Endospora bacteriana

Haughey delayed his announced meeting with the NESC. Before the change of government, Ó hUiginn had had the NESC agree to invite the “incoming Taoiseach” to meet it to discuss its report and seek a strategic role “elaborating” the “National Plan”. Haughey on becoming Taoiseach had accepted the invitation and a meeting was initially set for April. But, following discussions with Cassells, Ó hUiginn’s advised a delay to accommodate ICTU. Congress feared talks in a tripartite setting would put it “at a disadvantage since it can be assumed the other parties would form a united front” against it, and also sought an agreement structure determined by ICTU and government before involving other partners.2

Congress proved equally accommodating to government. Despite public outcry over the budget, ICTU only mildly criticised it, expressing its “extreme disappointment” at the “savage cuts”, but the same day wrote to Haughey seeking talks “on all aspects of the economic situation … to devise a national plan for growth and economic recovery” along NESC lines. Haughey of course agreed, publicly down-playing it in the Dáil as routine “consultation with the social partners at least on economic and social objectives”. But he warned that without pay restraint “major lay-offs” in the public service were inevitable. ICTU put down a marker by insisting both public and private sector pay form “an integral part of an agreed national programme of economic and social priorities”.3

Ó hUiginn agreed with Congress on principles and structures for negotiations before engaging other partners. ICTU insisted that any “negotiated national plan” be driven centrally from the Department of the Taoiseach to ensure control from the top and that it adopt NESC’s “four-part” strategy approach with integrated macro-economic, industrial, tax and social policies, from which “pay questions cannot be divorced”. Bilateral “working parties” chaired by the Department and involving, at a minimum, secretary-level officials should develop the detail and a 2 _{NESC Council Meetings 23.02, and 24.04.87, also Council Meeting 24.043.87 ‘Note from Secretariat’;} Secretary [Ó hUigin] to Taoiseach, 13/04/1987, ‘Subject: Meeting with ICTU’, DTA-OHP; Cassells, ‘Brief for General Purposes Committee re Discussions with Taoiseach’, 13/04/87, ICTU Archive: GS-PA-1a 3 _{‘Budget Statement’, 01/04/87, in ICTU Annual Report 1987: 206; Carroll (Pres. ICTU) to Taoiseach} 01.04.87, ICTU Archive: GS-PA-1a; Haughey in Dáil 07 and 08/04/1987; ‘Leading trade unionist urges new approach on public pay’, IT 11/04/1987

“Ministerial-ICTU Working Group” deal with pay and agree the final plan. ICTU’s insistence on this structure was because of its experience of senior civil servants in 1980-82 as uncooperative and given to “blocking tactics”, and their “general contempt for unions” during the FitzGerald years. It was a perception Haughey’s circle shared. When Ahern, now Minister for Labour, told officials of Haughey’s plans for social partnership, they advised him to “stay away from it”.4 Haughey himself faced considerable resistance from senior officials who had resented his centralisation of power in the Taoiseach’s Department in 1980-82. Enda Delaney, a new recruit to Foreign Affairs, described how, on taking up his post in early 1987 he encountered “an incendiary group of embittered senior officials … plotting against [Haughey]” and “drawing up ‘Documents of Resistance’”. They resented his moving responsibility for European and Northern policy from their Department to Taoiseach’s, as he had also done with socio- economic policy in 1981. Haughey would continue to face resistance from civil service circles, necessitating a tight central government group.5

Internally, Cassells, who spoke regularly with Ó hUiginn, recommended that in the talks ICTU “recognise and accept the necessity for pay restraint/moderation given the difficult competitive position of the private sector and the acute Exchequer financial problems”. This would “persuade Government to engage in meaningful discussions on public service pay”. A period of budget autonomy followed by a 2-year agreement would “help get [us] out from under” the budget pay deferral and build a positive framework for future pay development.6

Government also had a strategy, part of which, despite Haughey understating it in the Dáil, was engaging the social partners early to avoid the mistakes of 1982. In preparing for Haughey’s meeting with ICTU, Ó hUiginn advised him to commit to the NESC principles and structures Congress sought but stress the centrality of NESC’s debt/GNP formula, which was “so realistic in its approach to the public finances”, its prioritising of the exporting and FDI sectors as the “locomotives of growth”, and its tax/pay formula. “It is clear that the union 4 _{H/w note: ‘President of Congress and reps. of EC’ [for mtg. 15/04], and “Brief for General Purposes} Committee re Discussions with Taoiseach’, 13/04/87, ICTU Archive: GS-PA-1a; ‘Joint Government-ICTU Press Statement’, 15.04.1987, GIS: D/Taoiseach; Ahern in Hastings et al 2007: 22-3, 33-4 and Interview with Bertie Ahern 5 _{Delaney (2001), Accidental Diplomat: 1-3} 6 _{‘Brief for General Purposes Committee. Discussions with Taoiseach’, 13/04/87, ICTU Archive: GS-PA-1a}

leaders want to be involved … A Plan will take them off a number of hooks, particularly the evolution of public sector pay over the next few years”. Tax was also the key to involving business interests. The “prospects of such a consensus Plan, given the NESC basis, are excellent” and “would be a great achievement”.7 Ó hUiginn also urged Haughey to accept the “institutional mechanisms” ICTU proposed for the talks - the policy “working parties” chaired by his Department and only secretary-level civil service involvement, as well as the “Ministerial- ICTU Working Group”, chaired by Haughey himself. _{Just before the meeting,}

Cassells told Ó hUiginn that ICTU’s main concern was how serious Haughey was regarding the “integrated” four-part NESC strategy, while Haughey told him his concern was how serious ICTU was on debt reduction. Two intense meetings followed on 15 and 29 April clarifying these issues, at which Congress leaders stressed their commitment to reducing the debt and Haughey committed to the NESC framework and the “institutional arrangements” ICTU proposed.8

It was clear from these meetings that the agreement would not be a 1970s- style “redistributive” one, but instead involve monetary retrenchment and industrial growth on the basis of the NESC plan, as well as a trade-off of pay restraint for job creation, tax and social reform. The key moment came when, as Cassells had intimated to ICTU beforehand, Haughey said they would have to “envisage [an initial] period of time” to “enable the Exchequer finances to be put in order” and the EBR “reduced to a sustainable level”. A Programme could then be ready for agreeing in September. While ICTU agreed to this, Carroll warned that publicly ICTU would have to continue opposing health cuts and the retention of Bruton’s public pay freeze. But Haughey agreed to try to get employers to include a national private sector pay deal within the agreement, and the meeting agreed a target date of September. Ó hUiginn was confident that with the ICTU committed, other partners would have little other option but to follow.9 7 _{Secretary [Ó hUigin] to Taoiseach, 13/04/1987, ‘Subject: Meeting with ICTU’, DTA-OHP} 8 _{ICTU strategy, ‘Brief for General Purposes Committee re Discussions with Taoiseach’, 13/04/87, ICTU} Archive: GS-PA-1a; Ó hUiginn advice, Secretary [Ó hUigin] to Taoiseach, 28/04/1987, ‘Government/ICTU’ and ‘Mechanisms for Implementing the Programme for National Recovery’, DTA-OHP; on NESC structure and debt, interview with Pádraig Ó hUiginn and Hastings et al 2007: 36; on meeting outcomes, Cassells to ICTU EC, ‘Discussions with the Taoiseach on a National Plan for Growth and Economic Recovery. Report of Meeting on 29 April 1987’, ICTU Archive: GS-PA-1a and ‘Joint Government/ICTU Press Statement’, 29/04/1987, GIS: D/Taoiseach 9 _{“enable the Exchequer”, ‘Statement by Taoiseach at the meeting with ICTU’, 15.04.1987, ICTU Archive:} GS-PA-1a; discussion, Cassells to EC, ‘Discussions with the Taoiseach on a National Plan for Growth and

Having prioritised agreeing a framework with the unions, Haughey now met the other partners to bring them into the process, starting with the construction industry, the CIF, on 30 April. Though opposed to national agreements and minimum wage setting, CIF more than any sector was dependent on government capital programmes, a point Haughey exploited. He chided their infrastructure proposals as “not ambitious enough” and they quickly committed to engage with his more audacious plan. A joint CIF-Departmental “working party” was established, though with the Department of the Environment rather than the Taoiseach as was the case with the privileged ICTU.10

On 7 May Haughey met farming groups. Given his history of conflict with the IFA, he had ensured a wider grouping was involved, including dairy producers (ICMSA), the coop industries (ICOS) and, to the delight of Agriculture Minister Walsh, the “progressive” young commercial farmers of Macra na Féirme. IFA had welcomed the NESC report, its President, Joe Rea, praising its expenditure targets and food industry ambitions. He had called on all parties to “put aside” their antipathy to Haughey and support him in implementing it. But Rea now pressed Haughey for a “strong line on [the] EEC” to counter threats to CAP and presented a list of IFA grant-seeking demands, which he described as the IFA’s “development proposals”. Before the meeting, officials bemoaned the poor economic performance of farming and the IFA’s superficial endorsement of the NESC report: “This line, set out in the forward to the IFA proposals”, Finance noted, “is in contrast to the policy proposals which follow”, which would involve “substantial outlay” by the exchequer and “must be rejected”.11

The IFA pressed their shopping list on Haughey, which he deftly evaded by welcoming their endorsement of the NESC report with its strategy for commercialising farming. He re-stated his goal of transforming agriculture into an entrepreneurial, export-led and consumer-oriented sector by up-grading product quality, farmer training and marketing. He side-stepped demands for Economic Recovery. Report of Meeting on 29 April 1987’, ICTU Archive: GS-PA-1a; concessions and private sector pay, Secretary [Ó hUigin] to Taoiseach, 13/04/1987, ‘Meeting with ICTU’, DTA-OHP 10 _{Ó hUiginn to Taoiseach, 30/04/87, ‘Meeting with CIF’, DTA: OHP} 11 _{‘Meeting with ICMSA/ICOS 7th May 1987’, Fergus O’Farrell, chief executive, Macra na Féirme to} Taoiseach, 16/04/87, Travers, D/Taoiseach, hand-written note, ‘farm bodies’, 01/05/87, DTA: S25861-A; ‘Rea calls for decisive rule’, IT 02/03/87; IFA (1987); Joe Rea to ‘Mr. Haughey’, 02/03/87, D/Taoiseach, ‘Meeting with ICMSA/ICOS 7th May 1987’, F. Coleman, D/Finance to P O’Sullivan, D/Taoiseach, 06/05/87: ‘Brief for meeting of Taoiseach with IFA, 7 May 1987’, DTA: S25861A

wider grant schemes by suggesting the IFA pursue them and other ideas in a joint Working Party with the Department of Agriculture, to which they agreed.12

Finally he met business and employer leaders on 14 May. They were, as ever, divided on priorities. While what Ahern called the “big boys” of the CII were eager to progress proposals they had discussed with Haughey before the election, the “small boys” of the FUE remained truculent. They had endorsed NESC strategy but opposed any return to “National Understandings”, as they again repeated at the meeting. Ó hUiginn advised Haughey to focus on industrial policy and leave pay to be dealt with later at “Ministerial CII-FUE Group level”.13

Although the FUE’s insistence on excluding pay was a challenge for Haughey, he was not overly perturbed despite his promise to ICTU to try to ensure its inclusion. Finance, never enthusiasts for “Understandings”, had advised him the differences between the ICTU and FUE on pay made “the achievement of a central deal well nigh impossible”, and typically recommended that he control public pay along the lines of the FitzGerald government and hope this set the pace for the private sector. But it was also a growing public perception, with the

IRN believing an agreement on industrial policy “without a national pay deal” the

most likely outcome. For Haughey the pay stand-off provided more time for government planning without having to confront the issue yet. He told the Dáil the talks underway were on a “medium-term programme based on the principles recommended by NESC” and should not be “confused” with pay negotiations. Government would “adhere to [the] strategy of the budget”, including on pay, and budget policy would remain “a matter for the Government”.14

Before meeting the FUE/CII, Haughey had agreed to accept employers’ views on pay while encouraging them to engage with the recovery plan, with pay to be “revisited”. At the meeting they confirmed their support for the NESC plan and agreed to work with government on “industrial development strategy, industrial promotion, productive infrastructure, taxation and industrial input costs” to 12 _{‘Taoiseach’s meeting with IFA on Monday 27 April 1987’, Ó hUiginn to Taoiseach, 06/05/87, re ‘Meeting} with IFA, ICMSA/ Macra na Féirme’, ‘Statement by the Taoiseach at meeting with Presidents and representatives of the IFA, ICMSA, ICOS and Macra na Féirme on 7 May 1987’, DTA: S25861-A; IFA, National Recovery. The Role of Agriculture and Food 13 _{“big boys”, Ahern in McGinley 1997; FUE Bulletin, Feb. 1987; ‘Search for Consensus’ (editorial), IT} 13/03/87; FUE ‘Press Release’, 15/04/87; Ó hUiginn to Haughey. ‘CII/FUE Mtg.’, 14/05/87, DTA: S25875 14 _{D/Finance. ‘Briefings for Taoiseach’s meeting with the CII/FUE’, 26/04/87, DTA: S25875; IRN Report} 21/05/87; Haughey in Dáil 28/04/1987

make industry “competitive internationally”. Three CII-FUE “working parties” were established with the Department of I&C, on “Employment-Development Measures”, “Social Policy” and “Environment for Enterprise”. On industrial policy, CII was very much in the driving seat on the employer/business side.15