Encuesta dirigida al público en general de un rango de 18 65 años

Regarding actual whistle-blowing decisions, the data from the survey show that a substantial minority of auditors have observed organisational corruption. In responding to any observed wrongdoing, auditors’ decisions to blow the whistle on the wrongdoings committed by an individual in an equal and higher position were fewer compared to those for blowing the whistle on wrongdoing committed collusively by auditors. Decisions to blow the whistle were relatively greater for wrongdoing committed by lower-level auditors. Observers of wrongdoing mostly blew the whistle to co-workers and their immediate and higher superiors. Regarding whistle-blowing intentions, the study found that across six case scenarios, the level of respondents’ whistle-blowing intention was mostly high. Similar to actual whistle-blowing, the respondents were more likely to blow the whistle via internal channels than via external government agency channels or to the public.

In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify one case of organisational corruption that they had observed during the preceding 24 months and were asked to indicate the best description of the observed wrongdoing from a list of eight different types of organisational corruption. As shown in Table 4.1, 129 out of 365 respondents (35%) observed at least one case of organisational corruption being committed by auditors or other officials in the internal audit unit. ‘Abuse of power’, ‘fictitious payment’ and ‘acting against organisational policy’ were the acts of wrongdoing most commonly observed by respondents. Other acts of wrongdoing that may typically be expected within an internal audit unit – bribery,

extortion and covering up of audit findings, for example – were also observed by respondents. This finding indicates that employees have a significant potential role in detecting wrongdoing in their organisations.

Respondents who claimed to have observed incidents of corruption were then asked if they had reported these either verbally or by sending a letter, e-mail or text message or by any other channel for blowing the whistle. Of 129 observed incidents, 38 were reported (29%), with silence maintained for the remaining 91 (71%).

Table 4.1: Actual whistle-blowing decisions in responding to organisational corruption that occurred in and committed by fellow auditors in the Government Internal Audit Units that observed by respondents

Description Number of incidence observed Decision Blow the whistle % Silent % Covering up audit finding that were not

resulted in financial loss to government 8 5 63% 3 38% Extortion to audit client 7 3 43% 4 57% Abused of power or use of an official

position for personal benefits, personal

services or favours 24 8 33% 16 67%

Abuse of office facilities, improper use of

facilities or resources for private purposes 18 5 28% 13 72% Covering up audit finding that resulted in

financial loss to government 15 4 27% 11 73% Acting against organisational policy,

regulations or laws or work not in accordance with the provisions and

procedures 23 6 26% 17 74%

Fictitious payment, making false or inflated

claims for reimbursement 23 5 22% 18 78% Bribes (Taking and giving bribes), accepting

illegal gifts / donations/ gratifications 11 2 18% 9 82%

Total 129 38 29% 91 71%

Of the reasons for making the decision to blow the whistle, ‘covering up audit findings that did not result in financial loss to government’ was the most reported wrongdoing (5 out of 8; 63%). This was followed by ‘extortion to audit client’ (3 out of 7; 43%). ‘Taking bribes’ was the least reported wrongdoing (2 out of 11;

18%). Other types of organisational corruption, including ‘abuse of power’, ‘covering up audit findings that resulted in financial loss to government’, ‘acting against organisational policy’ and ‘fictitious payment’ were all at a similar level in the range of 22%–33%.

The study asked respondents to indicate the relative position of wrongdoers to the respondent in order to examine the organisational relationship between wrongdoers, whistle-blowers and silent observers. As shown in Figure 4.2, approximately 45% of all incidents were committed by an auditor in a higher position than that of the respondent.

Figure 4.2: Position of respondents relative to the wrongdoer(s) and their decision to blow or not to blow the whistle

Collusive auditors were perceived as the wrongdoers in 29% of all incidents, followed by auditors in an equal position (20%) and auditors in a lower position than the respondent (6%). Organisational corruption committed by wrongdoers acting collusively was reported in only six incidents (16%). The remaining 38 incidents (84%) remained unexposed. This low level of whistle-blowing was also found in cases where wrongdoing was committed by the auditor in higher and equal positions, with reported levels of 35% and 29%, respectively. In contrast, 75% of incidents of wrongdoing committed by auditors in lower positions were reported.

The whistle-blowers were asked to indicate to whom they had given their information. Respondents were provided with a list of 10 whistle-blowing channels – six internal and four external. Respondents could choose more than one channel. Based on the 38 cases of whistle-blowing, respondents preferred to blow the whistle internally. As shown in Table 4.2, 26 out of 38 whistle-blowing cases (68%) were reported to fellow auditors only or to fellow auditors and other channels combined. Whistle-blowers also utilised their immediate superiors in the audit team (50%), their immediate superiors in the human resources function (18%) and their higher superiors (37%) as either the sole or combined channels for blowing the whistle.

The special unit that has responsibility for managing the whistle-blowing system was selected in only 3 out of 38 whistle-blowing incidents (8%). External channels including a law enforcement official, the news media, a member of a people’s representatives’ council and a non-government organisation were chosen in two whistle-blowing cases.

Table 4.2: Whistle-blowing channels chosen in the thirty-eight whistle-blowing cases Report to Frequency % of 38 whistle- blowing incidences Internal channels - Fellow auditor 26 68%

- Immediate supervisor in audit team 19 50%

- Echelon II in your office 14 37%

- Immediate HRM supervisor 7 18%

- Special unit that has responsibility in managing whistle-

blowing system 3 8%

- Echelon I in your office or minister or head of

government agency 2 5%

External channels

- Law enforcement official 2 5%

- News media 2 5%

- Member of people representatives’ council 0 0%

- Non-government organisation 0 0%

- Others 1 3%

4.2.2 Perception of the Whistle-blower and the Act of Whistle-blowing