It can be seen that this article approximates the CCP's rather than Moscow's stand towards the Sian Mutiny.
Thus, it is clear that although initially Mao had favoured a strong line of action against Chiang, he had, out of his own accord, resolved to work for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. Accordingly, Chou En-lai, in his interview with Chiang (December 24), pledged the CCP's sincere support for the Generalissimo as the national leader in
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a united resistance. After the crisis ended with the dramatic return of Chiang to Nanking accompanied by Chang HsUeh-liang on December 25, Mao declared on December 28 :
Chiang should remember that he owes his safe departure from Sian to the mediation of the Communist Party .... Throughout the incident, the Communist Party stood for a peaceful settlement and made every effort to that end, acting solely in the interests of national survival. Had the civil war spread and had Chang and Yang kept Chiang Kai-shek in custody for long, the incident could only have developed in favour of the Japan^^ imperialists and the Chinese 'punitive' group ...
Only when the CCP had betrayed no trace whatsoever to the public that it had once contemplated a stern policy towards Chiang Kai-shek could Mao
have uttered such a statement without fear of being accused of deceitfulness Similarly, only when the CCP itself had positively endorsed the policy
of peaceful settlement could P'eng Teh-huai disclaim as sheer "nonsense"
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CCP-KMT Negotiations Towards the United Front
For the time being,, the CCP was seriously concerned about the possibility of reprisals by the Nanking Government since Chiang Kai-shek was not signatory to any concrete agreement. This apprehension was enhanced by the return of Wang Ching-wei from Europe, the confinement of Chang Hsdeh-liang, and the temporary "retirement" of Chiang Kai-shek to Fenghua. In a secret directive to the FNSA, dated January 6, 1937, the Central Committee of the CCP called for the exposure of the
manoeuvres of the Wang Ching-wei and Ho Ying-ch'in group, which it identified as an "anti-Chiang and pro-Japanese" faction, and called
upon the national Salvationists to ally themselves with other KMT leaders 133
to press for the anti-Japanese alliance. The CCP itself, in a
circular telegram of January 9, called upon Chiang to come out of retire ment and control the situation since pro-Japanese elements were still ordering the troops to advance on Sian and threatening to renew the civil war. Couched in an urgent but civil tone, it stated that the present situation constituted "a serious test of Mr. Chiang's political integrity and of his own dictum that 'works require fidelity, acts require determination'".^^
The CCP's peace efforts gradually bore results. In mid-January, through his personal representative Chang Ch'ung, the Generalissimo
informed Chou En-lai that he would accept the CCP's proposal for cooperation 135 provided that it sincerely subordinated itself to Nanking's command. In early February, Chou conferred with Chiang at Fenghua and agreement was reached on the amount of stipend to be given to the Red Army as part of the National Army, with the first payment ($500,000) delivered
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shortly after. Following this meeting the war between the CCP and the KMT reached an impasse.
At the same time, the Party Central Committee circulated internal documents to explain to the Party rank-and-file the new situation and
clarify the Party leaderships position taken during the Sian Incident. One internal statement issued on February 15, 1937 stated that the Sian Incident could only lead to two possible courses of development: either civil war, which would benefit Japan and the traitors; or internal peace and unity, which would benefit the nation and facilitate the organization of united resistance against Japan. The Party, therefore,opted for the
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Release of Chiang", further denounced as utterly fallacious the view that with the death of Chiang or his further detention Nanking would immediately
collapse and a nation-wide united front.could be established. It stated that the Party’s primary objective was the establishment of the Anti- Japanese United Front and for this purpose the policy of peaceful solution
138 had to be adopted in order to "push" Chiang into the anti-Japanese camp.
Upon securing peace with the KMT, the CCP had to change its
decade-old insurrection policy to that of peaceful co-existence, if not out right . cooperation. As the KMT was the chief representative of the big bourgeoisie as well as the landlords, the CCP had to make corresponding adjustments in its policy towards the landlords . As was previously
the case, the initiative of the policy change came from 139
Moscow. According to a Soviet publication, which is verified by a 140
KMT intelligence report, the Secretariat of the ECCI dispatched a directive to the CCP on January 20, 1937, recommending further modifica
tion in the political and socio-economic structure of the Soviet areas for the purpose of facilitating the alliance with the KMT. While the independence and continued expansion of the Red Army was to be maintained, the CCP should henceforth agree to the changing of the names of the
Soviet Government and the Red Army, the cessation of the expropriation of the landlords, and place its emphasis on the struggle for "democracy" and "unity for resistance" in all its political activities.
These recommendations were reflected in a telegram forwarded by the Central Committee of the CCP to the K M T ’s Third Plenum which met on February 15, 1937. In exchange for the guarantee of democratic freedoms, immediate preparations for armed resistance against Japan and the improve ment of the livelihood of the people, the Chinese Communists agreed to
carry out the following four conditions: 1. to cease all efforts at over throwing the National Government; 2. to rename the Soviet Government as
the government of the "Special Region" and to redesignate the Red Army as a unit of the National Revolutionary Army, both of which would accept direct supervision from the Central Government and the Military Council of Nanking respectively; 3. to enforce in the special region a democratic system based on universal suffrage; and 4. to abolish confiscation of
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