Large-scale investments can have mixed effects on local communities. Potential positive effects include that smallholder out-grower schemes can provide farmers with steady incomes by connecting them to the global market, thereby making them less susceptible to changes in local demand. Investors may shift their focus towards food crops for domestic markets, which combats food insecurity. However, these investments also come with a number of risks to local communities, which have not been adequately addressed in Ghana to date; though draft guidelines on commercial investments in land for agriculture have been drafted, they have yet to be adopted. (Wolter 2008; Bugri 2013b.)
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Role of Formal and Customary Authorities. In recent years, the government of Ghana has sought to create favorable conditions for international investment, including in land and commercial agriculture. In 1994, the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre was established with the objective of encouraging, promoting and facilitating investment in all sectors of the economy (with the exception of mining and petroleum). In 2008 the agency published the Ghana Land Bank Directory, which identified over
270,000 hectares of potential land for investment around the country, nearly 205,000 hectares of which is located in the Northern Region. The country’s favorable investment climate has attracted many foreign investors, including companies investing in commercial agriculture projects, mainly in the area of biofuels. (Hughes et al. 2011b; Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines 2008; Ahwoi 2010.)
The Ghanaian government has yet to adopt a policy governing commercial land acquisitions. Although the Lands Commission has circulated a set of draft guidelines for large-scale acquisitions, it is unclear how far along the Commission is in the process of finalizing and adopting the guidelines. The lack of a policy framework on commercial land acquisitions has left rural farmers vulnerable to subsequent waves of dispossession and manipulation as demands for biofuels and other commercial crops grow. (Hughes et al. 2011b; Lands Commission n.d.)
Specialized commercial courts and, more recently, land courts have been established to strengthen the institutional support for foreign direct investment. The government has also reformed land
administration and management in the country, establishing the Lands Commission as a one-stop shop for land registration, in part to ease the difficulties experienced by investors in acquiring land. (Tsikata et al. 2011; Bugri and Coulibaly 2012.)
In some cases, government officials have reportedly played an exploitative role in commercial
investment deals. Some state officials are members of local elite groups made up of chiefs, community leaders, and local partners of foreign investors and have used their positions for personal gains, while lack of regulation and attention to local communities has resulted in unintended harms such as displacement and loss of livelihoods. (Tsikata et al 2011.)
Customary land tenure systems developed in the context of ample land to support subsistence
agriculture, without significant pressure on land-use and access. The recent growth and intensification of commercial agriculture and the increased demand for land for subsistence farming has increased land pressure and led to new conflicts for chiefs and lineage-heads, who attempt to balance their traditional roles with the growing economic opportunities their power affords them. Though some chiefs continue to act in their traditional roles as caretakers and custodians of community land, news accounts in recent years indicate that alienation of land by chiefs is increasing. Chiefs have been accused of not distributing payment from these sales, leases, and compulsory acquisitions to community members, a possible violation of their fiduciary duties to the community. (Hughes et al. 2011b; FAO 2010; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Fred-Mensah 1999.)
As land increases in value, the power that chiefs have over land becomes complicated by economic interests. While some chiefs continue to act as custodians of communal lands, others have recognized the potential economic benefits of engaging in land transactions with outsiders and positioned
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themselves as de facto owners of communal lands. Customarily, the benefit of land use was reserved for members of the lineage and alienation of communal land to a stranger required the consent of stool elders. However, some chiefs maintain that land sales and leases to outsiders are within their rights as trustees of the land. This has enabled some chiefs to acquire vast sums of money from land transactions. (Ayee et al. 2008.)
Investments in Land. Ghana’s lack of regulation in the area of large scale commercial land acquisitions, combined with the customary tenure regimes which tend to vest chiefs with the right to deal in the communities’ lands, has resulted in land deals which reportedly benefit only the chiefs while alienating land from the community without wider economic benefit. It has been observed that the hierarchical nature of the chieftaincy sometimes results in decreasing commitment to the community the higher up the ladder a chief is, with the result that the paramount chief with the authority to transfer the land is generally the most far removed from the needs of the community as a whole. (Tsikata et al. 2011.) Contractual arrangements are generally for long-term leases, in part due to constitutional restrictions; as noted previously, the Ghanaian Constitution does not allow noncitizens to own land and limits their rights to 50-year leaseholds. In addition, the Constitution specifically prohibits the creation of any freehold interest in stool6 land. Payments are generally made either at the commencement of the leasehold or on an annual basis. In addition to the payment, some communities are also requiring commitments for the provision of infrastructure and social support, including employment opportunities for the local community. These demands may provide some explanation for the very low cash figures accepted by these communities. For example, in one case a community in the Northern Region
accepted rents of $1.50 per hectare per year while another acquisition was made at $36 per hectare per year which some view as a reflection of the larger secondary commitments in the former case as
compared to the later. The authors note, however, that this type of arrangement (whereby promises for future services or goods offset the cash price) provides for little transparency or accountability,
especially in the absence of a written and registered contract. Hundreds of farmers are estimated to have lost their land in the acquisition and interviews indicate that the process lacked sufficient community consultation. (Tsikata et al. 2011; Bugri and Coulibaly 2012.)
Customary land tenure systems in Ghana have traditionally been dynamic and flexible, with norms and codes of conduct shifting to react to changing conditions. While this aspect of customary systems has many advantages, recent land deals have exposed the disadvantages of these systems in the context of interactions with formal systems. One of the key reasons that customary systems can be flexible and adaptable is the limited number of decision-makers within the customary governance regime. However, this is also a disadvantage, as chiefs and other traditional leaders are able to quickly react to the
changing land pressures in ways that are harmful to the community as a whole. The potential personal economic benefits to chiefs in these communities have led many to set aside their traditional
responsibilities to the community in favor of personal financial gain. This gain, however, comes through
6 The section entitled “Stool and Skin Lands and Property” in the Constitution (article 267) makes no references to
skin land, only stool land (e.g., “All stool lands in Ghana shall vest in the appropriate stool.) These references to stool lands are assumed to also apply to skin lands. (Bobobee 2013.)
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the alienation of increasingly limited common resources. The result is widespread tenure insecurity among communities that had previously been considered to have secure tenure. (Alden Wily 2003; Bugri 2013b.)
A 2010 IFAD study of land investments in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali and Madagascar found that the major share of investments (by land area) is comprised of private companies, although state agencies account for a sizable portion of investments. The study also found that over 75% of land allocated in Ghana was dedicated to export markets. (Cotula et al. 2010.)
Recent years have seen increasing foreign investment in Ghanaian agricultural land for biofuel
cultivation. As is the case in many other African countries, there is little if any conclusive evidence of the scale of these investments available publically. A 2009-2010 study identified 17 commercial biofuel developments across Ghana; all but two of the companies are either financed by Ghanaian expatriates or foreign-owned and nearly all use business models that require large farms at least 1,000 hectares in size. Of those companies, thirteen have invested in cultivation of jatropha, one in cassava and one in palm oil. As of 2009, the companies had access to an estimated 1,075,000 hectares of land, nearly three-quarters of which was located in Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions (regions whose combined area is under 6.4 million hectares). (Schoneveld et al. 2010.)
Despite these large land allocations, less than 10,000 hectares of land are estimated to be under cultivation by the investors. While many companies claim they are going through an assessment process and conducting pilot activities to determine productivity, others ceased activities in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. In some cases, community members have repossessed the unused land, while in others the original occupants never vacated the area. Though the communities may retain use of the land in these ways, they face increased tenure insecurity as a result of the deals, which have created the threat of eviction at any moment. (Schoneveld et al. 2010.; Tsikata et al. 2011.)
The table that follows provides information on 13 commercial land investments in Ghana, drawn from multiple sources.
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KNOWN LARGE-SCALE LAND ACQUISITIONS IN GHANA
Company Location Size (ha) Crop Method of Acquisition Reported Effects Source
Prarie Volta Rice Ltd. (30% Gov. of Ghana, 40% Prarie Texas, 30% Ghana Commercial Bank) Mafi Dove, South Tongu District, Lower Volta
1,250 Rice Compulsory acquisition by GOG in 1977, no compensation paid
originally. Local landowners filed suit in 2008 for compensation.
Suit is pending, but company has permission
to cultivate the land in the interim.
Outmigration; tenure insecurity (land owned but
unused by the company is being used by the local community, but they no longer
have secure rights to it); intensification of land conflicts
between pastoralists and farmers; poor housing for resettled communities; loss of
livelihoods activities.
Tsikata et al, pp. 6- 17.
Prarie Volta Rice Ltd. (30% Gov. of Ghana, 40% Prarie Texas, 30% Ghana Commercial Bank) Agorta (near Lolito), Lower Volta
2,000 Rice 25 year lease, renewable for an additional 25 years, negotiated with three land owners. Company only expected to compensate land users for existing crops, though land owners have promised to provide new land to displaced people.
Acquisition in progress Tsikata et al, pp. 6- 17; Bugri 2013a. Biofuel Africa Ltd. (now Solar Harvest Ltd., Norway) Kpachaa Area of Northern Region 10,600 Maize and
Jatropha Naa, the major divisional 50 year lease from Tijo- chief. Public hearings held prior to signing of lease, local chiefs gave approval. Payment was
divided between paramount chief, sub-
Outmigration due to land scarcity; increased tenure insecurity for those who remain, as they are farming on
company land; loss of forest and bush resources (shea nuts,
dawadawa trees, firewood); loss of employment from
Tsikata et al, pp. 18- 25.
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chiefs and divisional chiefs.
commuter farming; emerging conflicts between village chiefs, Tijo-Naa and the youth.
Agroils (Italy) 105,000 Jatropha Friends of the Earth,
p.30.
Galten Global Alternative Energy (Israel)
100,000 Jatropha Friends of the Earth,
p.30.
Gold Star Farms (Ghana)
Mankessim, Central Region (250 acres); Dedukope, Volta (1000 acres); Nkronza district (250 acres); Tordzinu,
South Tongu District, Lower Volta (6000 acres);
Kwahu Tafo, Eastern Region (6250 acres); Gomoa Mprumem, Central Region (500
acres)
Jatropha Friends of the Earth,
p.30.
Jatropha Africa (UK/Ghana)
120,000 Jatropha Friends of the Earth,
p.30. Scanfuel (Norway) Kumasi, Ashanti, Akanland
400,000 Jatropha Friends of the Earth,
p.30.
Kimminic Corporation
(Canada)
13,000 Jatropha Friends of the Earth,
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Global Green (the Netherlands)
1,350 Teek Land Matrix
(landportal.info/land matrix)
European Union Walewale, West Mamprusi District, Northern Region 500 Jatropha Boamah. Biodiesal 1 Ghana Ltd. Kwame Danso, Sene District, Brong Ahafo 700 (acres) Jatropha Boamah. Caltech (through Ghanaian affiliate Banket Ltd.)
Volta region 1,180 Cassava for ethanol
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