La Tabla 3 presenta la distribución de proyectos y su coste por la duración de los proyectos
Medida 3.3. Equipamiento científico-tecnológico. Zona Permanente
Montagu forgot that these eastern arms of the Himalaya were so
difficult of access that any foreigi interference here was not easy
^Hirtzel*s note to Ritchie, 26 April 1912: P.S.S.F.Yol.l4(l910), 1493/1912.
Montagu's note to Ritchie, 1 Mayl9 1 2: P.S.S.F.Vol. 14 (1910), 1493/1912.
from the plains.
Though the proposal of a military police post in the tribal country ias thus set aside, it was shortly revived in a different form. A trade post in the hills was suggested for two purposes.
First, it would facilitate an uninterrupted trade between the hills and the plains. The Abor expedition had broken the power of those villages which had so long denied access to the plains to all the villages lying behind them. It was now expectedd that by providing these in-lying villages with a free access to trade with the plains, the proposed trade post would greatly improve relations with the
tribes. Secondly, it would help the government to maintain a visible presence of British authority among the Abors so that they might not forget their promise, and deal expeditiously with any breach of the orders which the offending tribesmen had promised to obey at the time of the expedition The post was to be held by a guard of 100 military police for at least several months in the year. As to the site of the post, the Chief Commissioner, Sir Archdale Earle, seems to have preferred Yambung which was about ten miles further
intothe hills beyond Rotung, at the head of a newly built bridle track, and very near Kebang which had formerly interfered with trade.^
^Assam to India, Foreign Dept., No. 69-P.T., 7 July 1912: P.S.S.F. Vol. 14 (1910), 3057/1912.
Montagu opposed the proposal, since he did not see any distinction, except perhaps of language, between the earlier proposal of a police outpost and the present proposal of a trade post which was to be held by an armed guard. He does not seem
to have been far from the truth if we remember that the guard was to be as large as 100 rifles for keeping open the insignificant Abor trade. He seems to have thought that a post in the Abor country was not essential to maintain an uninterrupted flow of trade with the plains, since what the Abors wanted was to trade in government territory "rather than in theirs".^ But he overlooked the fact that trade in British territory was not possible if the routes in the hills were interfered with. Neither Ritchie nor Crewe would now agree with Montagu. Crewe thought that Montagu's
stand was tantamount to the unacceptable demand that the Abor country should remain "for ever inviolable and unvisited even for trading". He would not agree with Montagu that the real motive behind the proposal was "to plant a police post leading to admini-
stration under a fictitious name". Ritchie's observation, however, betrays that Montagu was right in his essential objection that the
trade post was a guise for a police post. Ritchie told Crewe, "I
■^Montagu's notes to Crewe, 4 and 11 September 1912: P.S.S.F.Vol.l4(l910), 3057/1912.
am disposed to think that if the original proposalfor a post at Rotung had been in the present form and urged for the reasons now- given, they would have been approved".^ Crewe approved the tradb post but subject to some limitations which Montagu had suggested to distinguish it clearly from a police past. These limitations were: firstly, the post was not to be considered in any sense as an administrative or political step; secondly, the armed guard would be there only so long as thejpost was open, and that their sole duty would be tikeep the road open.^ Pending the decision
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on a final site for the post, it was temporarily opened at Rotung. This trade post was soon found inadequate to keep trade
opeh dji the Abor country. When in the open season of 1912-13 Dundas accompanied the Abor Survey Party, as Political Officer, he faced the "barely veiled hostility" of the tribesmen. The principal cause of the hostility seems to have been the same old jealously guarded monopoly of trade with the plains whichwas thought to have been removed by the destruction of the power and prestige of Kebang. Dundas found that the fall of Kebang had removed only one trade block but others had been left intact. He thought iilnecessary to
eliminate them. The resulting free trade trould, as he seems to have
^Ritchie's note to Crewe, 12 September 1912: P.S.S.F.Vol. 14 (1910), 3456/1912. My underlining.
"Montagu1s note to Crewe, 16 September 1912: P.S.S.F.Vol. 14 (1910), 30 57/l912. Crewe's tel. to Hardinge, 3 October 1912: P.S.S.F.
Vol. 14 (1916), 5800/1912.
thought, bring the government in close contact with the hillmen - a necessary precondition for any exercise of a loose political
control. So he proposed a scheme of road construction in the hills. The most important part of this scheme was to extend the existing bridle track from Yambung northward until at least Riga was reached by building one stage every year, and to push the trade post ahead
simultaneously with the extension of the track. Until Riga was reached, no semblance of the government's control could be claimed. Dundas believed that such a road through the Abor country would,
apart from removing trade barriers, have a great political effect on the hillmen. He even wanted the government to bring the important Padam villages, which had cultivation in government territory, under direct administration and connect them with the outposts at Pasighat and Nizamghat by a good bridle track. ^ Dundas1 suggestion was in line witli Bentinck's made in April 1912, that the line of
least resistance for exercising political control would be to estab lish trade posts along with the extension of roads inthe tribal
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country. In addition to Dundas' plan, the Chief Commissioner pro posed that the Political Officer must visit a number of the more powerful Abor villages with a strong escort to make than realise the
Vol. 28 (1913), 994/19X3.
For the proposal of posts in the tribal country, also see Lamb, The McMahon Line, pp. 363-64.
■^Dundas' note, 17 February 1914: P.S.S.F.Vol.28 (1913), 4745/1914; Assam to India, Foreign Dept., No. 2076P., 7 May 1914: P.S.S.F. Vol. 28(1913), 4745/1914.
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