ENFOQUE DE CARTERA Y SUSTITUIBILIDAD BRUTA DE ACTIVOS FINANCIEROS

One key area in which political actors are keen to secure legitimacy is by tracing their identities, and mobilising political support from within their respective clans through identity politics. In Chapter 6 I will describe the dynamics of local elite pacts as I examine the role of local elites in the strategic alliances or fragmentation at the local level. In the current chapter, I describe only the nature of local elite pacts as generally used as a bargaining tool by political elites to reach out to citizens and secure legitimacy.

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Local elite pacts generally occur between new political elites and other influential private individuals or with Maliks; I refer to these collectively as local elites. Often, political candidates engage in negotiations with local elites that are reciprocal in nature. The relationship is dependent on the ability of local elites to accumulate votes, in return for personal favours granted by the politicians. The influence of local elites is judged by voter strength in the constituency and the ability to persuade the voters. Local elites with significant influence over voters have a greater chance of getting a better deal. My respondents sarcastically (and bluntly) termed the reciprocal relationship as a laissez-faire, ‘market’-like condition with a price tag on local elites – i.e. a competitive market with no government involvement. There is competition between political candidates to forge alliances with the local elites. Even the Maliks act as independent brokers in some cases, and are open to negotiations with other candidates. Often, some candidates including new political elites and Maliks both run in elections to demonstrate their authority by accumulating votes – thus gaining authority that could potentially be used in future negotiations. Others withdraw their nomination (depending on negotiations) in favour of other individuals during the general elections.

The amount disbursed amongst local elites varies depending on the nature of negotiations with individuals. Negotiations are generally about cash advances (or bribes), development projects and/or contracts, employment for friends or family, or a combination of all these. According to most political actors and Maliks I spoke to, Shah Jee Gul spent millions of rupees during his 2013 election campaign. He approached most local elites by visiting their Hujra. During these visits, the candidate would engage in two different types of discussion. One, held openly in the presence of others, was related to the resolution of day-to-day governance issues. The other, a private discussion between the politician and local elites, was held indoors. One of my respondents explained the type of exchanges that take place during such private negotiations:

the candidates would ask for votes in return for personal gifts to the elders such as [a] car, money, and also the promise of hospital and tube well to the community. In addition, the Maliks were promised employment [a quota] in local law-enforcement forces [Khassadars, Levies and scouts]. (Interview (respondent requested anonymity), 19th _{November 2014)}

This statement highlights that access to public goods and other favours for local elites is negotiated via informal practices. My respondents claimed that the politician used his influence to recruit the close relatives of local elites in the Levi and Khassadar force. In return, the local elites, particularly the Maliks, mobilise local social ties so that support is given to a political candidate. The local elites persuade people by making promises about perceived benefits a candidate can bring once in power.

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The nature of ethnic loyalty in Khyber Agency is not primitive and static; rather, clan members are rational and emotional actors and loyalties are subject to change. In effect, an influential person with better political connections and more money may or may not receive the support of a clan or sub-clan in elections, even if the candidate has identical ethnicity. In Khyber Agency, ethnic-based politics has been disturbed in instances where the clans were faced with a choice between an ethnic candidate and a charismatic figure, particularly a religious candidate. One independent candidate in Khyber Agency, Noor ul Haq Qadri, belongs to the minority Shinwari tribe, yet won constituency NA-45 in the 2002 and 2008 general elections (and was runner-up in 2013). Qadri is a religious figure and has a huge regional following. He belongs to the 'Pir' school of thought (similar political figures in the Swat region are outlined by Barth (1959)), which has a widespread religious following in the whole of Pakistan. Pirs are actively engaged in conflict resolution at the local level and in charitable causes. Qadri enjoys a relatively stable voter base from his religious followers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the candidate also used the traditional principles of success to gain additional votes, i.e. money, social welfare and local elite pacts. In sum, ethnic politics has been important throughout FATA, unless influenced by strong ideologies – whether religious or political – in providing citizens a chance to bypass the traditional ethnic-based choices.

In regions where a political party actor lacks an ethnic following, discourses reworking identity beyond ethnic relationships are developed, emphasising any moral connections. Another way of gaining legitimacy for the political actors involves adopting the rhetoric of good governance and democratic citizenship, highlighting the exercise of the fundamental rights of citizens in FATA; the new political elites position themselves as agents able to protect citizens’ democratic rights. The following section explains the narrative that new political elites use to justify their legitimacy in the field of governance.