The above regressions indicate a negative relationship between human rights and GDP as well as GDP per capita. However, this finding is inconsistent with existing research (Howard and Carey,
2004). Consequently, three corollaries test the interrelationship of the data. The first is that the higher
the GDP the greater de jure constitutional court autonomy. This builds on Sweet’s work (2005) arguing that markets value the autonomy of courts to protect their rights. Since this is measuring GDP rather than an ordinal representation thereof, a regression with panel-corrected standard errors is used. Since this method accommodates heteroscedasticity or the unequal variability inherent in comparing
economics and constitutions.39 Table 4.16 presents the results from the regression. Although the
attempt to compare GDP and de facto constitutional court autonomy results in large coefficients, it does indicate a statistically significant relationship for all variables. Both constitutional protections against the dissolution of the court and the finality of decisions have a negative relationship with GDP. As the R square value indicates this regression has little explanatory power since it accounts for only 4% of the variance.
39 Based on definitions and examples at Confusing Stats Terms Explained: Heteroscedasticity (Heteroskedasticity)
available at http://www.statsmakemecry.com/smmctheblog/confusing-stats-terms-explained-heteroscedasticity- heteroske.html accessed February, 27, 2014.
Table 4.16 Results of Regression of De Facto Constitutional Court Autonomy and GDP
Coefficient Error Significance
Dissolve -401656.0 54342.28 0.000 Remove 208356.3 18468.5 0.000 Budget 213936.9 32757.7 0.000 Procedures 17938.4 189196.17 0.015 Final -149699.5 18196.17 0.000 Access 29412.0 7865.737 0.000 Review 2959.8 10351.33 0.005 Constant 272624.3 16700.12 0.000 R Square 0.0487
Dependent Variable: GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-
world-table accessed January 14, 2014
Dissolve: Constitutional protection against dissolution of the constitutional court Removal: Constitutional protection against removal of constitutional court judges Budget: Constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court sets its own budget Procedures: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions N = 1019
The second corollary is that as democracy increases de facto constitutional court autonomy increases. This corollary tests the relationship between democracy and constitutional court autonomy. Table 4.17 presents the results of the regression. Three variables, protections against the removal of constitutional court judges (Remove), protections ensure that the constitutional court sets its own budget (Budget), and the finality of constitutional court decisions (Final) are not statistically significant. All other variables are significant at the p<.05 level. Two variables, the finality of constitutional court decisions (Final) and the timing of the court’s review (Review) have a negative relationship with Polity. The largest impact is protections against the dissolution of the constitutional court (Dissolve) where a one-point change in the variable’s value changes the polity score by almost 10 points. Broad access to the constitutional court (Access) also has a large impact where a one-point change increases the polity score by almost 7 points. The smallest impact is protection against removal of constitutional court judges (Remove) since a one-point change alters the polity score by less than on point. This model also has a limited impact since it explains only 5% of the variance.
Table 4.17 Results of Regression of De Facto Constitutional Court Autonomy
Coefficient Error Significance
Dissolve 9.916 1.284509 0.000 Remove 0.527 0.4905154 0.283 Budget 1.337 0.7221524 0.064 Procedures 3.305 0.5934971 0.000 Final -0.921 0.6379584 0.149 Access 6.873 0.7063744 0.000 Review -4.247 0.8213191 0.000 Constant 1.399 0.6295852 0.026 R Square 0.0504
Dependent Variable: Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm accessed January 14, 2014
Dissolve: Constitutional protection against dissolution of the constitutional court Removal: Constitutional protection against removal of constitutional court judges Budget: Constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court sets its own budget Procedures: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions N = 1019
The third corollary is that as de jure constitutional court autonomy increases de facto
constitutional court autonomy increases. This corollary looks at the relationship between de facto and de jure autonomy. Table 4.18 presents the results. Neither protections against dissolution of the constitutional court (Dissolve) nor the ability of the constitutional court to set its own procedures (Procedures) are statistically significant. All other variables are statistically significant at the p<.01 level. Only broad access to the constitutional court (Access) and the ability of the constitutional court to set its own budget (Budget) have a positive relationship with de facto constitutional court autonomy. All other variables have a negative relationship meaning the greater de facto constitutional court autonomy the less de jure constitutional court autonomy. However, none of the variables have a large impact since a one value change in any of the results in less than a one value change in de facto constitutional court autonomy. This model does have a modest contribution since it explains 12% of the total variance. Table 4.18 Regression of De Facto and De Jure Constitutional Court Autonomy
Coefficient Error Significance
Dissolve -0.086 0.1479495 0.560 Remove -0.092 0.0288185 0.001 Budget 0.421 0.058319 0.000 Procedures -0.014 0.0338358 0.687 Final -0.321 0.0394463 0.000 Access 0.582 0.0422848 0.000 Review -0.234 0.0248155 0.000 Constant 0.907 0.0287633 0.000 R Square 0.1281
Dependent Variable: De facto constitutional court autonomy
Dissolve: Constitutional protection against dissolution of the constitutional court Removal: Constitutional protection against removal of constitutional court judges Budget: Constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court sets its own budget Procedures: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions N = 1019