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1962, but did not erupt in Yogyakarta because the majority of the population in the principality were loyal to nationalist figures such as Soekarno-Hatta and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. Only after the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) was accused of masterminding the abortive coup d’état attempt in 1965 did ethno-religious conflict take place in the city. A large number of communist sympathizers in Yogyakarta were put under military detention without trial. Some of them were executed on the outskirts of the city, and others were exiled to Nusa Kambangan or Buru (Sumarwan, 2007: 55-197). Muslim and Catholic groups backed by the military clashed with the organizations affiliated with the PKI, such as the Indonesian Peasant Organization (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI), People’s Youth (Pemuda Rakyat, PR) and the Student Movement of Liberation (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, CGMI) (Harnoko, Fakkih and Darban, 1996: 45-54).

During the New Order, the government suppressed conflicts based on ethnicity, religion and race (Suku, Agama dan Ras, SARA). Incitement to such conflicts was considered subversive and attracted severe punishment. During the first decades of his regime, President Soeharto was also very critical of Muslim politicians who were keen to combine religion and politics and were thus a danger to the neutral Pancasila state philosophy. In 1990, when Soeharto’s grip on power was slipping, he began to accommodate Islamic leaders both in and outside government. For example, he sponsored the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim, ICMI) in order to obtain more support. Since then, Islamic leaders have become deeply involved in government policies, and a great number of Muslims have taken over strategic positions in the military and the bureaucracy (Van Bruinessen, 2004: 31-34). In Yogyakarta, Muslims began to intensify their religious activities on campus through the Campus Preaching Institute (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK), and Muslim student organizations such as the Jamaah Shalahuddin)20 at the University of Gadjah Mada, and Jamaah Al Mujahidin21 at the State University of Yogyakarta (Turmudi and Sihbudi, 2005: 116- 119). In neighbourhood communities, religious activities have intensified with the establishment of the Mosque Youth organization (Remaja Masjid) (Kim, 2007: 90-92). These religious organizations run their programmes not only to deepen knowledge of Islam among Muslims, but to promote action in religious, societal and political arenas. Occasionally, they collect funds for charity, particularly for distributing aid to victims of disasters or conflicts. Compared to Christian organizations such as the 20 Shalahuddin is the name of an Islamic figure from the Crusades. The organization took his

name in recognition of how he incited Muslim forces at the time (Karim, 2006:37).

21 Al Mujahidin was originally the name of the mosque in the State University of Yogyakarta. Mujahidin means holy warrior.

Youth Commission of Churches (Komisi Pemuda Gereja), or Catholic Youth (Pemuda Katolik), Muslim groups are much more active.

When violent conflict erupted in Ambon and Poso during the reformation, Muslim and Christian organizations supported their fellow believers in the conflict zone by collecting donations, and recruiting volunteers and fighters. Many Muslims from these organizations became jihadists of the Holy War Force (Laskar Jihad) or the Indonesian Holy Warriors’ Force (the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia), paramilitary groups with headquarters in Yogyakarta. The Holy War Force was originally founded in January 2000 by salafi groups, namely the Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet (Forum Komunikasi Ahl Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, FKAJ), to help Muslims in the Moluccas fight against Christians; recruitment of jihadists started after a huge prayer meeting (tabligh akbar) in the Kridosono Stadium in Yogyakarta. The Indonesian Holy Warriors’ Force was founded in August 2000 by the Indonesian Holy Warriors’ Assembly (Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia). This group was an alliance of Muslim paramilitary organizations from Solo, Yogyakarta, Kebumen, Purwokerto, Tasikmalaya and Makassar; it aimed to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia by rejecting all ideologies that are opposed to Islam, and by conducting jihad for the dignity of Islam. Many members of the group had joined the jihad in Afghanistan and the Southern Philippines (Hasan, 2005: 3-9).

The religious tension between Muslims and Christians that started to increase in the 1990s raised concern among academics, progressive religious leaders, students and NGO activists in Yogyakarta, while the government paid skant attention to it. In 1991, the Institute for Interfaith Dialogue (Institut Dialog Antariman di Indonesia, DIAN/Interfidei) was founded to generate mutual understanding among different religious groups and to prevent conflicts. When violence broke out in different regions of Indonesia in 1996, DIAN/Interfidei established the Brotherhood in Faith Forum (Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman, FPUB) in Yogyakarta. The Forum aims to share knowledge of religion and to generate tolerance by respecting difference. Its members consist of religious leaders such as kyai (Islamic teacher), priests, monks and followers from religious communities in Yogyakarta. In the regular meetings (which are usually held in a mosque, church, Buddhist vihara or Hindu pura in turn), each religious group presents information about their religion and their religious activities. Among the student population, a group called Tikar Pandan promotes student solidarity across ethnic and religious lines. Their activities are mainly designed to unify students by fostering understanding of other religions and reducing the prejudice that arises from ignorance. The Tikar Pandan was founded by Tim Relawan Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Volunteer Team) in response to the inter- religious tension in the city.

Besides this dialogue about religion within various organizations, tensions between ethno-religious groups are reduced further via the slametan ritual in

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