ENFOQUE DE REHABILITACION VIRTUAL EN LA MARCHA:

“We need a tougher immigration policy and we need to stop seeing it as a dilemma. It's not. It's easy. I'm going to do my best to help the British back to work.”

Minister of Immigration, Phil Woolas, (2008)

This chapter analyses BNP impact on the British immigration politics and policy between

2005 and 2009. Chapter 5 demonstrated that the BNP lacked any impact on the three

dimensions of immigration politics and policy at the 2001 general election and during Blair’s

second term. Nevertheless, the BNP electoral breakthrough was still incorrectly associated

with Labour’s government repressive approach to asylum. This chapter explores whether the

BNP had a significant impact on inter-party competition on immigration and on public

attitudes to this social phenomenon at the 2005 general election. It then surveys the BNP’s electoral development between 2005 and 2009 and its frame of immigration policy. Finally,

this chapter’s last section examines whether the BNP had a relevant impact on the development of immigration policy during the Labour government’s third term.

6.1 – The 2005 general election - Blair’s third victory

The May 2005 general election developed in a different political context in comparison to the

2001 ballot, as Blair’s position as Prime Minister was no longer unassailable. Under pressure

from the Iraq War and both the Hutton and Butler inquires of 2003 and 2004, Blair’s

popularity and credibility was low before the ballot (Butler and Kavannagh, 2005). In

October 2004, Blair announced that the next general election would be his last, yet he could

still attain a unique achievement for a Labour Prime Minister by securing three consecutive

156 was modest with a turnout of 61.4 per cent, the second lowest turnout since 1918 (Butler and

Kavannagh, 2005).

6.1.1 – BNP impact on inter-party competition

The research developed through Chapter 5 found that the BNP lacked impact on inter-party

competition on immigration in 2001. Now, this thesis explores whether the BNP reinforced

the restrictive character of mainstream parties’ positions on immigration and the salience of

this issue in their electoral manifestos at the 2005 general election. The salience of

immigration policy increased substantially in 2005 and mainstream parties adopted

increasingly restrictive positions. This was especially true of the Conservatives under

Michael Howard’s leadership. Despite these observations, the BNP lacked any relevant impact on mainstream parties’ positions on immigration policy at the 2005 general elections. As seen below, the BNP inability to mount an electoral threat to mainstream parties by 2005:

looked as the most relevant factor behind its lack of impact on this dimension of immigration

politics (Table 2.1).

6.1.1.1 – The BNP’s electoral campaign

The BNP contested 119 constituencies in 2005, a fourfold growth in comparison to 2001

(Table 6.1). Internal party documents suggested that the leadership’s objective was to identify

potential voters in specific wards to increase the BNP effectiveness at the 2006 local elections

(Copsey, 2009). The BNP’s political opportunities were marginally improved by the high salience of immigration and the party’s eligibility for mail shots across the UK, as well as a

five-minute TV broadcast. Demonstrating the BNP’s radical xenophobia, the TV broadcast

focused on the shortage of social housing caused allegedly by its allocation to asylum seekers

and on the supposed failings of the Labour and Conservatives Parties on asylum (BNP,

157 As in the past, the BNP electoral strategists continued to associate cultural xenophobia with

local grievances in particular constituencies to enhance the party’s respectability at the local

level (John et al., 2006). In Barking and Dagenham, the shortage of cheap social housing was

exploited by a BNP leaflet entitled “Africans for Essex Scheme”, which alleged that African immigrants received incentives from the local council to buy houses in Barking (Cruddas et

al., 2005). In Keighley, West Yorkshire, the BNP tried to exploit a local campaign against

schoolgirl prostitution by framing it as an issue of Asians’ grooming of white girls for sex. As in Oldham in 2001, Griffin was the BNP’s candidate in Keighley in a bid to exploit local

tensions (Guardian, 2005a). The launch of the BNP electoral manifesto entitled “Hope not Hate” was ignored by the mainstream media, demonstrating Griffin’s feeble access to the British media. 45 At this event, Griffin declared that British troops should be pulled out of

Iraq and deployed to patrol the “Channel Tunnel and Dover ports to keep out illegal immigrants and asylum seekers” (BBC, 2005).

The BNP 2005 electoral manifesto integrated Griffin’s ideological reform with a new critique

of multiculturalism (Copsey, 2009). The document devoted high salience to immigration

policy with particular emphasis on irregular immigration (Figure 6.1, BNP 2005b). Arguing

that “Britain’s existence is threatened by immigration”, the BNP demanded an immediate halt to all types of inflows (BNP, 2005b). By contrast to the absence of references to irregular

immigration across mainstream parties’ discourse, a regularisation programme for irregular

immigrants was proposed alongside the forced deportation of all irregular immigrants settled

in the UK (BNP, 2005b). Respect for the 1951 Geneva Convention was acknowledged, but it

was deemed that asylum seekers ought to find refuge in third states rather than in the UK

(BNP, 2005b). Finally, the voluntary resettlement programme of ethnic minorities and

immigrants was still proposed. The BNP’s agenda on immigration had a clear restrictive

45

158 character while its inherent ambiguity reflected Griffin’s aim to water down his party’s pariah

status.

Figure 6.1 – Salience of immigration policy in British parties’ electoral manifestos at the 2005 general elections

Source: BNP, 2005; Conservatives, 2005; Labour, 2005; Liberal Democrats, 2005

6.1.1.2 – Conservatives’ “it is not racist to impose limits on immigration”

The Conservative Party, under Howard’s leadership, quickly recognised its inability to

challenge the government’s record on public services and the economy without dumping Thatcher’s unpopular legacy (Bale, 2010). Instead, Howard opted for a valence strategy on the only issue on which the Conservatives had a clear advantage over Labour – immigration

(Whiteley et al., 2005). Thereby, “loss of control” of immigration and the “chaotic” asylum

system dominated his speech made in September 2004 (Howard, 2004). References to his

origin from a Jewish asylum seeker family preceded projections that “immigration will account for 85 per cent” of Britain’s future population growth and associated immigration with shortages of social housing in the UK (Howard, 2004, p. 4). Conservatives’ proposals

159 included a points-system inspired by the Australian experience and “pulling out of the 1951

Refugee Convention” (Howard, 2004). The disrespect for such international conventions and human rights could lead to withdrawal from the EU and drove the Conservatives onto

increasingly extremist grounds.

The Conservatives’ emphasis on immigration was reinforced by the appointment of Lynton Crosby in October 2004 as campaign director. He was a marketing guru widely known for his

dog-whistle strategy on immigration employed in Australian elections (Geddes and Tonge,

2005). Instead of proposing positive and constructive policies, Howard opted for an

aggressive and negative electoral campaign that involved playing the “race card” (Saggar,

2001). This strategy targeted the Conservatives’ core voters and sought to tackle UKIP’s success at the 2004 EP election (Cowley and Green, 2005). Moreover, this choice was also

ideological: Howard and his entourage were convinced in 2001 that Hague had the right

issues at the wrong election whilst the Conservatives’ populism would resonate with the

electorate in 2005 (Bale, 2010).

A Conservative campaign poster with the slogan: “It is not racist to impose limits on

immigration” received wide condemnation from ethnic minorities who considered it provocative and racist (Independent, 2005). In a speech in Telford in April 2005, which

specifically focused on immigration, Howard justified the slogan as “plain common sense”

(Howard, 2005, p. 2). “Bigots who preach racial hatred” (Howard, 2005, p. 2) would be assisted if the Conservatives failed to tackle the immigration issue. In addition to the

proposals previously presented, Howard announced an annual limit to immigration approved

by Parliament (including a quota on asylum seekers) and 24-hour security at all ports of

entry. Despite the criticism of racial extremists, his speech ended with a strong populist

160 “Vote Conservative to limit and control immigration or vote Mr Blair or Liberal Democrats for no limits to immigration and an increase in the population by five

million over the next three decades” (Howard, 2005, p. 4).

Reflecting Howard’s populist campaign, the salience of immigration in the Conservatives’ 2005 electoral manifesto expanded in comparison to the 2001 document (Figure 6.1).

Benefits of economic migration were acknowledged in contrast to 2001 whilst asylum

continued to be the most salient type of inflow (Conservatives, 2005). Two weeks before the

election, Howard was forced to deny internal opposition to his political strategy after senior

figures, such as Kenneth Clarke, urged him publicly to move on from immigration (Butler

and Kavannagh, 2005). Later on, Howard justified his strategy on immigration by pointing to

the need to tackle ERP growth at a time when the BNP electoral strength amounted to 21 city

councillors by 2004 (Table 5.2). Instead, Howard’s playing of the “race card” reflected his

valence issue strategy, based on ideological convictions, alongside his failure to challenge the

government on other key issues.

6.1.1.3 – Centre-left parties’ positions on immigration

The Labour’s government immigration policy had been subordinated to Blair’s electoral strategy to neutralise the Conservatives’ challenge. Consequently, the 2005 White Paper integrated the points-system proposed by the opposition alongside the introduction of

biometric ID cards and a reduction of protection granted to refugees (Home Office, 2005).

The Labour 2005 electoral manifesto also doubled the salience granted to immigration policy,

and framed the management of inflows as a security issue like the 2005 White Paper (Figure

6.1). Effectively, irregular inflows were the most paramount type of immigration flows in the

document (Labour, 2005). Yet, Labour refused to establish an annual cap on immigration as

Conservatives demanded proving its strong liberalism towards labour inflows. By moving

161 opposition proposals, Blair pushed the Conservatives onto extremist grounds and forced them

to present unfeasible proposals.

In contrast to 2001, Blair addressed the topic of immigration through his electoral campaign

and delivered a strong speech in Dover (Howard’s own constituency) in April 2005 (Butler

and Kavannagh, 2005). For the first time, the Prime Minister directly challenged the

Conservatives’ campaign on immigration by stating that: “It is an attempt deliberately to exploit people’s fears” and blamed Howard for leading a single issue party (Blair, 2005b, p.2). After defending his government’s record in contrast to Howard’s poor record as past Conservative Home Secretary, Blair labelled the Conservatives’ proposals as “incoherent

babble” (Blair, 2005b, p. 2). Among other criticisms, Blair questioned the viability of Howard’s plan for 24-hours surveillance over the existing 650 ports of entry and airports and simultaneously halve the costs of the immigration service (Blair, 2005b, p. 9). The premier

ended with a robust defence of immigration’s benefits to the UK. Instead of past convergence on the demonization of immigrants, Blair’s direct challenge to Howard’s campaign pictured the opposition as unrealistic and populist.

Finally, the Liberal Democrats proposed the introduction of a quota system for labour inflows

set by an independent panel (BBC, 2004). The Liberal Democrats’ manifesto devoted less salience to immigration policy and only addressed labour and asylum inflows (Figure 6.1,

Liberal Democrats, 2005). Migration’s economic benefits were praised and a new governmental agency to deal only with asylum was proposed, as well as the suppression of

refugees’ ineligibility to work (Liberal Democrats, 2005). Hence, the Liberal Democrats converged with the Conservatives on the establishment of a quota system for labour inflows.

In short, the salience of immigration policy expanded considerably at the 2005 general

election in comparison to 2001, and asylum and irregular inflows were the most salient types

162 demonstrating the success of Labour’s narrative of managed migration in leading the political debate. Nonetheless, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats converged on the proposal

of a quota system for labour inflow while Labour and the Conservatives agreed on deploying

high profile security measures to tackle the supposed widespread abuse of the immigration

system.

Despite the increasing salience of immigration and the more restrictive positions of British

mainstream parties in comparison to 2001, the BNP had no impact on inter-party competition

on immigration policy at the 2005 general election. Intense salience of immigration at the

electoral campaign was an outcome of the intense inter-party competition between Labour

and the Conservatives on this issue, observed since the early 2000s. The Conservatives’

valence issue strategy was designed to appeal to the wider electorate and tackle the success of

UKIP, not the BNP. However, Blair’s occupation of the centre-right ground on immigration policy pushed Howard to increasingly extremist grounds, a trend reinforced by his failure to

challenge the government’s record on other key areas. Once more, the Conservatives’ escalation of their populist approach to asylum and restrictive mainstream parties’ consensuses developed in a political context marked by a non-relevant ERP. It presaged the

BNP’s electoral breakthrough at national level and cannot be conceived a response to the ERP’s moderate success at local elections before 2005.

The BNP’s lack of impact on inter-party competition on immigration at the 2005 general election coincided with its insignificant electoral threat and with the agency of mainstream

parties. In contrast, the expansion of immigration rates up to 2005 (mostly supported by the

increase of grants of settlement for asylum and labour purposes; see Figure 5.2) and the high

salience of immigration amongst the public opinion (Figure 6.2) failed to coincide with the

preceding observation. The BNP’s failure to mount an electoral threat to mainstream parties

163 Figure 6.2 – Most important issue at the British 2005 general election (N=3,589)

Source: BES 2005, Pre-election

2005 (Table 5.1). Finally, British mainstream parties’ full isolation of the BNP at the fringes

of the party system also diminished Griffin’s chances to influence the BNP’s competitors positions on immigration. Within the former context, the BNP non-relevant electoral threat to

mainstream parties at the 2005 general election seemed the most important factor behind this

party’s lack of impact on this dimension of immigration politics. 6.1.2 – BNP impact on public attitudes

Whereas immigration was considered largely irrelevant by the British electorate in 2001,

significant levels of hostility towards this social phenomenon had been observed across the

electorate. Now, did the BNP intensify levels of concern and hostility towards immigration

across British public opinion at the 2005 general election? Immigration became the top

priority issue of British voters and this social phenomenon was associated mostly with

employment concerns in 2005. Despite these observations, this research points to the BNP’s lack of impact on public attitudes to immigration. The British ERP’s irrelevant levels of

16.8% _16.4% 9.2% 7.2% 5.7% 5.7% 3.6% 2.8% 1.8% _1.3% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%

164 electoral support at national level and its subsequent limited party organisation were

considered the most relevant factors behind the preceding observation (Table 2.1).

Surprisingly, immigration (in particular asylum) was the top priority of British voters at the

2005 general election, above the NHS or law and order (Figure 6.2). This trend had not been

observed in the UK since the late 1970s, when Thatcher informally co-opted the British NF

discourse on immigration (Geddes and Tongue, 2005). The acute rise of concern with

immigration in 2005 developed in the context a dramatic drop on asylum seeking into the UK

and cannot be dissociated from the intense inter-party competition on immigration between

Labour and the Conservatives through Blair’s second term (Figure 5.9). The Conservatives

continued to be ranked as the best party to deal with immigration by voters most concerned

with this issue, but the advantage over Labour was cut to eight percentage points (Figure 6.3).

Furthermore, the BNP was considered a better party to deal with immigration by such voters

than UKIP, and ranked at similar levels to the Liberal Democrats (Figure 6.3). This

contrasted with its insignificance in 2001. Yet, the BNP was still very far from holding the

issue ownership of opposition to immigration.

British public attitudes to immigration at the 2005 general election were similar to those at

the 2001 ballot. Immigration continued to be perceived mostly as a threat to employment by a

majority of respondents to the BES 2005 pre-electoral survey (Figure 6.4). Immigration was

also positively regarded as a source of new ideas and cultures to the UK by a majority of such

respondents (Figure 6.5). Once more, separate analysis of BNP voters’ attitudes towards

immigration is prevented by the residual sample of this party’s voters in the BES 2005.46

A

majority of the respondents to an IPSOS-MORI poll in March 2005 also rejected the

association between immigration and the growth of criminality in March 2005 (Figure 6.6).

46

Only 7 respondents sympathised with the BNP out of an entire sample pool of 3,542 British respondents (BES, 2005).

165 Figure 6.3 – Best party to deal with asylum seekers among respondents who ranked immigration as top priority at the British 2005 general election (N = 603)

Source – BES 2005 Pre-election

Figure 6.4 – Public perception of immigration and employment at the British 2005 general election (N = 3,589)

Source – BES 2005 Pre-election

28.9% 20.4% 3.2% 0.3% 2.8% 1.7% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

Conservatives Labour Liberal

Democrats

UKIP BNP Other party

11.2% 30.6% 19.2% 32.5% 5.5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

strongly agree agree neither disagree strongly disagree

166 Figure 6.5 – Public perception of immigration contribution to cultural enrichment at the British 2005 general election (N = 3,589)

Source – BES 2005 Pre-election

Figure 6.6 – Public perception of immigration and criminality at the British 2005 general election (N = 1, 004)

Source – IPSOS-MORI Poll, 2005

4.6% 41.4% 21.8% 24.5% 6.2% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%

strongly agree agree neither disagree strongly disagree

Immigrants bring new ideas and cultures

16% 17% 19% 28% 20% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

strongly agree tend to agree neither tend to disagree strongly disagree

167 Hostility to immigration at the 2005 general election persisted at similar levels to the 2001

ballot despite the intense concern across the electorate. Therefore, the BNP failed to intensify

resentment towards immigration amongst the British electorate increasing the responsibility

of the British mainstream parties for the observed trends across public concern with

immigration. Moreover, the expansion of concern exceeded the expansion of electoral

support for the British ERP while the levels of hostility to immigration were similar to those

observed in 2001. The trends in public attitudes to immigration observed in 2005 should be

regarded as an outcome of the intense mainstream inter-party competition on immigration

and the hegemony of widespread abuse of the immigration system in mainstream political

elites’ discourse on immigration.

Overall, the BNP lacked impact on public attitudes to immigration at the 2005 general

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