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The evaluation made by parents between the cost of sending children to school and the long-term benefits they can obtain by studying is, for most authors, a result of parents’ altruistic attitude (Ravallion & Wodon, 2000; Buchmann, 2000; Edmonds E. , 2008). In opposition, others claim that not sending children to school is a result of the parents’ indifference regarding the well-being of children (Edmonds E. , 2008). They argue that parents seek to benefit from the job opportunities available to their children, even when this decision goes against the children’s long-term well-being. From this perspective, child labor is the result of the demand for work from which parents seek to take advantage; and they affirm that the demand for work is the main determinant for both the child working and the way the child carries out the work (Edmonds E. , 2008).

However, despite the lack of empirical evidence favoring one or another position, and given the difficulties of measuring parental attitudes regarding their children’s work, much of the literature on child labor and schooling is based on the assumption of parents’ altruism towards their children (Becker, 1965). This is based on parents’ calculation of

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what is best for the whole family, as previously argued. It also recognizes the presence of other factors that, despite the good will of parents, influence the decision of their children to attend school or not. From this perspective, lack of information or the inability to visualize the long-term benefit prompts parents to meet the present day emergencies rather than thinking of investing in a better future for their children.

Based on this assumption, children will work only if the family is unable to meet their basic needs (Basu and Van 1998). Likewise, if the household income increases, the need for the child’s income decreases, and parents can send their children to school. For Becker (1965), parents are altruistic to the extent that they are interested in their children’s well-being and they allocate a portion of the family budget to ensure this well-being. But altruistic behavior implies parent’s interest in maximizing family resources on behalf of all family members, not on behalf of individual family members (Buchmann, 2000). For Becker and Barro, this behavior is a result of the impact of the children’s utility on the utility of parents (Schluter & Wahba, 2010). That means the children’s well-being results from a calculated strategy aimed to facilitate parental well-being; if a child has access to education it is more probable for him to have a better income in adulthood and, therefore, it is easier for him to take care of his parents in their old age.

A major confusion regarding the altruistic parent axiom has to do with the lack of clarity about the concept of altruism proposed by Becker (1965). He defined altruism as utility interdependence: altruistic parents are concerned with the well-being of their children because the children’s utility function becomes part of the parents’ utility function (Becker & Barro, 1988). From this perspective, the resource maximization within the household is the result of an altruistic attitude. This is not altruism without conditions; to

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the contrary, it is an altruism that arises from the benefit that a parent can obtain given their children’s benefit. This definition has generated a number of arguments in favor of parental selfishness, significantly adding to the debate between the two perspectives. Despite this debate, empirical research has failed to determine the validity of one perspective over the other.

Parental generosity is often limited by the collective interest, meaning the need to maximize the family benefit. Some authors argue that there are times when trying to benefit the majority of the family members can go against the future well-being of some of its members. An example of this is when older siblings drop out of school to help pay for their younger siblings’ schooling. The need to maximize family benefits can also put some children in jobs that endanger their physical and moral soundness. If the child’s income is greater when working on the street, the family may decide to send them to work on the street instead of keeping them in school. Similarly, there may be instances in which the child is left to work at home so that one or both parents can work outside of the home. This is especially true when parents' marginal revenue is higher than that of their children. Domestic work is important to the family in terms of quality of life. When the domestic work performed by the child is central to the family, this increases the likelihood that the child will drop out of school to care for the household. Finally, there may be a case in which the parents prefer that their children work in jobs which pay more, notwithstanding the price their children can pay, such as selling drugs or prostitution.

However, it is unclear if situations like the one I describe above are the result of family resource maximization or self-interest. In defense of altruism, Buchmann (2000) challenges the idea of selfishness and raises the possibility that exploitation of some

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children is the result of needing to support all family members. Similarly, some authors consider that exploitation or work may be a result of lack of internalization of the long-term negative consequences that result from child labor and not attending school (Edmonds E. , 2008). In that case, the axiom of the altruistic parent remains valid.

Basu, Das, and Dutta (2010) argue that, in general, parents avoid sending their children to work if their financial circumstances allow it. However, the evidence has not been conclusive, and has not been able to determine whether this axiom is realized or not. Based on the results of the Public Report on Basic Education in India, published in 1999, Edmonds (2008) argues that not all parents want to invest in their children’s education, affirming that parents are not necessarily looking out for the greater good of their children. In that report, 37% of the parent respondents indicated that they have never enrolled their children in school, due to lack of interest in their children’s education (Edmonds E. , 2008). However, despite this response, there is no evidence to affirm that the parents have internalized the cost of working instead of attending school. From the perspective of those who recognize parents’ altruistic behavior, the axiom still holds.

Assuming altruistic behavior among parents facilitates analysis because altruism is considered a characteristic of human nature and social reproduction; therefore, it is a general cultural principle that facilitates comparative analysis. It enables us to understand why, despite the difficult situation in Mexico—an economic crisis, growing unemployment, worsening of working conditions, just to mention some examples—people seem to be behaving altruistically.

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Could altruistic behavior be assumed in the case of Mexico?

There is little empirical evidence to assume true altruistic behavior by parents, but in Mexico, the existing data suggests the existence of parental interest in the well-being of their children, especially in terms of education. According to a survey by the Ministry of Social Development regarding the opinion of the poor, parents positively value their children’s education. Most poor people in this country believe that, once food and access to the basic services of electricity, water, and gas are met, it is necessary to invest in education. The majority of poor people give priority to education over health and clothing; and seventeen out of a hundred consider that, before investing in electricity, water, and gas, it is important to invest in education (SEDESOL, 2003). This data might explain the high rate of elementary school attendance in Mexico. However, despite parental preference regarding their children’s education, they cannot always send them to school, nor sacrifice the child's income for improved school performance. Hence, although there is preference for education, low income in Mexico (Levinson, Moe, & Knaul, 2001), and to a lesser extent the lack of household wealth, remain a major cause of child labor (López Villavicencio, 2005).

One research project has been carried out that provides evidence against the hypothesis of selfish parents. Schluter and Wahba (2010) demonstrate altruism in poor families living in rural areas. Using data from PROGRESA, they reject the hypothesis of the selfish parent in poor families from non-urban areas. They find that parents benefiting from this program spend more money on goods for their children than those who do not receive program benefits. Furthermore, spending on goods for adults is held constant. If we take into account this evidence, and consider both the school attendance rate in Mexico

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(which is greater than 90%), and the fact that 84% of children live in a household where the per capita income is under the basic well-being level established by CONEVAL2

(see table 3.1)—meaning families are not able pay for both the basic food basket and non-nutritional needs—we can hypothesize that, in fact, in the case of Mexico, altruistic behavior occurs. Therefore, we can expect that parents will send their children to work only when truly necessary. According to data from the MTI 2009, 64 out of every 100 children between the ages of five and seventeen living in rural areas have a monthly income below the minimum poverty line. Less than half (48%) in urban areas are able to ensure their well-being (Table 3.2). Moreover, 87 out of every 100 children in rural areas have an income below the basic well-being level(Table 3.2).

There are significant differences between the countryside and the city. The difference in well-being between rural and urban areas is .11 percentage points, with a significance of 99%. In terms of income, overall boys and girls living in urban areas have proportionately a better quality of life than those living in rural areas. The proportion of children living in households with a per capita income above the poverty line is higher in the first case (see Table 3.2 and 3.3). Similarly, the proportion of households with an income below the well-being level is even greater for those children who live in the country; hence, we can assume that in most cases child labor is a real need, and that parents send their children to work because they really need their child’s work. The answer to the

2 _{In October of 2009 the monthly cost of the Canasta Alimentaria (Basic Food Basket) was $691.76 Mexican} pesos per person (51.85 US dollars); while the monthly cost of the basic food basket in urban areas was $974.75 Mexican pesos (73 US dollars), which is equivalent to the minimum well-being line (línea de

bienestar mínimo). The level of well-being (línea de bienestar) equals the total monthly cost of both, the basic

food and non-nutritional needs per person, which in 2009 was $2,075.21 Mexican pesos (156 US dollars) in urban areas and $1,315.02 Mexican pesos (99 US dollars) in rural areas. (CONEVAL, 2010)

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question posed at the beginning of this section should be yes, we could assume altruistic behavior for the case of Mexico, given the poverty level in which most of the households of the children live, and the proportion of children that attend school.

Table 3.1 Boys and girls between 5 and 17 years old by level of well-being

Total Population

Below the minimum well-being line*

Above minimum well- being, but below the

well-being line**

Above the well- being line***

Girls 49,426 25,469 15,264 8,693

Boys 51,596 26,644 15,827 9,124

Total 101,021 52,113 31,091 17,817

Source: Calculations based on data from MTI 2009 and estimates from the CONEVAL Well-being Level (Línea de Bienestar)

* All who live in the countryside and have an income less than $691.76 Mexican pesos (52 US dollars) or living in urban areas and having an income less than $974.75 Mexican pesos (73 US dollars).

** Those living in the countryside and have an income less than $1,315.02 Mexican pesos (99 US dollars), but equal to or greater than $691.76 Mexican pesos (52 US dollars), and those living in urban areas and have an income less than $2,075.21 Mexican pesos (156 US dollars), but equal to or greater than $974.75 Mexican pesos (73 US dollars).

*** All who live in the countryside and have an income greater than or equal to $1,315.02 Mexican pesos (99 US dollars) or living in urban areas with an income greater than or equal to $2,075.21Mexican pesos (156 US dollars).

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Table 3.2 Boys and girls between 5 and 17 years old by level of well-being in rural and urban areas

Rural Population Below the minimum well-being line*

Above minimum well- being, but below the

well-being line**

Above the well-being line***

Girls 10,456 6,678 2,410 1,368

Boys 10,952 7,010 2,499 1,443

Total 21,408 13,688 4,909 2,811

Urban Population Below the minimum well-being line*

Above minimum well- being, but below the

well-being line**

Above the well-being line***

Girls 38,970 18,791 12,854 7,325

Boys 40,643 19,634 13,328 7,681

Total 79,613 38,425 26,182 15,006

Source: Calculations based on data from MTI 2009 and estimates from the Well-being Line of CONEVAL (Línea de Bienestar)

* All who live in the countryside and have an income less than $691.76 Mexican pesos (52 US dollars) or living in urban areas and have an income less than $974.75 Mexican pesos (73 US dollars).

** Those living in the countryside and have an income less than $1,315.02 Mexican pesos (99 US dollars), but equal to or greater than $691.76 Mexican pesos (52 US dollars), and those living in urban areas and have an income less than $2,075.21 Mexican pesos (156 US dollars), but equal to or greater than $974.75 Mexican pesos (73 US dollars). *** All who live in the countryside and have an income greater than or equal to $1,315.02 Mexican pesos (99 US dollars) or living in urban areas with an income greater than or equal to $2,075.21Mexican pesos (156 US dollars).

Table 3.3 Difference in level of well-being between rural and urban areas, using a lineal regression

Difference between Rural and urban Beta

Girls -.11495***

Boys -.11522***

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