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Confucius was often accused of advocating some sort of a more or less insubstantial moral formalism based on an unnecessarily complicated system of rituals and it was considered as a system that restricts freedom instead of supporting it. This accusation was made especially in contrast to Daoism, and it is indeed not easy to absolve every cultural phenom-enon in the Chinese history that justified its validity and existence in reference to Confucius, from this suspicion. I would even doubt that the li of Zhou need to be considered in our current debates. But the philo-sophical fidelity requests us to distinguish between the original theory that was advocated by Confucius himself and the tradition of Confucian-ism, and to consult Confucius’ own attitude to this topic. In reference to the Analects III, 26 we can easily argue that Confucius himself con-demns the idea of an insubstantial moral formalism:
“The Master said, ‘High station filled without indulgent generosity;
ceremonies performed without reverence; mourning conducted with-out sorrow;— wherewith should I contemplate such ways?’”
According to this, he definitely dislikes the practice of rituals without the adequate attitude, especially, as we might add, without the most substan-tial of all ethical principles, ren. The execution of rituals must therefore be based on an appropriate attitude and without it the whole ritual would
degenerate to a mere spectacle and even to a charade. Thus we conclude that he advocates a theory of the appropriate figuration of values in our practice. In reference to the Analects III, 3:
“The Master said, ‘If a man be without the virtues proper to human-ity, what has he to do with the rites of propriety? If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with music?’”
we can incorporate the principle ren into our argumentation and con-clude that the whole attitude that forms the groundwork of the appropri-ate practice of the li culminappropri-ates in ren and that therefore ren represents the principle and source of every single moral action. Without ren, the moral practice is impossible and of course the practice of the Rituals (li) is insubstantial. In this case the li serve to the figuration anything. It is therefore a key concern of Confucius to teach and advocate the insepa-rability of ren and li.
The main difference to the daoist understanding of the ideal human attitude, wu-wei, dos not at all consist in the putative rejection of this concept by Confucius, but rather in the fact that, probably in concor-dance with Lao Dan, but in contrast to Taishi Dan, he argues that only within a society, where virtue and duty, ren and li, and thus the substance and form of morality have evolved to their ultimate perfection, a placid action such as wu-wei is able to provide and maintain morality, the so-cial order, and freedom. But as soon as these forms turn into disorder, or as soon as they are executed without the appropriate attitude and without the rootage in ren, wu-wei becomes inapt to maintain order and avert chaos. Confucius’ main objection to the daoist theory of wu-wei is after all based on a certain understanding of education and the idea that the moral substance cannot evolve to its full potential without the appropriate form. Thus, if ren represents the embodiment of the moral substance, and the li represent the embodiment of the moral form, the moral practice must be based upon the unity of ren and li. Confucius is deeply convinced that morality is reliant on its appropriate form and that the moral principle, ren, cannot find its expression in the moral practice randomly. The articulation of the underlying moral principle within the reality of the moral practice is bound to the idea that there is a privileged, necessary, natural expression of morality, which is the system of the rituals of Zhou, li. As a matter of fact, I think that we need to face the authentically philosophical challenge to understand that for certain rea-sons that are rooted in the human nature, “ren” must be the ground of “li”.
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From Guo Yi I learned that there is a continuity in the development of the underlying principle of ancient Chinese ethics. It was originally be-lieved that the principle was justice (yi) but in the Zhou Dynasty justice was replaced by the rituals (li) which evolved to the unity of ren and li in Confucius’ philosophy and the Four Beginnings in the teachings of Meng Tse (ren, yi, li, zhi). The evolution of Chinese ethics in the transition from the philosophy of Zhou to the philosophy of Confucius consists in the establishment of a new principle of ethics based on the unity of ren and li and we must try to understand why, according to Confucius, it is necessary for the li to be rooted in ren.
8. REN (仁)
In my opinion, the concept “ren” does not necessarily need to be associ-ated to the Western concept of humanity. It suffices to emphasize the fact that ren stands for at least two people being together, which is the underlying figure in the theory of recognition (Hegel and Fichte), en-counter (Martin Buber), and substantial communication (Karl Jaspers).
Fichte and Hegel were the first Western philosophers who devel-oped a sophisticated theory of recognition based on the encounter of two free, self-conscious agents. Martin Buber refers to a similar figure by the concept of the “encounter” in “I and Thou”14 and Karl Jaspers specifies it within the theory of the “substantial communication” (ge-haltvolle Kommunikation).15 Thus the idea of at least two people coming together to build a unity is not only the origin of the idea of a family, but furthermore the offspring of the specifically human practice, hu-man freedom, and huhu-man virtue, which is, in the first place, based on the social interaction. But ren is insufficiently analyzed, if we emphasize only its moral dimension. Its moral dimension is actually based on the underlying experience and practice of the encounter: two people who turn to each other and come together establish a unity, com-unity, and begin to share values, which is the offspring of society and all the options it can provide for the individual self-determination. From the theory of recognition we know that two people together are very different from two 14 Buber, M. 1923: Das dialogische Prinzip. Ich und Du. (I and Thou). In:
Werke I. Schriften zur Philosophie, 5. Aufl. Heidelberg 1984.
15 See: Jaspers, K. 1932: Philosophie. Zweiter Band: Existenzerhellung. Vierte Auflage. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1973 (Chapter on Communication)
people alone and that the concept “we” contains much more then “me and the others” because “me and the others” can culminate into the idea of “us” only as a result of our free commitment. Thus the encounter is a necessary condition and original source of shared values. And these shared values find their privileged form within the system of the social codes. So, if I had to approach ren from the point of view of the European tradition, I would in the first place refer to Martin Buber’s “encounter”
or Karl Jaspers’ “substantial communication”. If I had to address it by a general, non-philosophic concept, I would first of all choose “commu-nity” and if I had to describe its structure philosophically, I would choose the approach of “recognition” as advocated by Hegel.
The secondary meaning of “ren”, that contains its ethical and educa-tional elements, and to which we usually refer as “humanity” is actually based on the encounter, and since, according to Confucius, ren and li represent an inseparable unity, the moral implications should rather be approached by an analysis of the underlying values within the system of the rituals, respectively the social codes. This is actually an essential element of his theory of education. Education is certainly based upon the transitory moment of getting in touch with the rituals, gaining the know-ledge of virtue, but it evolves to the practice of these rituals based on the appropriate attitude and thus also to the understanding of the underlying values. And furthermore it leads to the internalization of these values, which integrates the individual into the community that shares these values. Without the knowledge of the rituals an individual is unable to exercise them properly. Without the appropriate attitude the rituals are meaningless. Without study the individual will never understand the underlying values. And without the internalization of these values, the individual will never accept them as an expression of his own volitional self-determination. This is why the process of education is crucial to the establishment of society and we might conclude that the internalization of values and the ability to share values represent an offspring, a figura-tion of freedom.
9. CONCLUSION
In sum, I emphatically support Guo Yi’s idea that we need to establish a new spiritual home for all human beings in the world and provide the groundwork that enables us to develop the whole potential of our nature.
But in the tradition of the classical German philosophy I need to
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phasize the importance sophisticated theory of freedom or action. In this sense freedom means the ability to determine one’s own volition on the basis of classifiable principles and ends and to realize these ends in the lifeworld. The manifestation of our values is a product of our interaction because we recognize and manifest values by actions. This transition from a mere verbal commitment to an object or phenomenon of the social interaction is what I denote as figuration, emergence of values.
And if the exercise of our volitional self-determination represents the manifestation of values within the sphere of the social interaction, and if the volitional self-determination represents freedom, I conclude that our social practice represents a figuration of freedom. This figuration is based on the specifically human ability to build communities, share values, and thereby establish a society that provides options for the individual self-determination by participation. I use the concept “figuration” to em-phasize the nascent character of the society and the concept “encounter”, which I associate to ren (仁), in reference to our ability to come together, build communities, and share values.
PAUL COBBEN (TILBURG)