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Communication, according to Grice (1989), is essentially cooperative. However,

cooperation, as Origgi and Sperber assert, is “vulnerable to free-riding, which, in the case of communication, takes the form of manipulation and deception” (2000, p. 161).

Therefore, for communication to remain advantageous, as Sperber et al. argue, humans have developed a “suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance, targeted at the risk of being misinformed by others” (2010, p. 359), i.e. a defence mechanism against the risk of deception. Epistemic vigilance is a cognitive mechanism that caters for the

calibration of trust towards the source and filters incoming content. Epistemic vigilance, as Cruz (2012) states, denotes a “captious alertness to the believability and reliability” (p. 368) of the communicated message and to the one who dispenses it. Epistemic vigilance directed at the source checks for evidence related to the trustworthiness of the speaker in terms of competence, benevolence, credibility, and reliability. As for the content,

epistemic filters monitor the logical consistency of the message and the degree of its coherence with addresses’ background knowledge and beliefs (Sperber et al., 2010).

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The believability of the newly communicated message, as Sperber et al. (2010) iterate, relies on a subset of background knowledge and beliefs that are activated during comprehension. The authors maintain that the “same background information which is used in the pursuit of relevance can also yield an imperfect but cost-effective epistemic assessment” (p. 374). In this respect, the accessed subset of contextual information (selected through the mechanisms of the CSC), which is devoid of any critical or contradictory information, forms the basis for meaning derivation and evaluation processes (Oswald & Lewinski, 2014, p. 323–325).48 Recall that for an utterance to be relevant in a context of existing beliefs, it has to yield one of the following contextual effects: acceptance of contextually implied beliefs, modification of the strength of beliefs or revision of existing beliefs. The assessment of this inferential output leads to various judgements depending on whether or not the recipient trusts the communicator.

Assessment can lead to one of these possibilities: (i) rejection of new beliefs, if the source is not trusted; (ii) correction of existing beliefs, if these are not held with much

conviction, given that the addressee acknowledges the communicator’s competence and authority; and (iii) revision of background beliefs or reducing confidence in the source if the addressee has strong convictions in both (Sperber et al., 2010).

Following this line of thought, Oswald and Hart (2013) argue that addressees’ failure to spot and assess the fallaciousness of ‘source-related fallacies’, such as ad populum, ad verecundiam and ad hominem, can, on the one hand, be attributed to the type of cognitive

48_{This view is based on the mechanisms of the argumentative module, proposed by Mercier & Sperber}

(2009, 2011), which plays a role in the production and evaluation of arguments. At the production level, the module allows communicators to construct arguments so as to satisfy or exploit addressees’ epistemic filters. At the evaluation level, it is responsible for evaluating the validity of the arguments adduced, i.e. identifying the type of relation between premises and conclusion (Oswald & Hart, 2013).

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constraints that these fallacies exert on argument processing, which prevent addressees from accessing critical content and hence increase acceptability. On the other hand, these fallacies manage to circumvent addressees’ epistemic vigilance by providing apparently satisfactory evidence, therefore preventing addressees from questioning the credibility and/or reliability of the source to whom the information is attributed (ibid.). In ad

populum and ad verecundiam, as Oswald and Hart (ibid.) elucidate, the epistemic strength of the conclusion is derived from the perceived trustworthiness of the source and from the widespread endorsement of the belief, respectively. In contrast, ad hominem works by inducing addressees to reject the conclusion by casting doubt on the legitimacy and credibility of the source. Source-related fallacies manage to satisfy addressees’ epistemic filters by presenting supporting evidence for the claims advanced, such that the cognitive system is not alerted to invest the more complex processing mechanisms that could point to their fallaciousness.

These fallacies are examples of accepting claims based on the perceived trustworthiness and credibility of a third party. A revision of beliefs is triggered when new information is inconsistent or incoherent with contextually activated beliefs or existing background knowledge. This is because, when these “inconsistencies and incoherencies occur, they trigger a procedure wholly dedicated to such assessment” (Sperber et al., 2010, p. 376). It follows that in cases where the communicator suspects that her addressee will not accept her words out of confidence and trust but will, as Sperber et al. (ibid.) elucidate, exercise some vigilance to check whether her representation coheres with his own beliefs, she then must satisfy or overcome the epistemic defences of her addressee in order to convince him.

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When an addressee is reluctant to accept a representation that is incoherent with his background beliefs, the communicator has to induce him to access less highly activated beliefs that weigh in favour of the representation if these are taken into account (ibid.). To put it differently, the communicator will induce the addressee to expand his activated set of contextual assumptions or background knowledge so as to include a set of beliefs that cohere with her claims. To this end, as Sperber et al. (ibid.) argue, the communicator can remind the addressee of these background beliefs or provide other information that the addressee will accept out of trust.

Perceiving a source as trustworthy means that addressees regard what this source is telling them as epistemically strong (Oswald & Lewinski, 2014). It might be safe, then, to deduce a reciprocal relation between the degree of trust ascribed to the communicator and the believability of claims: the more an addressee trusts the speaker, the less vigilant he tends to be, and the less trustworthy is a speaker, the more vigilant her addressee tends to be. One implication of this line of thought for my thesis is related to the nature of the audience that Nasrallah addresses. Nasrallah is primarily interested in convincing the 14th of March audience, who are expected to be reluctant towards accepting his claims out of trust – presumably, due to the actions and decisions that Nasrallah has taken against them and their leadership, and which have negatively affected them.49 Therefore, their

epistemic defences are expected to check whether his justifications and claims are consistent and cohere with their existing beliefs and convictions. To get past these

49_{In pragma-dialectical terms, Nasrallah is addressing primary and secondary audiences. The secondary}

audience encompasses those who directly affiliate with Hizbollah as well as supporters and sympathisers from different political groups. However, due to the nature of the charismatic bond that relates this audience to Nasrallah, they tend to take his words on trust (see Chapter, section 3.1). Meanwhile, much discursive work is needed to convince the opposition’s audience, Nasrallah’s primary audience, that the actions and decisions taken against them are acts of heroism and patriotism (as the analysis will show).

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defences, as I claim, Nasrallah attempts to induce the audience to expand the activated set of contextual assumptions in order to make them access a less highly activated set, which consists of undisputable and generally accepted background knowledge and beliefs that cohere with his justifications.

At this point, I believe, it is possible to suggest a relation between the construction of charisma and epistemic vigilance. More specifically, salvation/ rescue narratives (see Chapter 2, section 3.1), which are part and parcel of charismatic discourses and via which actions or decisions already taken are reframed in terms of rescuing and saving a

community, might provide the link. In other words, in his attempt to justify past controversial actions or decisions, Nasrallah reframes them via salvation or rescue narratives in order to make them cohere with generally accepted moral values and nationalist views, despite the opposition audience’s beliefs to the contrary.

The above discussion is related to vigilance towards content. In what follows, I elaborate on the mechanisms of vigilance directed at the source. Epistemic trust directed at the source can be driven by general impressions of trustworthiness, such as the

communicator’s reputation, or by context-specific considerations (Sperber et al., 2010). The latter means that the allocation of trust, as Sperber et al. (ibid., p. 369–370) explicate, depends on the topic, the nature of the audience and the circumstances. A communicator is deemed reliable and trustworthy if she meets two conditions: competence and

benevolence. This means that the calibration of trust is a function of the communicator’s character (ibid.), inasmuch as epistemic filters do not provide evidence that points to the contrary. Sperber et al. (ibid.) also note that granting trust to the source of information can be the result of a successful attempt to “project an image of trustworthiness” (ibid., p.

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370) that is discursively mediated. The assessment of trust is, therefore, a function of the discursive construction of ethos.

Aristotle (1959) considers ethos to be one of the influential means of persuasion – along with logos and pathos – and defines it in terms of the moral character of the speaker. In the Aristotelian tradition, the moral character of the speaker is primarily constructed through speech, while reputation and authority are considered ‘extrinsic’ to the art of persuasion (Zmavc, 2012). It follows that ethos is discursively constructed, whereby a trustworthy image of the speaker as benevolent, virtuous and competent is reflected in discourse. It is through discourse that a speaker constructs a “kind of a mask which is socially acceptable and even desirable” (Danler, 2013, p. 40), even if it does not represent the speaker’s actual personality (Zmavc, 2012). It seems that the concept of ‘image’ is the modern equivalent of Aristotle’s ethos (Szczepanska-Wloch, 2013).

From a different perspective, Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005) argue that the construction of ethos is not only contingent on the creation of the speaker’s image, but also dependent on the speaker’s stance and her level of engagement with the audience. Ethos, then, is not a “fixed set of traits” (Danler, 2013, p. 41) but is, rather, a matter of how these can be differentiated to best suit the topic and audience demands (Szczepanska-Wloch, 2013). According to Danler (2013), ethos is the result of linguistic-discursive construction, whereby ideology, religion, culture and philosophical trends, among others, form the content of discursive texts that eventually convey the facts, truths, values and assumptions of the respective culture.

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Two implications can be derived from this view. First, the construction of ethos is inherently linked to the discursive construction of charisma (see Chapter 2, section 3.1, 3.2). This is because the construction of a proper image (personal presence or magnetism) is considered one of the traits that define a charismatic personality (Eatwell, 2006a). The validation of charisma partially relies on projecting an appropriate image of the self, which, according to Wodak (2011), is realized through footing and narrating (see Chapter 2, section 3.2). Through the construction of charisma, Nasrallah aims to provide the audience with palpable evidence that attests to his trustworthiness and competence (see below) in order to satisfy audiences’ epistemic defences directed towards the source. Another aim is to provide the audience with evidence that satisfies their vigilance directed towards the message. Both aims are realised through the construction of charisma. The first objective is achieved via the construction of a proper image, whereas the second is achieved via rescue or salvation narratives.50

The second implication is related to the linguistic means via which the construction of ethos is mediated in discursive texts, i.e. the type of linguistic evidence that constructs the image of the source as trustworthy, competent, and benevolent. Therefore, the next section outlines the linguistic means that speakers employ to influence addressees’ epistemic stance.

50_{This is not to say that coherence is the only criterion for acceptability. The members of the 14}th _{of March}

audience are also expected to check the logical consistency of his claims and arguments. However, I assume that coherence will most likely be the overriding criterion for believability, as Nasrallah’s speeches are attempts to respond to opponents’ criticisms, counter-claims and arguments which underscore the inappropriateness and undesirability of Nasrallah’s actions and decisionsbecause they destabilize and jeopardize Lebanon’s security.

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