Encuestas aplicadas a los clientes internos del GAD parroquial rural de

Now the synthesis findings have been presented, the moment has arrived to draw the necessary conclusions. In this chapter, the findings that are most relevant in answering the central research question and key emergent concepts that are promising and surprising will be highlighted. In order to return to the central research question, it may be convenient to repeat it:

Which events occur after implementing team-based financial incentives and rewards within Western- based companies?

In the design stage of a team incentive system, before actual implementation, the owner of a manufacturing facility heavily protected his own financial interests by proposing suggestions that allowed him to control and minimize bonus payouts. The owner proposed a bonus calculation with countless cost factors and rations, many of which were beyond the control of the non-management employees. Non-management advocates of a team incentive system were given the opportunity to participate in the design team, and hence the chance to do something about the less favourable bonus conditions, but they simply agreed to the suggestions proposed by the owner. The advocates cherished their prerogative to participate in the design team and therefore allowed the owner to protect his own interests. It became clear that all actors involved had their own agenda and acted accordingly. Management could and perhaps should have played a key role in striking a balance between the different interests at stake.

In addition, there was the dual role of accounting in the implementation process. This theme did not consist of clearly tangible events but was certainly an important emergent theme in this qualitative research synthesis. First, accounting played a crucial role in the implementation while establishing team targets, measuring team performance, determining the level of rewards, and quantifying all these aspects. The second role involved that accounting-inspired arguments were deployed by management to promote the newly introduced team incentive system. To conclude, accounting was both an integral part of a team incentive system and a means to promote the system.

In addition to the dual role of accounting, team managers also had a very specific role to play, namely the role as intermediary between management and subordinate team members. Team managers felt personally accountable for their team's performance under management's new team incentive system and whether the system was well received by the subordinate team members. Moreover, team managers felt they had specific influence on the implementation and planning of the system, including sometimes exerting pressure to give monetary rewards to team members. Finally, there was sometimes room for managerial discretion. Such an opportunity for managerial discretion not only generates uncertainty and invites bargaining but also paves the way for moral appeal to team managers. In short, team managers approached and fulfilled their role as intermediary in different ways.

Also striking were the predominantly negative responses to team incentive systems. These negative responses included an owner who felt embarrassed but did not significantly increase bonus payouts, counteractive responses by supervisors and non-management opponents, and negative responses to both equal and equitable reward distribution. These were pronounced reactions to a perceived lack of bonus payouts and to other negative aspects of a team incentive system. The relatively large

number of negative responses makes clear that if no early intervention occurs (e.g., adjustment of the number of cost factors and ratios in a bonus calculation) in the case of predominantly negative perceptions of a team incentive system, then responses to these negative perceptions can be of an extreme and prolonged nature. It should be noted, however, that the events related to the negative responses almost entirely arose from a single study, namely the study by Collins (1995). Therefore, it may be wondered whether this argumentation is not a one-of-a-kind account of responses to a team incentive system that is not applicable to other settings.

Finally, the sense of power and control is perhaps the most promising emergent concept of this qualitative research synthesis. This sense of power and control was influenced in almost all stages before, during and after implementation of a team incentive system. Before implementation, non- management employees were given the opportunity to increase their sense of power (a greater voice in decision making) and control (over their own compensation and the system's targets) by participating in the design team for the team incentive system. However, they agreed to a bonus calculation that reduced their sense of control over personal compensation. Moreover, negative perceptions of a complex system in which it was difficult to know how to increase your own income and in which there were hardly any opportunities to provide input led to an even greater sense of lack of control over personal compensation. Furthermore, the resentment over not being able to exert influence on peers' performance also did not lead to team members having a greater sense of power and control over the situation they were in. In addition to subordinate team members, the sense of power and control of supervisors was also affected. Supervisors felt that a team incentive system eroded their power base and might even take away their entire reason for existence.

The aggregate dimension of sense of power and control did not necessarily consist of clearly tangible events. Logically, feelings and perceptions are not equal to events. However, a very strong sense of lack of power and control led to staff turnover, an aggregate dimension that did consist of tangible events. In this way, the sense of power and control constituted a generating mechanism and 'motor' for the events related to staff turnover. Employees either voluntarily resigned and left their organization or were forced to resign and forced out of their organization. The former group of employees consisted of team members who left their organization due to perceived unfairness or a perceived lack of control over compensation, and supervisors who left their organization due to a strongly eroded power base. The latter group consisted of supervisors who were forced out of their organization after being made redundant. A team incentive system, however, sometimes also 'attracted' new employees.

To recapitulate, all actors involved in the design process had their own agenda and acted accordingly, the dual role of accounting and the role of team manager as intermediary were of great importance in the implementation process, and the promising emergent concept of sense of power and control acted as a generating mechanism for the staff turnover-related events. It can be concluded that before, during and after implementation of a team incentive system, the various actors involved seek to protect their own interests and would like to have a certain degree of power, control and influence over the system and their colleagues, and that a lack thereof can lead to significant levels of staff turnover and negative perceptions, responses and events.