7. DINAMICA EMPRESARIAL
7.2. Empresas matriculadas
7.2.2. Empresas matriculadas por sector
The Homocertain partnership was established to contribute to a reduction in pesticide use by identification of a new apple variety resistant to fungal diseases and preferred in taste by consumers. In this case innovation uncertainty was limited because of the potential of the innovation to contribute to the reduction of time-to-market of a new apple variety (reduction of time needed for the breeding process) and lowering of the costs, due to reduction in pesticide use. Due to these advantages, interest among the pip fruit growers for this new breeding technique and a new apple variety was present. The co-innovation partners had less control over the uncertainty related to consumer acceptance of such new products, which were perceived to be genetically modified. The task uncertainty was also limited because two of the partners had already discovered the fungal-disease resistant gene in an earlier DNA-marker research project. The goal in the studied partnership was to isolate or single out this apple gene. Previous cooperation and a limited number of partners made the level of heterogeneity rather limited in this co-innovation partnership. During the four years of this partnership, their network heterogeneity ranged from 3 to 5 types of organisations, including a plant research institute, fruit growers, a consultancy firm and communication experts.
Structural governance - formalisation and application
In this partnership a rather detailed formalisation took place at the start of the collaboration and the limited size of the network enabled the partners to involve everyone in this process. The partners made agreements about the innovation goals and planning, as well as a number of progress assessment criteria (see Figure 5.3 structural governance (formalisation)). The low level of network heterogeneity eased the application of agreements. Also the partnership manager had an important role in the structural governance, through active engagement in the coordination of the collaboration and progress of the innovation process. He was in charge of welcoming new ideas and adaptations, but also critically assessing changes to assure continuance and coherence of the initial innovation aims (see Figure 5.3 structural governance (application)). In this partnership, a number of contractual agreements about investment of resources and property rights were also made. A joint venture was set up, with the plan to use future profits from commercialisation of the new apple variety to continue innovation (see Figure 5.3 structural governance (formalisation)). In order to assure free circulation and mobility of knowledge, agreements concerning the confidentiality and knowledge exchange were also made.
Rational commitment and competence trust
The high interest among the apple cultivators for the development of a new fungal- disease resistant apple variety was motivated by the reduction in the use of pesticides it would bring, and eventually also the costs. This was also the reason for the cultivators to
developments and achievements in the partnership, so as to ensure and safeguard continuing support and commitment to the innovation. Rational commitment in this partnership was also demonstrated by the fact that the partners were not only motivated by financial gains, but also passionate about the development process, the goals of the innovation and the potential success. The support from the growers and the competence trust in the knowledge institute to single out the necessary gene for the fungal disease resistant apple variety were at the basis of rational commitment in this innovation partnership (see Figure 5.3 rational commitment and competence trust). Rational commitment was the self-enforcing drive, making the partners put time and effort into the innovation activities and refrain from opportunistic behaviour. Low rational commitment was present in the case of the partner responsible for the communication and procurement of the innovation in the society and among the consumers to achieve acceptance of this new apple variety, avoiding confusion with genetically modified varieties. In the absence of rational commitment, this partner tried to put in as little effort as possible while sharing in the advantages to a maximum extent.
Previous collaboration and trust, but continued alignment and adaptation
In this partnership, a high level of competence and compliance trust was already present between the pip fruit innovation firm and the plant research institute. It was developed on the basis of previous cooperation where the partners learned much about each other’s trustworthiness and compliance with promises and agreements made. This basis of trust made them very confident about the potential success of the innovation partnership. They were aware of the complementary aspects of their skills and resources and the congruence in their working methods, which enabled governance of organisational challenges by trust in this partnership (see Figure 5.3 previous cooperation and competence trust). The attachment of value to their relationship, or in other words attitudinal commitment, made them behave according to the common norms, including compliance with agreements and refraining from opportunistic behaviour. Nevertheless, they remained aware of the need to devote attention to adaptations and changes necessary for this specific co-innovation process. The partnership manager indicated that ‘each party saw the valuable contribution of the others which resulted
Structural governance (formalisation)
• detailed extra-contractual and some contractual (property rights) agreements • all partners involved
Rational commitment Competence trust
Structural governance (application)
• high application of agreements, assessment necessity changes
• coordination of activities by manager • co-investors kept up to date about developments • high alignment working methods
Compliance trust and
refrain from opportunistic behaviour
Homocertain
Previous cooperation
• experience with the necessary technique • complementarities of competencies Structural governance (formalisation)* • low attention to agreements Lack of previous collaboration Rational commitment*
• different partners unclear
Competence trust
•complementarities individual competencies unclear
Structural governance (application)
• negotiation • deliberation • confrontation Compliance trust* • low Uncertain Common mode
of collaboration Compliance and competence trust† growing
Rational commitment†
• entrepreneur • university
in increased contact and communication, turning around their differences into an advantage.’ Only the shirking partner turned out to be very unreliable and opportunistic in its behaviour, which eventually led to eviction of thus partner from the partnership. This case indicates that for trust to function as a governance mechanism, a large amount of time is needed for the recognition of similarities and sharing of norms of behaviour, as well as the working methods and approaches. While the build-up process is slow, the process of trust destruction is much faster and easier.