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Identity in social constructivism has usually been dealt by two overlapping approaches. One is from the psychological insights based on Tajfel’s social identity theory (Kowert 1998) and the other is from a sociological perspective based on Mead’s ‘symbolic interactionism’ (Wendt 1999). After taking these ideas into account, I will also add to them by conceptualizing India-Pakistan identities from their ideological parameters. The identity of an actor is defined as the “relatively stable, role specific

understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt 1994: 385). The expression of ‘state identity’ is being exhibited through the social practices of ‘key decision-makers’ (Jackson and Sorensen 2007: 172). Constructivists argue that the interests of a state originate from its identity. They consider human thought, ideas and norms crucial in making states’ identities and the present international order.

According to Giddens, identity is required whenever ‘existential anxiety’ threatens ‘ontological security’ (Giddens 1991). Ontological security gives oneself a sense of ‘fundamental’ security and ‘trust’ by making the world us around

comprehensible and avoiding threats to our ‘existential anxiety”(Giddens 1991: 38-39). Therefore, it can even be said that identity is a precursor to interests. In other words, the state identity is developed by elites through its cultural and social milieu and then its interests are configured according to this identity. The process of identity formation is ‘enacted domestically and projected internationally’ (Katzenstein 1996). A state may have many identities and it can assume an accomplished identity towards any state with which it is in conflict through its social practices. Wendt has categorized identities into two types: ‘type identities and role identities’(Wendt 1992). ‘Type identities’ may be shared by many states like a democratic state, liberal state, and Islamic state and so on. While ‘role identities’ represent the relationship between specific states. With regard to the relationship between India and Pakistan, both states have developed enemy ‘role identities’ toward each other. India’s identity as an enemy of Pakistan is acquired through its social practices towards Pakistan.

The development of a state’s identity is a social process contributed by socio- cultural norms of society. It is within this ‘social structure’ that national identities

develop (Kowert 1998). Since this ‘social structure’ is based on domestic social norms, the whole idea of an identity is endogenous and is prone to change (Kowert 1998). Identity develops from ‘domestic’ sources of ‘national ideologies’ which form state’s interests (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). The absence of problematizing a state’s identity in neo-realist assertions makes it difficult to understand Indian and Pakistani identity vis-à-vis each other. The domestic culture exhibits traces of Indian and Pakistani identities at two distinct levels. One is a dominant discourse of state identity which transpires through elites’ social practices, while the other is the subjugated popular identity defined by popular social practices which is hidden under the official identity discourse. Oddly enough, both these identity discourses are lumped together representing a homogenous state identity in the rationalists’ theories. These popular social practices will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. At this point, what is important to understand is that the identity of a state changes and whenever it changes, it produces shifts in the intersubjective understanding of states. The conflict between India and Pakistan is the result of such shifts which I will explain in following paragraphs.

Identities are not in flux all the time, nor are they ‘carved in stone’ (Wendt 1995: 71). McSweeney, a theorist in social constructivism, reprimanded Weaver and Buzan for taking a culturalist stance in the construction of state identity. According to McSweeney, identity is always in flux due to the changing norms of states (Roe 1999). Buzan and Weaver reject this charge claiming that if one keeps on studying identity which is in flux then there will be no finished product. They argue it is important to study identity at its stable points using recurrent social practices of a state as a “possible referent object for

security” (Buzan and Waever 1997: 243). Identities and interests can change over time which may produce ‘subtle shifts’ in the relationship of states (Walt 1998:8). Wendt uses the term ‘alter casting’ (Wendt 1992) to refer to the change of identities in a given

situation. This means that in an anarchic situation between two states A and B, if state A wants to change its identity towards state B, then it will send a gesture of good will to state B. This will be very novel to state B given the history of its relationship with state A. Now if state B accepts its new role and reciprocally sends a goodwill gesture to state A, then the identities of both states will change vis-à-vis each other. The change in Indian and Pakistani identities by their respective elites has been accomplished primarily

through ideological and psychological routes.

Pakistan and Indian identities have shown that they become less accommodative of each other whenever elites with strong ideological commitments come to power. Whenever ideologically committed political parties hold power in India they try to change the identity discourse resulting in violent shifts in the intersubjective behaviour of India and Pakistan. I propose that by closely studying the social practices of elites who are ideologically committed with in a stipulated time frame, we can discern the change in intersubjective behaviour which develops between these two states. It is important to understand this critical link between ideology and identity for the context of India and Pakistan security relations.

Identity and ideology are correlated. Pakistan is an ideological state that was established on the basis of the “Two Nation Theory”. Similarly, the presence of a mainstream ideologically committed Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] in India made it imperative to study both states identities through the ideological practices of their elites.

According to anthropologist Clifford Geertz, ideology has cultural connotations that make “incomprehensible social situations meaningful for those experiencing them”. Geertz believes that “ideologies are born and come into conflict where societies are in the throes of change” (Festenstein and Kenny 2005: 11). Identity dilemmas for a state

become acute primarily during two phases of state building. First, when a state achieves independence; and second, when there are sudden and violent shifts in the history of state building. In the history of the subcontinent both these stages converged at the time of the independence of India and Pakistan. There was an abrupt end to British colonial rule in India followed by the worst communal carnage in the region where millions of people lost their lives as a consequence. This created identity crises among people of both states who had previously lived together for centuries. The Pakistani elites used Islamic

ideology and Indo-centric approach for its identity. Islamic ideology has greater potential to fill the void of anxiety by acting as a ‘thick signifier’ to an identity (Huysmans 1998). Ideology in this sense is the ‘wider framework’ or an important ‘structural’ constraint which encompasses the identities of the two states, and without it we cannot understand the identities of India and Pakistan (Huysmans 1998). Among these norms, religious beliefs played the most dominant role in shaping the ideological beliefs of the two societies.

India has a secular identity, but since the 1990s ideological slogans of ‘Hindutva’ have started to be used in the Indian body politic. Religion in India and Pakistan is a way of life. Religious beliefs encompass all aspects and spheres of life. When religious slogans were first used to define distinct and separate identities of the Muslims and the Hindus in the subcontinent during the colonial phase, it automatically constructed two

communities. Religious norms have been largely employed by the elites of both states to construct the identities of both India and Pakistan. Some argue that religious norms tend to influence the social psychology of individuals more than other sources of norms (Seul 1999). In the case of Pakistan, religion is a source of stability for its ethnically,

linguistically and culturally disparate regions. The rationale for establishing the state of Pakistan was supported more by those provinces in India where Muslims were in the minority, than in the Muslim majority provinces which actually formed the territory of Pakistan in 1947 (Jalal 1985). The state itself was also sandwiched between two regions of East Pakistan and West Pakistan with a thousand miles of Indian territory separating them. Given this separation, there was a pressing need to form a common identity. Thus, there developed a strong nexus between state elites and the propagation of their ideology by the state regulated media machinery. This means that those who provide a ‘discourse’ can also present it as ‘true’ (Kinvall 2002). The elites developed a strong feeling of hatred based on the process of ‘Othering’ against the rival state in order to overcome threats to existential anxiety. Nationalism and religious ideological tools helped to fill this

existential void by providing a stable sense of identity for the people through their self claimed true narratives (Kinnvall 2004). But identity as a discourse does not end here as there are various transforming phases in social practices of the two states depending on the ideological commitments of the ruling elites in power which I will explain in detail in my empirical chapter on the ideology and identity of India and Pakistan [Chapter 4]. The ideological-identity route is one way of trying to ease the ‘existential anxiety’ of people in India and Pakistan. The other route is the psychological route.

The second discourse on identity resulted in a deliberate attempt by both states’ elites to create hostile binaries among them in order to fortify one’s own claims of self- identity. In psychology, the theory of social identity maintains that people belonging to a group always project a positive image of their group and associate negative attributes to another group in order to maintain feelings of ‘Us versus Them’ (Tajfel 1982). Social identity is defined by the ‘values’ or the norms of a group (Monroe, Hankin et al. 2000: 421). People in an in-group see their actions on the basis of situational logic, negotiations and so on but behaviour of an out-group is always being considered as homogenous, ‘intentional’ and directed against an in-group (Kowert 1998). It is called ‘attributional bias’ in psychology (Kowert 1998). The ‘concert’ of social constructivism and cognitive psychology depends on the role of the elites while explaining ‘national identity’ (Kowert 1998). The elites play on people’s attributional bias by ‘exaggerating’ (Kowert 1998) the differences between ‘Us versus Them’ (Lebow 2008). Moreover, the absence of the free movement of people across borders between India and Pakistan has created an identity void, which has helped the elites by giving them the opportunity to develop each other identities as ‘hostile binaries’ (Lebow 2008).

The commonality found among either the ideological or the psychological route is the role played by the elites in India and Pakistan. The elites’ ‘discursive practices’ have played a significant role in both states’ identity construction (Waever 1995). The social world is intersubjectively created through such ‘rhetorical practices’ (Waever 1995). Just a brief example can demonstrate this point. There were almost two simultaneous

announcements in India at the beginning of the year 2010; one was at the state’s elite level, while the other was at the societal level. At the elite level, the Indian outgoing army

chief General Kapoor proudly reiterated that the Indian army was ready to simultaneously cope with twin threats from China and Pakistan. However, at the societal level, the

people of both countries had launched ‘Aman ki Asha’ [A desire for peace] through the largest mass media groups in the two states [see Chapter 1]. It was at this level that the majority of people from both states voted for peaceful relations. Hence, having an

identity is not the problem as it explains ‘how a self’ can sustain changes throughout ones lifetime (Lapid and Kratochwil 1997: 206).5 It only becomes a problem when deliberate attempts are undertaken to develop identities as the in-group versus the out-group. These social practices cannot be understood from a strictly rationalist [neo-realist and neo- liberalism] standpoint because these theories are “at base about redefining identity and interest” (Wendt 1997). The attempt to understand states’ identities leads to an

intersubjective relationship among states. In my next sub-section, I will examine what is meant by this intersubjectivity and how it develops in India Pakistan relations.