2. DESCRIPCIÓN DE LA EMPRESA E INDUSTRIA
2.5. Empresas comparables
158 SCRA 282 (1988)
Facts: Oct. 31, 1940 Cadastral Court declared Lot No. 8423 of the Ormoc Cadastral as public land. 32 years later (Jan 12, 1972) spouses Adolfo filed a petition to
re-open the Oct. 31, 1940 decision. Spouses claimed ownership by virtue of having purchased it and as evidenced by a deed of quitclaim and confirmation dated August 28, 1969, likewise alleging that due to accident, mistake, and excusable neglect of the previous claimant, the land was declared public. Director of Lands appeared as oppositor. Judge adjudicated Lot No. 8423 in favor of spouses. Rep. and Dir. Appeals by certiorari. Petitioner claims spouses’ petition is barred by the expiration of the period for reopening of cadastral proceedings under RA 931 (Dec. 31, 1968). Issue: WON spouses are barred.
Held: Yes. Decision set aside.
Ratio: Spouses filed their petition more than 3 years after the lapse of the reglementary period required by the law. The period having expired, respondent judge was without jurisdiction when he entertained spouses’ petition to re-open the decision of the cadastral court.
Spouses claim that assuming the LC has no jurisdiction to re-open the cadastral proceedings their petition may be taken as one for confirmation of imperfect title considering the allegation contained in the complaint. But looking into their petition, the spouses’ cause of action is premised on RA 931 because it conforms with the conditions to be met before one can avail of the provisions of RA 931 therefore the petition filed by the spouses cannot be one for confirmation of imperfect title. If it were a confirmation of imperfect title, spouses can take advantage of the extension of period granted by RA 6236 (Dec. 31, 1976) but that law does not apply to re-opening of cadastral cases.
Requirements of the rules relative to perfection of appeal in an ordinary case apply in the same manner to appeals from a decision of a court of first instance in registration and cadastral proceedings. Hence, from Aug. 28, 1972 when the assailed decision was received by herein petitioners until Sept. 15, 1972 when the petition was filed, the 30 period had not yet elapsed.
I. Lost or Destroyed Certificates
(Sec.109, PD 1529)
In case of loss or theft of an owner’s duplicate certificate of title
Due notice under oath is required to be sent to Reg. of Deeds where land is situated as soon as loss or theft is discovered
Petition to be filed by registered owner or other person in interest
Notice and hearing required OCAMPO V. GARCIA,
105 PHIL. 533
FACTS: Appellees ask for the issuance of another duplicate certificate TCT which was lost in the liberation of Manila. They ask as well that the two encumbrances (re appointment of special administrator and sum due to a judgment creditor) thereon because such encumbrances no longer exist or have been satisfied.
HELD: There is no question that under the foregoing quoted provisions of Act No. 496, the court of first instance, acting as land registration court, may, upon petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, after notice and hearing, and upon satisfactory proof, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of a lost or destroyed one, and the cancellation of encumbrances on a certificate of title which have terminated or ceased. Having shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the owner's duplicate of transfer certificate of title No. 28709 had been lost or destroyed during the battle for liberation of Manila, the appellees are entitled to the issuance of another owner's duplicate TCT. Having also shown to the Court's satisfaction that Mariano Ocampo y Zamora, who had been appointed by the probate court to administer the estate of the late Manuel Rivera y Angeles, died in 1938, and the record of that fact on the back of the certificate of title would serve no useful purpose, the appellees may ask for the cancellation thereof and the Court commits no error in directing the cancellation of the annotation on the certificate of title of the
administrator's appointment by the probate court.
SERRA V. CA, 195 SCRA 482
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; PURPOSE. — The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. The reconstitution of certificates of title should be made, as just stated, in the same form and exactly as they were at the time they were lost or destroyed. A person who seeks a reconstitution of a certificate of title over a property he does not actually possess cannot, by a mere motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which is summary in nature, deprive the actual occupants of possession thereof. Possession and/or ownership of the property should be threshed out in a separate proceeding
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; ACTUAL AND PERSONAL NOTICE TO ACTUAL POSSESSORS, INDISPENSABLE. — Private respondents argue that the herein petitioners are bound by the order granting reconstitution because the reconstitution proceedings was heard after notices were sent to alleged boundary owners and the petition was published in the Official Gazette. However, the petitioner who were in actual possession of the properties were not notified. Notice by publication is not sufficient as regards actual possessors of the property. In the case of Alabang Development v. Valenzuela, No. 54094, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 277, We held that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the lands involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition.
RECONSTITUTED TITLE A NULLITY WHERE NO ORIGINAL TITLE EXISTS. — If no such original title in fact exists, the reconstituted title is a nullity and the order for its reconstitution does not become final because the court rendering the order has not acquired jurisdiction. It may be attacked at any time. The same rule applies if in fact
there is an earlier valid certificate of title in the name and in the possession of another person/s.
REPUBLIC V CA AND YUPANGCO,