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Howard has usually been regarded as being on the right of the Conservative Party. His reputation in office was as a tough politician, particularly in relation to his time as home secretary. However, he immediately put together a close team of staff who were, and would become regarded as modernizers, and some of whom remain at the centre of Conservative politics to this day, such as Steve Hilton, Stephen Sherbourne, and Rachel Whetstone to a lesser extent (Snowdon, 2010, p.113).⁴⁶

He was chosen because he was seen to offer the possibility of strong leadership and experience, something that had been lacking, and that the Conservative Party needed as its absence was believed to be the cause of many of the problems of the previous years (Hennessay, 2000, pp.437-476; Bale, 2011b, pp.150-155). Indeed, the speed with which Howard established himself, and his team, seems remarkable considering the absence of a leadership contest that might have allowed planning to take place, and was in marked contrast with 2001. Former and experienced staff were recruited: people who knew what they were doing, and it is argued understood the scale of what needed to be done, right from the start and were allowed considerable autonomy (Tempest, 2003b; and see Snowdon, 2010, pp.131-133).

Howard moved the leader’s office, re-organized the chairmanship, organized Central Office into three sections: research, marketing, and communications, and appointed experienced people to lead this areas (Roth, 2004, p.362; Denham and O'Hara, 2007, p.183). Then just five days after becoming leader he announced the party’s lease on their Smith Square office would be sold off to raise funds and subsequently set up Conservative Campaign Headquarters.

46 Although Rachel Whetstone is no longer around due to personal reasons.

Howard has always denied that much planning went into this prior to Duncan Smith’s removal from office (see Crick, 2005, pp. 429- 432) and others have attested to his desire not to participate in the efforts to remove him. However, whilst there might not have been formal plotting or preparation, the weight of speculation, and the despair at the direction the party was heading led individuals and small groups to spend some time thinking about what needed to be done to improve the party, and Howard had ministerial experience of appointing and managing staff (see Hennessey, 2000, pp. 434-550).

In Bulpitt’s language Howard was able to quickly create a ‘court’ of staff and advisers he could trust, who were loyal and able to do the job asked of them, and for whom he had established personal authority to lead. This did cause a few tensions with MPs who were clearly outsiders from Howard’s circle of influence, but they were rare and based on personal as much as a political basis, or stemmed from a feeling by one individual that Howard’s staff were more influential than backbenchers (Murphy, 2004; Snowdon, 2010, p.133 ). It also meant that Howard’s staff were in a strong position, and able to act as enforcers for their leader, which is an important part of managing a party used to divisions (Snowdon, 2010, p. 132-133). Howard also created an unusual shadow cabinet, in that it contained just twelve positions, and individuals would be given large briefs including a combined health and education portfolio which as discussed later would cause some difficulty (George and Brogan, 2003; BBC News, 2003j). It was designed to create a sense of cohesion and arguably make the most of the limited talent he felt able to draw on at this time (Tempest, 2003b). Howard also effectively used his limited powers of patronage to help him encourage large numbers of his MPs to remain loyal, and this is discussed further in the section on tendencies below, but in combination these factors facilitated more quiescent party relations than had existed for years. Only in the latter stages of his leadership, as the election campaign was seen to go badly, would dissent emerge. Howard and those around him had found temporary solutions to management problems the party faced. On a limited mandate (which is discussed more in strategy and PAH), he set limited ambitions for the party which meant there was little in the way of policy that proved divisive. He was seen as competent enough to engender the support of ambitious

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colleagues and those who might not have been wholly happy with the direction he took the party in.

Indeed, the attitude of some MPs seemed to be that even if they sometimes didn’t agree with, or like the firm leadership, they were glad to have it (Ashcroft, 2005, p.25). They were also grateful he’d pacified the party, and they knew because of his age and limited mandate, would not be leader for too long. He was also helped because figures like Portillo and Clarke, who might have been seen as powerful alternative leaders, had both been pursuing other interests, and publically remained largely supportive until after the election in 2005 when the battle for the future direction of the party was rejoined (BBC News, 2005b).

4.2.3 Tendencies

Examining party factions, tendencies and divisions during the period when Michael Howard was leader is relevant because Howard was chosen as a figure for the party to unite around. Superficially, this is exactly what happened, however scratch the surface, and tensions remained evident, but were far less prominent and damaging than they had been. It could be argued that Duncan Smith’s plea for the party to ‘unite or die’ had been heard as the prospect of another calamitous defeat approached. However, rather than this, the period should be seen as one of uncertainty about future direction. As discussed throughout this chapter, at first the situation seemed different under Howard, he was a strong leader, and Labour, or at least Blair, seemed to be in real trouble over Iraq, tuition top-up fees and Labour’s internal wrangling. Howard’s actions also seemed to reach out across the various strands of the party, and the combination of all these factors meant in particular that those regarded as modernizers, paused to assess the situation and see what happened. Whilst, dissent about the prominence of immigration and asylum policy were expressed later on, by that time the election was approaching, and this quelled the prospect of dissent. Some of the disquiet that did occur has to be considered in the light of a looming defeat- it is easier to express concern about the leadership’s direction if it’s obviously going to fail. The key tendencies of modernizer versus traditionalists, Europe, and to a lesser extent leadership are discussed here.

Europe

The issue of Europe returned to a position of greater prominence during Howard’s leadership, mostly as a result of the debate around the European Constitution that the EU was trying to formulate, and also because of the decision of former Labour MP Robert Kilroy Silk to join UKIP prior to the 2004 Euro-elections (Assinder, 2004a). However, because the Conservative Party was now overwhelmingly of a Eurosceptic disposition, it was not something that was likely to cause damaging internal disputes. To its supporters the European Constitution represented little more than the formalised enshrining of the existing treaties that established and defined the EU. However, and this was the position many Conservatives held, it did mean a greater role for the EU, in particular with relation to justice policy, asylum and immigration (BBC News, 2004a). Furthermore, the more symbolic, though important institutional aspects of the EU Constitution raised the hackles of the centre-right press and many Conservatives (Snowdon, 2010, pp. 145-148). The notion of (another) EU president and foreign minister was greeted with hostility, because even if it didn’t entail a significant extra transfer of sovereignty to the EU, symbolically, it’s opponents argued that this made the EU seem like a sovereign state (Young, 2004).

Howard’s own Eurosceptic credentials were strong, and he saw an opportunity due to the level of opposition to the constitution in the centre-right media, polling seemed to confirm that a large majority of the public either opposed it, or supported a referendum on it. (Ipsos MORI, 2005a). At least at first, the Conservatives' promise to hold a referendum on the constitution seemed a good tactic, that both satisfied many in the party and was popular. However, when Labour later announced their own pledge to hold a referendum the impact of this policy was undermined (Bale, 2010, pp. 210-211). Once again, it became an important issue for the party’s statecraft, as the leadership attempted to satisfy both the Eurosceptics who were adamantly opposed to the constitution (some of whom remained opposed to the EU membership in its entirety) and those who were to varying degrees Eurosceptic, but didn’t want Europe to dominate the party’s agenda. There were still some pro-European figures, but there was no significant faction urging the party to support the EU constitution.

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What there was, was an increasingly prominent external concern for the party’s statecraft in the form of UKIP. It should be noted, that the actual impact UKIP has had on the Conservatives is disputed.

Whilst it is frequently claimed to have cost the Conservatives a number of seats in general elections (particularly 2005 and 2010) it’s hard to be sure that the votes UKIP secured would in their absence have gone to the Conservatives (for a discussion see UK Polling, 2011). Yet, dealing with UKIP became, and has remained a problem, because sections of the Conservative parliamentary party and its membership have long believed that if they advocated a more Eurosceptic approach, the ‘UKIP threat’ would evaporate⁴⁷, whilst others highlight the votes that would be lost from sections of the electorate. Howard had to be careful how he managed the various strands of thought on this within his party, whilst at the same time trying to capitalize on an issue where the Conservatives had support.

Howard was helped because the Euro elections took place only a few months after he assumed the leadership. Those who wanted the party to concentrate on issues other than Europe, which was to a greater extent those who have become labelled as modernizers, rather than pro-Europeans, were unsure of Howard’s plan. By this, it is meant that Howard was still making references to the modernizing agenda discussed below, so there seemed room for the party to discuss Europe in relation to the constitution and election, especially as it seemed a potential vote winner until Labour matched the pledge of a referendum. It is also the case that whilst some Conservatives agree with UKIP’s desire to see a withdrawal from the EU, particularly at election time, they are still an opponent, and perhaps the worst of all as they regard them as stealing Conservative votes⁴⁸. However, the increased prominence of Europe, in combination with the publicity Robert Kilroy Silk brought UKIP, and a sense of disenchantment amongst the electorate with both of the main parties in the wake of the Hutton Report, contributed to a fall in the Conservative share of the vote in the 2004 Euro elections despite Labour’s problems (Crick, 2005, pp. 447-451).

47 Being from a marginal constituency, this is frequently debated, and this author has heard this sentiment repeated ad nauseam in party debates and at conference fringe events, despite there being little evidence to support it.

48 This author has watched Council meetings where there has been a great deal of public agreement between Conservative and Labour councillors whilst both launched attacks of a minority group of Liberal Democrats. Upon enquiring why, the answer came that both sides saw the Liberals as their main threat. It much the same way, at Conservative meetings, UKIP's name is often followed by an accusation of treachery.

Whilst some attribute blame to Howard for raising the prominence of European matters, it is difficult to see what alternative he had as a European election had to be fought (see for example Crick, 2005, p. 447). Party management required him to try to capitalize on the issue, and some Eurosceptic MPs would have become more vocal had the party’s leadership sought to minimize talk of Europe to concentrate on other matters. Given that, and the opposition of the traditionally

‘Conservative press’ to the EU Constitution it would seem inconceivable it shouldn’t have been an important issue for the party. If anything, rather than seeing the reoccurrence of party divisions over Europe, the divisions morphed into divisions about the scale of the ‘UKIP threat’ and how to deal with it.

Modernizers versus traditionalists

Despite his right wing reputation, even before Howard formally became leader, he drew significantly on the services of what are usually termed modernizers, and there was little open dissent from this grouping, and that which did occur towards the end of his tenure was, came mostly from obscure figures, rather than the senior figures who had undermined Duncan Smith (Crick, 2005, pp. 458-462). At first, and indeed throughout his tenure, Howard was supported by a number of those with a prominent association with wishing to modernize the party. Symbolically, Francis Maude, Portillo’s right hand man, was a vocal supporter from the start (Snowdon, 2010, p.134).

Yet, Bale highlights the right wing nature of many of the senior members of his shadow cabinet, and the small numbers of those not from the centre right, some of whom were on the front bench, but outside the shadow cabinet (2010, pp. 196-197). However, Howard also managed to find positions in the parliamentary hierarchy for nearly 100 of his 160 MPs, meaning that whilst the roles may not have been as significant, an astonishing proportion of MPs were to some extent tied to the leadership, this helped with quiescent relations (Crick, 2005, p.437).

Bale also claims that it was Howard’s right wing ideology that (pre) determined the course the party followed during this period, but this raises the question of why there wasn’t more dissent from those who advocated greater change in the party (Bale, 2010, p. 197). Before highlighting some

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inconsistencies in Bale’s claim that ideology was the key, it’s worth considering the factors that led to the appearance and to an extent reality, of a much more united party.

Firstly, having been at the cliff’s edge and peered over, the shock of reflecting on how bad the position the party had been in during 2003 encouraged all to take a step back. Secondly, combined with this, the election was approaching, and although still 18 months away, it was the fear of what would happen at the next election that had prompted the removal of Duncan Smith⁴⁹ and the sense that they needed to fight for the next election rather than each other also helped keep dissent from the surface. Thirdly, and most importantly, it was sometime before asylum and immigration came to be seen as the dominant concerns of the party’s campaign. Whilst these, and other ‘right-wing’

issues were still a feature, early on Howard was trying to appeal to the various strands of his party.

He discussed the importance of ‘happiness’, his abhorrence of discrimination, the ‘work-life balance’, improving childcare and the party held a ‘gay summit’, a number of these themes would also be repeated after 2005 (see Oborne, 2004; Crick, 2005, pp. 439-440; Telegraph, 2005).

There were elements compared to ‘red-meat right-wingery’, which were interspersed with some modernizing themes, and it is argued that this uncertainty about the final composition of the party’s policy platform represented effective party management. It wasn’t a strategy designed to keep the party quiescent, whilst always intending to move to the right, it was a simple attempt to keep his party united, which Duncan Smith before him had failed to do, whilst serving to ‘test the water’ and the wider reaction to the various themes. In the end, many believe this resulted in Howard pleasing no one, as is often the way for those who try to ‘please’ many (see Crick, 2005, pp. 465-472). As asylum and immigration assumed a greater role in the party’s campaign, a greater number of

‘modernizers’ did feel uneasy, and mention of the possibility of opting out of the UN Convention on Refugees in early 2005 caused genuine concern (Tempest, 2005b). However, by this stage in the parliamentary cycle, with the election likely to be only months away, it was no time for factionalism

49 Despite their denials at the time, some of Duncan Smith’s whips, realizing the need to do something about their leader, had urged unhappy MPs to think about their majorities, and act. The act they suggested was writing to Sir Michael Spicer to call for a vote of no confidence (Crick, 2005, pp. 423-424.).

to bubble to the surface, instead it encouraged others to (informally) think about what was needed after the election, which they realized they would lose, even if the scale of that defeat remained unclear (see Snowdon, 2010, pp. 176- 180).

Future modernizers

As mentioned at the start of this section, at the time this thesis was being written, David Cameron had become leader of the Conservative Party, and he had surrounded himself with many young modernizers. It has become common to claim that apart from uniting the party, in light of the 2005 election defeat, the only other redeeming feature of Howard’s leadership of the party was to path the way for a younger generation (Snowdon, 2010, pp. 176-178). There are often inconsistencies in this argument, for example Bale’s claim that Howard’s ideology prevented him from ‘modernizing’ the party doesn’t seem to sit easily with Howard’s rapid promotion of young modernizers, employing young modernizers, and eventually ‘rigging’ an election in an attempt to ensure he was succeeded by young modernizers (see Denham and O’Hara, 2008, pp. 105-129). He may not have been a member of the modernizing camp, but it lends significant weight to Howard’s claims that he was aware of the limitations on his ability to offer a credible policy platform at odds with his own established reputation (see Bale, 2010, p. 197).

The arrival of the ‘Notting Hill Set’ of young, ambitious, well-educated Conservative MPs and aspirant MPs⁵⁰ attracted interest before 2005. Indeed, the personal aspect ‘modernizer’ versus

‘traditionalist’ wrangling should not be overlooked. Whilst ideology is important, the rapid promotion, and growing influence of young, inexperienced MPs always causes resentment amongst those outside the inner circle, those who are displaced, or those who fear a generation change will foil their own ambitions.

50 It was coined as a pejorative term, by Derek Conway, designed to compare them to Labour’s ‘Islington Set’ (and there had been an earlier Conservative ‘Smith Square set’ of the early 1990s) for whom a few Tory backbenchers had considerable disdain. A list is probably superfluous, but it includes David Cameron and George Osborne; and outside parliament at this stage, Michael Gove, Ed Vaizey and Nick Boles. It also included staff members of the group, some of whom would go on to enjoy great influence after 2005 like Steve Hilton (Methven, 2004).

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The situation towards the latter stages of Howard's leadership somewhat resembles Bulpitt’s notion of ‘the court’, with a small group of close individuals with a degree of unity of purpose around the leader, at least far more so than for Duncan Smith. Indeed, this has often been a feature of British Politics: leaders usually surround themselves with a small group of influential, like-minded figures.

Howard’s team and staff are discussed elsewhere, but he surrounded himself with very influential staff, and increasingly relied on younger members of his front bench towards the end. In

Howard’s team and staff are discussed elsewhere, but he surrounded himself with very influential staff, and increasingly relied on younger members of his front bench towards the end. In