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The distinction between qualitative and quantitative aspects of value can be traced to Sweezy (1942) who attempted a Theory of Capitalist Development sitting along side many other theories of the capitalist trajectory such as flexible specialisation, globalisation, etc,.17 Sweezy’s (1942) project was distinct from Marx’s (1954, 1956), but

was a logical extension because it considered the development of capitalism into mature forms such as “monopoly capitalism”, post capitalism, as well as pre-capitalist forms. However, as a result of Sweezy’s emphasis on the capitalist trajectory, the notion of the “circuit of capital” plays a minor role, and this undermines the relevance of the value concept. The historical perspective and pre-capitalist formations on the other hand, played a key theoretical role in Sweezy (1942) who, like Toms (2005), attempted to develop the historical aspects of capitalism, capitalist development, within the framework that Marx (1954) set out for theorising capitalist production. This represents an

inconsistency in Sweezy’s approach and the greater emphasis placed on the Q/Q distinction is, therefore, not well founded.

Sweezy (1942, p.20) gave serious consideration to Marx’s methodological underpinnings and was especially influenced by Lukacs’ (1968) historical perspective. The methodological texts that later stimulated the emergence of the value form approach, such as Rubin (1972, 1994), were not available to him, and the two-part interpretation of Marx’s method was not well developed. He understood the fact that Marx’s method may “appear strikingly similar to that of classical predecessors” (1942, p.11), and on this basis could be described as “abstract deductive” or “successive approximations” and he also understood the other dimension, “what to abstract from” (1942, p.12).

Sweezy’s (1942, p.12) understanding of “what to abstract from” rests on the selection of the problem and identification of its main elements. In Sweezy’s view, understanding class struggle is Marx’s “problem” and he argues that in CapitalMarx abstracts from all elements that are irrelevant to this (1942, p.17). Sweezy (1942, p.20) takes a historical view of class struggle and this, combined with his desire to uncover “developments” in capitalism, leads to the now discredited view that Marx’s Capitaladopts a chronological form of presentation, in particular that the analysis of the commodity involves a pre- capitalist or abstract economy, has to start from ‘simple commodity production’.

Sweezy (1942, p.23) argues, “Marx begins by analysing ‘simple commodity production’, that is to say a society in which each producer owns his own means of production”.

Seeking to uncover the source of the capitalist trajectory therefore leads Sweezy to adopt a universal theory of class struggle, rather than a capitalist theory of class struggle, which is inconsistent with Marx’s declared aims in Capital. Sweezy describes history and social theory as “the process of change inherent in a specific set of relations” (1942, p.20), but Marx’s subject in Capitalwas narrower, specifically capitalist production and its contradictions.

A framework for studying class struggle and exploitation such as Bryer’s (2005, p.29) therefore becomes an indispensable tool for historical study because it clarifies the point that capitalism involves a particular form of exploitation, and evidences it with different historical forms of accounts. Sweezy (1942), however, mistakenly interprets the value categories of Marx’s theory of capitalist production as categories appropriate for the analysis of exploitation in general. Bryer’s interpretation of Marx’s (1954) framework suggests that the logical starting point for theorising the capitalist trajectory is the contradiction in capitalist production, the capitalist dialectic, not the dialectic of history, or Landes’ (1998) global economic history.

Interpreting the analysis of the commodity as involving a pre-capitalist economy leads Sweezy to the idea of the distinction between Q/Q dimensions of value. He argues that:

“Commodity production, in other words, is not the universal and inevitable form of economic life. It is rather one possible form of economic life, a form, to be sure, which has been familiar for many centuries and which dominates the

modern period, but none the less a historically conditioned form which can in no sense be claimed to be a direct manifestation of human nature. The implications of this view are striking. Commodity production is withdrawn from the realm of natural phenomena and becomes the valid subject of socio-historical investigation. No longer can the economist afford to confine his attention to the quantitative relations arising from commodity production; he must also direct his attention to the character of the social relations which underlie the commodity form. We may express this by saying that the tasks of economics are not only quantitative but they are also qualitative” (1942, p.24).

Developing this further he argues:

“The great originality of Marx’s value theory lies in recognition of these two elements of the problems and in its attempt to deal with them simultaneously within a single conceptual framework. The same considerations account, in no small degree, for the great difficulty in understanding the theory, which is almost invariably experienced by those brought up in the main tradition of economic thought. For this reason it has seemed advisable to separate Marx’s value theory into its two component parts and attempt to deal with them one at a time” (1942, p.24).

Here Sweezy separates the Q/Q dimensions even though he does not argue that there is only a ‘qualitative’ value theory, but rather a qualitatively separate dimension to value theory. However, he puts qualitative theory first:

“We have reached these conclusions through purely qualitative analysis and it may appear that they have little bearing on the quantitative problem. This, however, is not so. The truth is that the basic significance as well as the main tasks of quantitative value theory are determined by the qualitative analysis”.

Although scholars claim the authority of Sweezy (1942) for the idea of pure ‘qualitative’ value theory, for example, Fleetwood (2001), in fact, Sweezy (1942) stresses the distinction, and prioritises the qualitative, but he does not deny the two dimensions of value.

A pure qualitative historical perspective on class struggle is the main force behind Sweezy’s (1942) theorising, rather than dialectics. This reduces the idea of class relations to historical and on-going conflict rather than contradiction, meaning both conflicts over the social produce, a distributional question, and control of the labour process designed to increase the surplus product capitalists’ receive. Marx’s (1954) idea of contradiction involves more than class conflict. A contradiction involves two forces that both attract and repel, which are the source of movement from essence to appearance. A dialectic view of class conflict therefore involves understanding the

capitalist need of workers as well as the workers need for capitalists, and the conflict in the relationship and, consequently, it is always a two-dimensional process of reciprocity.

By contrast, Sweezy’s (1942) class conflict is a simpler conception, not two-dimensional. Sweezy is open to the criticism that, in deciding “what to abstract from” (Rubin’s analytical stage), it was not just the issue of historical class conflict that concerned Marx, but the shaping of a fundamental universal contradiction capable of animating the whole of capitalist production, not capitalist development, quantitatively in its many forms.

The drift away from quantitative Marxism begun with Sweezy reaches its ultimate form in the work of those, such as Perelman and Elson, who deny the very possibility. Clearly, if this is so, the viability of a political economy of accounting and the accounting firm has reached its nemesis.