Encuesta realizada a 10 Fiscales del Distrito Judicial de Huánuco

Like the Matryoshka Doll approach each of the case studies illustrate different yet complimentary facets of the producer - consumer relationship at various levels In the Reagan Administration. They reveal the key factors which affected adherence to the principles of crisis management and the intelligence process by the administration in Lebanon. The case studies demonstrate how the political system responded to the demands placed on it by a series of terrorist attacks which affected the ability of the administration to respond in a structured fashion and how the intelligence process

197 For pertinent examples of where tactical intelligence played a vital role in military operations see Bruce Hoffman, (et.al.), Lessons for Contemporary Insurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience, (Santa Monica, California, Rand Report, R-3998-A, 1991), pp.28-37 and 91

malfunctioned. They provide an insight into the consequences of the traditionalist and activist approaches when applied to intelligence management and the producer - consumer relationship.

This chapter has shown how intelligence interacts with all the principles of crisis management and is a necessary activity that is prevalent throughout the crisis management process. Not only is it an essential element reflected in all the other management principles, but intelligence is a fundamental necessity that provides information upon which policy decisions should be based. It is therefore an essential tool in decision making. It is an instrument that can be used by decision makers to gauge the expected resistance to policy objectives and the success of initiatives that have been implemented. Furthermore, intelligence is an aid in the use of force against an adversary in that it provides information on the amount of force that is required and where it should be applied to achieve an objective.

While it is accepted that the function of intelligence is to provide vital information to facilitate decisions towards the security and prosperity of the state, it must be recognised that although intelligence is but one source of decision making input available to policy makers, it is nevertheless the most important. What sets it apart from other sources of information is that intelligence derives its strength and importance from the fact that it is usually based on secret information acquired by the intelligence services from well placed sources and that it is presented in context of the consumer's objectives. Intelligence is necessary in determining which objectives are possible and in limiting those objectives to the critical few. In order to apply the minimum amount of force against an adversary, intelligence supports tactical initiatives and provides feedback on their success or failure against the adversary.

The tension between intelligence and crisis management occurs when intelligence is used in support of counter terrorism. In this instance the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is

juxtaposed with the need to provide evidence for prosecution purposes. Towards creating contingency capabilities, intelligence is indispensible in game theory and scenario forecasting. Contingency planning helps decision makers to identify where there are specific intelligence shortcomings and to task the intelligence community more effectively in advance of foreseeable crises. Just as intelligence is the prerequisite for decision making, communication is essential for the effective distribution of intelligence. Intelligence and its swift communication is essential and is the lynch-pin of crisis management. The communication of ideas and objectives is necessary between allies and adversaries during crises in order to avoid any misunderstanding. In this regard, intelligence is an aid in the evaluation of communication and information that is received from third parties. As a source of institutional knowledge, background and analysis, intelligence assists decision makers from implementing decisions that are liable to create precedents or situations that can undermine or invalidate existing agreements between actors. This chapter has also explained why there is an inherent tension between intelligence and the media. The media which is often a source of overt information for intelligence analysts and decision makers, is a competitor for the attention of the decision maker. This places greater pressure on the intelligence community to acquire better placed sources and to surpass the media in its importance by providing the decision maker with secret information on the adversary's capabilities and intentions and to place media reports into policy perspectives. In his testimony before the U.S. Commission on the roles and capabilities of the intelligence community, Joseph S Nye Jr, argued that:

I think the challenge for Current intelligence is to ask what's our value-added that CNN doesn't do? And the challenge for Estimative intelligence is what's out value added that the economist or the financial times doesn't do? ...one thing that the intelligence analysis can do, estimated intelligence analysis, is distill this information in ways that are relevant to the policymaker, bring it to the point that the policymaker needs.198

The case study that examines the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 explores the tension between the media, intelligence and crisis management. Unlike the media who serve the public interest, intelligence serves the policy maker. Where the media usually decides what is in the public interest, however, the intelligence services are tasked by the decision makers to collect and report on specific issues. This can render the intelligence community vulnerable to manipulation or politicisation which is done by steering it towards a specific subject or phrasing the intelligence questions in such a manner as to shape the answers and analysis. This is demonstrated in the case studies that follow.

198 See the testimony of Joseph S Nye Jr, Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Washington D.C., Friday January 19,1996 ~~ ... ~

Chapter 3

THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY ON APRIL 18, 1983 AND