriorating security environment and the impact on post’s operations.18 _{No one at that EAC}

meeting recommended that State Department personnel depart the facility in Benghazi. Instead, they agreed to request a series of security improvements designed to mitigate the risk to personnel working at that facility. Ambassador Stevens approved the cable reporting on the discussions and decisions of the EAC.19

In addition, the Select Committee received evidence that the IC regularly briefed the congressional committees of jurisdiction on the U.S. government’s counterterrorism posture in Libya during the Arab Spring, the NATO intervention, and the post-Qadhafi era. During these briefings, witnesses described bipartisan support for the U.S. mission in Libya.20