Encuesta aplicada a los miembros de la asociación San Pedro de Lico

Another problem in the literature of Chinese politics is the narrow focus on government performance – many scholars concentrate on very few (if not solely economic) aspects of government performance. For example, as mentioned, Zhao’s definition of performance legitimacy only focuses on the elements of the economy, morality, and nationalism. This kind of understanding misguidedly implies that the functions of government are separate and independent. Indeed, most functions of government are indispensable and inter-related. Economic performance, for instance, is based on a stable social order. Without a stable social order, economic prosperity cannot be achieved. As discussed in Chapter 2, mass campaigns such as the Cultural Revolution did not only undermine social stability but also lead to the stagnation of the Chinese economy. In this sense, a stable social order is a prerequisite for economic growth.

Moreover, economic performance needs to be transformed by other aspects of government performance in order to gain legitimacy. The public provision of welfare, for instance, is an important channel through which to transform economic growth into material benefit to citizens. Without an effective provision system of public goods, economic growth

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will not lead to popular support because the poor cannot share the benefits of economic prosperity. As the next chapter will discuss, some studies conducted by Chinese intellectuals suggest that the public provision of welfare has replaced economic growth to become the most important source of legitimacy. As such, the narrow focus of performance legitimacy on very few aspects of government performance is misguided. Thus, this thesis redefines performance legitimacy as a state’s right to rule is justified by its performance of all government functions, as discussed above.

The following section will examine several critical aspects of government performance, including social stability, provision of welfare, crisis management and moral performance. As we shall see, ideology plays a crucial role in all those aspects.

3.3.1.3.1. Stability: External Stability and Internal Stability of the CCP

Unlike those who emphasize economic performance, some also consider stability important to the CCP’s legitimacy Breslin ickson alibert and anteigne 2008a; Shue, 2004; Sandby-Thomas, 2011; Sandby-Thomas, 2014). Shue (2004), for example argues that the CCP “stakes” its legitimacy on its capability to maintain social stability. Some also argue that the central state rather than local government is a principal provider of social stability (Shue, 2004; Yu and Chen, 2012). Shue (2004), for example, argues that local governments are responsible for promoting economic growth, and the primary task of the central state in China is to maintain social stability.

In the literature on the subject of stability and legitimacy in China, there are two major problems. First, the existing literature in general does not pay sufficient attention to the interaction between social stability and ideology, although some address this issue, as Chapter 5 will discuss. Popular beliefs about the CCP’s one-party rule play a role in affecting the social order in China. As Chapter 5 will discuss, the CCP’s (in)stability discourses have helped to enhance people’s compliance with the current social order by exploiting the people’s concern about instability.

Second, not only social stability but also political stability within the CCP is important to legitimacy. The existing studies usually use stability to refer to social stability – an unwritten “social contract” between the party and the society. According to this contract the party delivers material benefits to the citizens as a trade-off for their compliance with the existing social order. In China it is called “use the money to buy stability” which suggests that economic success will generate social stability.6 As discussed, social stability is crucial, because it is a prerequisite for other aspects of government performance such as economic growth. However the word “stability” emphasized by party leaders represents a much broader spectrum – it also includes the political stability of the regime. For example, “stability and unity” stressed by Mao in 75 mainly pointed to the unity of the CCP leaders (Mao, 1996). In this thesis “stability” not only refers to social stability (i.e. external stability of the regime) but also to political stability among ruling elites (i.e. internal stability).

The vitality of the authoritarian political system lies in the strength of the ruling party, and in China, the CCP is a core of the political system. Taking a step back, political stability

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This is valid to a certain point; however, economic growth does not guarantee social stability. Indeed, many local popular protests in China are led by problems of economic growth – the grievances of social inequality created by the unequal distribution of economic benefits people’s dissatisfaction with the local economic policies and people’s concerns about environmental pollution as mentioned above.

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among ruling elites is the key prerequisite for the party to use its full power. As Chapter 2 discussed, the inability of the CCP to quell the protest of 1989 was largely owing to the divisions among ruling elites. In this sense the party’s ruling capability to maintain social stability is actually built on the internal stability of the party first. In other words, without the internal stability of the CCP, there is no external stability of the party, as the CCP is unable to quell social unrest and protect the personal safety of the masses. In this sense, the internal stability of the CCP is a prerequisite of the CCP’s ruling capacity to maintain legitimacy by maintaining social stability, promoting economic growth, and defending the national interests of China.

3.3.1.3.2. Provision of Public Goods

The provision of public goods is another important dimension of performance legitimacy. As mentioned, rapid economic growth will lead to popular support only when it is transformed into material economic benefits to the people. A strong economy is the necessary condition to enable the state to deliver material resources. As the distribution of economic benefits is very unequal in China, improving the public goods provision system is quite important to maintaining the CCP’s legitimacy. Currently, China still lacks a well-developed public welfare system that is able to deliver sufficient material benefits to the majority of the society. This is one of the reasons why Chinese intellectuals are so pessimistic about the impact of rapid economic growth on legitimacy, as I will discuss in Chapter 4. With its increasing concerns over social inequality, the CCP has gradually shifted its growth model from efficiency-oriented towards a more equal position between equity and efficiency under the ideological guidance of Scientific Outlook of Development and Harmonious Society, as Chapter 5 will discuss.

As Chapter 4 will discuss, some Chinese intellectuals argue that the public provision of welfare has replaced economic growth to become the most important source of legitimacy in China nowadays (Ma and Wang, 2012). For example, based on their survey, Meng and Yang (2012) argue that economic growth is not helpful to win popular support any longer; however, to improve the performance of public service is still effective in generating legitimacy. Another study also finds that the public provision of welfare is the key to enhancing the legitimacy of Chinese local governments (Ma and Wang, 2012).

The theoretical origin of the above views can be traced back to the aforementioned studies of communist regimes. The theory of the social contract suggests that communist states provided a package of welfare benefits while strictly controlling civil liberties (Kusin, 1978). In this contract, the provision of welfare acts as an intermediary to complete this deal by transforming economic growth into actual material benefit and delivering to the people. Notably this “social contract” is based on the assumption that human are completely rational. The trade between civil rights and economic benefit in this contract indicates a rational calculation and implies that the relationship between society and the state is based on pure interest (Tong, 2011).

Yet, humans are often subjective. Under the influence of propaganda and ideology, people might support their leaders at the expense of their own well-being. For example, after the three-year famine starting in 1959, many Chinese people still firmly trusted the CCP and Mao Zedong, although some began to doubt the policies. On the one hand, it was because the control of information helped the government to hide the actual loss, and thus most Chinese people only knew about the tragedies that happened around them. On the other hand, official

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propaganda combined with strong communist beliefs managed to convince many people that sufferings were the necessary cost of achieving full communism. In this way, the regime stayed in power even it failed to deliver material benefits. Therefore, ideological factors again play an important role in affecting the impact of public goods on legitimacy.

3.3.1.3.3. Crisis Management

Crisis management is also an important part of government performance in China. The control of information and the authoritarian system’s mobilization capability allow the regime to manipulate crises. The literal meaning of the term – crisis (weiji) – in Chinese refers to danger and opportunity, which implies that a crisis is also an opportunity. It is particularly true for the CCP’s crisis management strategies. The CCP’s overwhelming capability of mobilization and powerful propaganda make it capable of transforming a crisis into an opportunity to win popular support. As Xiao Yuefan (2013: 8) argues “the CCP has managed to sustain its political hegemony to date through the manipulation of these major crises and through the maximum tinkering with the current political system it reigns over.”

As discussed above, in facing the 2008 financial crisis, the CCP managed to win popular support through its strategic official propaganda. In the case of the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, the CCP also managed to gain legitimacy (Schneider and Hwang, 2014; Wang, 2012a; Xiao 2013). After the earthquake, the CCP launched a series of relief, reconstruction, and propaganda campaigns to highlight their effective disaster management. A relevant study finds that, in the month after the earthquake, 53% of the news in the People’s Daily was about this earthquake (Wang, 2012a). 37.7% of those news stories reported activities of the central leaders, party and state institutions, military soldiers and officers, and CCP members (Wang, 2012a). In particular, 21.6% of those reports portrayed a positive image of the role of central leaders in the earthquake reconstruction. Thus, this study concludes that the CCP used all possible occasions to enhance its legitimacy through powerful propaganda.

Another study finds that the governments’ disaster relief and post-disaster reconstruction after the Wenchuan earthquake led to an interesting double-track effect on political legitimacy – the legitimacy of the central government increased, whilst the legitimacy of the local government decreased (Chen, 2012). On the one hand, official propaganda managed to enhance the legitimacy of the central government after the earthquake. The relevant news stories focused on reporting the central government’s emphasis on people’s livelihoods equality hope and the leaders’ charisma. The Chinese government also used the earthquake reconstruction as a marketing opportunity to build a positive national image and increase China’s soft power. The CCP spent a great amount of human capital and energy reconstructing Wenchuan after the earthquake. In the end, Wenchuan recovered from this magnitude-8 earthquake within three years; after reconstruction, its various material conditions – such as its infrastructure and cities’ appearance – are over twenty years more advanced than they were before.

On the other hand, Chen’s study finds that the political legitimacy of local government somehow decreased. Chen suggests that the efforts of local government were hidden and ignored in the propaganda, but the flaws in their governance were magnified because people could observe the activities of local governments. In other words, the propaganda campaign is a key factor leading to the double-track effect on political legitimacy, which again suggests that ideological factors matter.

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In addition to the 2008 financial crisis and the Wenchuan earthquake, a similar manipulation strategy was also used in managing the crisis of the 2003 SARS epidemic, the Sanlu milk scandal, and the 2011 Wenzhou train collision (Xiao 2013).

3.3.1.3.4. Moral Performance

Moral performance is another important aspect of performance legitimacy. Corruption is a principal problem which undermines the CCP’s moral performance. As Chapter 4 will explain, corruption has been considered by Chinese intellectuals as one of the biggest threats to political legitimacy. The CCP has taken great efforts not only to strengthen anti-corruption institutions but also reform ideology for rebuilding the moral basis of legitimacy. For example Jiang Zemin’s ideological formula Three Represents aimed to urge the CCP to maintain its advanced nature – especially probity, as Chapter 5 will discuss,

The lifestyles of party cadres are another problem. The CCP is concerned that the extravagant lifestyle of party members would not only undermine its strength but also its popular support. A serious charge against Bo Xilai was his immoral life style as a CCP leader, such as inappropriate sexual relationships with many women. In order to improve the CCP’s moral performance Chinese leaders attach importance to traditional cultural values such as “virtues”. For example “rule of virtue” is incorporated by the CCP as a ruling strategy, as Chapter 5 will discuss. Thus, ideological factors are used by the CCP as attempts to improve its moral performance.

In sum, the above section examines the performance legitimacy approach that is a mainstream approach to explaining regime legitimacy in China. The above discussion shows that ideological factors play a crucial role in affecting people’s perceptions of almost every aspect of government performance.